Why Peace With Russia Will Prove To Be So Difficult

Over the last few days I’ve returned to a familiar theme—the difficulty the Anglo-Zionist led West will find in coming to a negotiated end to its war on Russia. Cf. especially:

Russians: We're Not Satisfied

What Is Russia?

The fundamental problem, of course, is that the Anglo-Zionist led West still wants to somehow defeat and subjugate Russia, not negotiate a peaceful and reasonable end to its war on Russia. Trump is a bit of an exception to this, in the sense that he appears to be aware that continuation of this disastrous war imperils virtually his entire MAGA agenda. Still, far from being an easy conflict to resolve—recall Trump’s famous “end it in 24 hours” gag, for domestic political consumption—Trump is likely to find this nut a very tough one to crack.

Thomas Fazi has an excellent article at Unherd addressing this entire issue. While he covers basically the same ground as we have here, the article is very well thought out and well worth the time to read it:

Why Trump won’t end the war in Ukraine

Russia has the upper hand

The basic problem is that you can’t win a war through negotiations if you’re suffering a programmatic defeat on the battlefield. That’s the position Trump finds himself in. He’s been trying to construct a narrative of himself as the benevolent uninvolved deal maker who wants to put an end to the slaughter on a fair basis. The problem with that is that the Russians are fully aware of Trump’s past role in preparing for the war—no reasonable person can expect Putin to swallow Trump’s claim that he never wanted an actual war. The facts are facts, and the best face the Russians are likely to put on Trump’s protestations is that Trump never should have allowed himself to be buffaloed into preparing for a war on Russia, but that’s water over the dam. As matters now stand, the Russians are also fully aware that Trump is the one who needs peace, because the Anglo-Zionists are losing badly. They know that if Trump had inherited a won war he wouldn’t be angling for a deal. As a result the Russians have flat out rejected Trump’s narrative, and that means that any deal will involve a Trump climbdown.

Here’s how Fazi frames the fundamental difficulty, with an appeal to John Mearsheimer:

The main hurdle is that the West’s relentless push for an impossible Ukrainian victory against a much stronger opponent has strengthened Russia’s hand. By rejecting earlier opportunities for negotiation — when Ukraine was in a stronger position — Western leaders have allowed Russia to consolidate its military gains, leaving little incentive for Putin to compromise.

In this sense, the belief that the West can achieve at the negotiating table what it failed to secure on the battlefield is, as political realist John Mearsheimer has argued, a dangerous illusion. “To win at the negotiating table, you have to win on the battlefield,” he explained, “and it’s the Russians who are winning on the battlefield.” Putin’s own words at his end-of-year conference underscore this: “The Russian army is advancing along the entire front line… We are moving towards resolving the main objectives that we set at the beginning of the military operation.”

Now, while Putin doesn’t necessarily have much of an incentive to negotiate, in terms of Realpolitik, he has made it clear that he is quite open to honest negotiations—not “empty talk”. However, as we have stressed, Putin’s terms were laid out in writing in his two draft treaties. By presenting written draft treaties Putin was making a point of drawing a line behind which he would not retreat—a line for the benefit of the Russian people. Putin was insisting on a “global” settlement with the United States, and at the same time he was telling the Russian people that he would accept nothing less if matters came to negotiations. Of course, that was also a message to the Anglo-Zionists setting out Putin’s bottom line. Meanwhile, the Anglo-Zionists remain in denial about their disastrous lost war—the meaning of Trump’s proposals is that they’re an attempt to avoid facing the consequences of losing a war they started. And the Russians are having none of that.

Fazi, without reference to the draft treaties, treats Trump’s proposals briefly—they’re clear attempts to avoid the reckoning that comes with losing a war:

Trump's vision of a “quick fix” in the form of a ceasefire or truce, pending a more comprehensive agreement, is also unlikely to succeed. ... Such proposals all but guarantee Moscow’s resistance to any short-term, half-botched agreements.

However, again without reference to the draft treaties, Fazi outlines the resolution that Trump is trying to avoid, along with the rest of the Anglo-Zionist led West:

The deeper challenge here lies in navigating the profound mistrust between Russia and the West. This demands a fundamental shift in the West’s approach: abandoning its (failed) attempts to isolate and weaken Russia, and taking genuine steps to address Russia’s security concerns. This is why Putin has emphasised that a comprehensive peace deal must include the removal of all sanctions against Russia.

Achieving such a geopolitical grand bargain, though, would require an all-out paradigm shift, in which the West relinquishes its pursuit of dominance and recognises the multipolar nature of global power dynamics. Yet, no Western leader — including Trump — seems prepared to make this leap. ... There is little to suggest a fundamental departure from the US’s current strategy of aggressively countering the decline of American global dominance through diplomatic, economic and even military pressure.

Trump's foreign policy picks reinforce this view. For example, Keith Kellogg, his choice for special envoy to Ukraine, co-authored a report earlier this year arguing that it is in America’s interest to ensure a “defeated and diminished Russia”, and that the next Trump administration should continue to arm Ukraine ...

The move from ensuring a “defeated and diminished Russia” to the negotiating table probably will require a bit of groveling. Fazi is right. As I wrote yesterday, Americans have no use for losers, and especially not big talking ones. Trump knows that. And he knows that the moment he attempts to move from a “frozen conflict” to an honest addressing of Russia’s very real security concerns—centuries old concerns—he will be subjected to withering attacks from all sides:

... the real problem will be selling an agreement on Russia’s terms inside the US, where he is likely to face massive pushback from the pro-war establishment, including the neocons in his own party. They will try to weaponise Trump's “America First” rhetoric against him by claiming — as they are already doing — that this would be a “humiliation” for the US.

Much could change in the next month or two, but as matters now stand Trump is in a difficult position, with little wiggle room. Nor can he expect much support from the Euros (although, again, much could change, possibly quickly):

Meanwhile, NATO's general thrust seems unaffected by Trump's impending return, suggesting that it answers more to the US military-security apparatus than it does to the White House. ...

I’m not entirely sure what is comprehended in Fazi’s choice of words—”the US military-security apparatus”; I might have opted for Deep State or Ruling Elite—but I think we get the basic concept: a US president has limited control over national security these days. At any rate, Fazi’s conclusion is difficult to argue with:

The path forward remains fraught with obstacles. Putin’s conditions for peace are uncompromising, Western leaders remain entrenched in their positions, and Europe’s hawkish stance only complicates matters further. For Trump, the challenge will be twofold: overcoming domestic resistance to concessions and navigating the geopolitical minefield of competing interests. While his desire to end the war is commendable, the complexities of achieving a lasting resolution will demand far more than quick fixes or bold proclamations.

On a closely related matter, I came across a tweet that presents a French military analyst’s view on NATO’s future. His idea is that NATO may not have a future. Once again, the corrolary seems to be, why would Putin want to throw a lifeline to a drowning NATO?

East_Calling @East_Calling

NATO is facing the fate of the collapse of the USSR due to the lack of geopolitical potential, French military expert Regis Chamagne told Stratpol:

"My forecast is that in 5 years there may be neither NATO nor the EU. Yes, NATO will try to weaken Russia on its periphery, harm it in the Middle East, but globally the North Atlantic Alliance has no potential."

[Follow the link below for Chamagne’s bio]

He is not the only one saying that. We'll see for how long the NATO parasite will be able to maintain itself. What will come in its place? Maybe, some smaller, more flexible alliances, like JEF, but it is hard to evaluate their potential now.

In general, I would not be too optimistic, or say that when NATO ends all problems cease to exist the same day - the world is going to be even more turbulent in upcoming years. And here I trust Putin in his assessment - 20 years of instability.

…

5:44 AM · Jan 2, 2025

Onward to more related matters! Alastair Crooke had his usual stimulating discussion with Judge Nap today, in a way very reminiscent of some things I’ve recently written. The Judge began by asking Crooke about Russia, and it’s that part that I’ve transcribed. Most of it is self explanatory, but there are at least two matters that I want to address.

First, Crooke speaks of a “corporatist” vision for a new America, run by the technocratic elites—a technocracy to replace democracy. Corporatism has a fairly specific meaning which is usually associated with some form of Fascism:

Corporatism is a political system of interest representation and policymaking whereby corporate groups, such as agricultural, labour, military, business, scientific, or guild associations, come together and negotiate contracts or policy (collective bargaining) on the basis of their common interests. The term is derived from the Latin corpus, or "body".

I think the popular term used in Ruling Class circles today for corporate groups is “stakeholders.” Just be aware of what Crooke is referring to.

The second matter arises from the first. Crooke then refers to “identitarian politics” following upon the loss of an American national culture. What I take his meaning to be is that the technocratic elites, the ruling class, have deliberately sought to suppress traditional values laden traditional culture with identities based on various interest groups. The idea is that the chosen representatives of those designated interest groups would haggle over policy. Note that this also assumes a sort of puppet show, with the Ruling Elite largely choosing which groups are worthy of representation and which are not. That, to a great extent, is what censorship and the control of information flow by the technocratic elites is all about. And if you think that this explains the ruling class allergy to Trump and populism generally, well, you’re on to something.

Putin, of course, sees all this. The Russians generally see this, and that’s not the future they want for Russia. They want a Russian future for Russia. The technocrats of the EU, by contrast, have jumped on this chance to redefine European national identities into simply ‘non-Russian’, a manufactured identity largely devoid of content. Much as Progs talk about “who we are as Americans” without ever specifying who we are—it’s always a work in progress, to be decided by the ruling elites as the occasion demands.

Here we go:

[Russia is] a complex issue. It really goes back to Byzantium, to really understand what Russians mean by ‘Russia’. But that [the emerging Russian identity with its past] is taking place and shape, so I would say it's stronger than it's ever been. I think what's facing them, and the challenge that they see ahead, is basically the challenge of how to deal with the United States in this coming period when Trump will become president and will seek a discussion with Russia and with Putin. I think it's going to be difficult, and I've said that before, because firstly I don't think there is a deep understanding [on the American side] about what Russia sees as a solution to Ukraine. It's very clear what Russia thinks about Ukraine. It's not interested in a frozen conflict, any of those things. What it is interested in is a permanent solution to Ukraine. By that they mean a wider, a big picture talk with Trump--a big picture, not just the minutiae of Ukraine. But how to come to some sort of understanding between Central Asia--the heartland of Asia--and with the Western Atlanticist group of countries? Where does it stop? Where does this whole process--the expansion of NATO that was promised at the time of the the fall of the Berlin Wall would never move forward--how far does it move forward? [Does NATO] really have the right to say, 'It's none of anybody's business where we take NATO. We can put it on your doorstep and you can't complain because we have that right'? It's a discussion about that and about missiles that needs to be had.

But I think that the problem is more acute, because I don't think America--indeed the West--is prepared for this. They're not prepared to see a strong Russia emerge. They've been conditioned to see Russia as being weak. They're conditioned to seeing Russia as as a sort of backward State--heavily conditioned for a long time. And I think there's also another aspect that makes it so difficult for there to be an agreement. I don't think that [the West] understands Russia. That's partly because the United States has given up its national values. Not completely, of course. There is an American culture, but that American culture has been suppressed and has been replaced in the' 70s, where they swapped out national values--the traditional values of America--for identity politics. They did that because they wanted to move us away from what was a democracy towards a technocracy--that is, the multinational corporates, multinational energy, multinational bankers, as the experts. These are the only people that can make a serious decision about our future and design our future. It was Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was the National Security Advisor to Carter at that time, wrote this book forecasting the technocratic era and saying that Man needs to be leave the nation state concept, get rid of the nation state concept, and accept the sort of technocracy that would manage and would create a sort of sphere of identity which would be controlled and manipulated for the purpose of serving the new corporatist future that he foresaw for America.

This has great consequences for doing a deal on Ukraine, because this identity politics has been used in Ukraine to try and present Ukraine--or at least the west of Ukraine, west of the Dnieper River--as Europe and the other part as Slav, and to create a Slav cultural conflict between European Ukraine based on its identity that it's somehow more European than Slav, against Asia and the values of Asia. And of course the European Union jumped on this. They were delighted to find this new tool of unity that they could use, because their own unity was fraying quickly. Ukraine suddenly became the pole of unity around which Europe could try and gather and recreate Europe as a powerful actor on the stage.

I think what you're seeing, and coming ... there is upheaval taking place everywhere ... a sort of pushback against that corporatist vision that eventually became Wokism ... because the world is just fed up with Western nihilism. They want to find something that has meaning, they want to find something that has value in life, and to get back to their own values--civilizational values. And the problem is that I don't think the team around Trump probably understands what Russia means, that it sees itself as a civilizational state and not just as another nation state. That's what's important to [Russia] and it has to be negotiated on that understanding, and not simply about, 'Shall we freeze this here, shall we freeze it there?' No, they want a permanent solution, which means a new security architecture for Central Asia and for Europe.

I like that. They want to find meaning. Meaning in history!