The View From Southern Lebanon

I came across this analysis of Hezbollah strategy in the current situation, from the perspective of a student of Hezbollah. I pass it along because it gets us past a lot of the usual talking points. As I wrote yesterday, I continue to regard much of the rhetoric emanating from the US and Israel as bluff—attempts to pressure the Lebanese government and/or Hezbollah.

Amal Saad

@amalsaad_lb

16h • 7 tweets • 2 min read •  Read on X

THREAD: While the likelihood of an Israeli offensive against Lebanon in the coming weeks remains uncertain, what's clearer is that Israel's threats of attack, coupled with US pledges of support, are part of a coordinated media strategy to pressure and intimidate Hizbullah 1/ 

The US and Israel hope that a planned scaling down to a less intense "phase 3" operation in Gaza will create a diplomatic "off-ramp" that encourages Hizbullah to stop it attacks. Media-channeled warnings aim to pressure Hizbullah towards embracing this diplomatic "solution" 2/ 

But it's very unlikely that Hizbullah would agree to close its solidarity front without a cease-fire. This condition for ending attacks has been Hizbullah's consistent stance for the past 9 months. Given that Nasrallah has repeatedly tied Hizbullah's attacks to Hamas' fate on the battlefront, its improbable that Hizbullah will abandon its ally while Israel continues to wage war against it 3/ 

How Israel and the US will respond to the expected continuation of Hizbullah’s attacks remains to be seen. But what is becoming increasingly apparent, is that Israel will have lost whether it attacks Lebanon or not. If Israel's objective is to allow its citizens to return to northern settlements, then a war with Lebanon will force tens of thousands more to flee or evacuate from other parts of Israel. 4/ 

This will be the case even if Israel pursues seemingly modest goals like a limited incursion to push Hizbullah away from the border by setting up a "security belt" or if it launches attacks on its weapons' depots which aim to deny Hizbullah a counter-strike capability. Regardless of the scenario, Hizbullah is poised to launch a large-scale counterattack 5/ 

And if Israel chooses to refrain from an attack, then it would have failed to ensure the return of tens of thousands of northern settlers, 40% of whom have said they don't plan on returning even if the war did end. This situation would likely erode Israeli citizens' confidence in their state and their sense of security. Moreover, Israel's credibility would be severely undermined after issuing forceful threats without follow-through 6/ 

Hizbullah will continue to play on Israel’s vulnerabilities. This conflict isn't solely about military might; it's equally focused on exposing the lack of war readiness and resilience among Israel's military and home front. Although both parties have the capacity for widespread devastation, Hizbullah and Lebanese society have developed resilience through years of conflict and occupation. In contrast, Israel's limited experience with warfare on its own soil will likely prove to be its most significant vulnerability. 7/

These are all considerations to keep in mind as we are inundated with propaganda talking points. Hezbollah has a clearcut strategy, while the Anglo-Zionists are largely flying by the seat of their pants. That gives Hezbollah a decided advantage. Israel cannot be eager to repeat the debacle of Gaza in southern Lebanon—on a much larger scale. But what, then? Tactical nukes? World War 3? Someone in DC must also be thinking about these matters, although you’d never know it from Trump’s words last night.