The Trouble With Scandinavia

Earlier this week, while discussing the Russian missile strike on Poltava—in which numerous Swedish military advisers were killed—I addressed the historic significance of Poltava as the site at which Russia decisively defeated the Swedish Empire in 1709. This was a pivotal battle of the Great Northern War, and it’s worth glancing at a map to get an idea of how far from Sweden this battle took place (look to the lower right). It’s interesting to note that the players in the Great Northern War include all the newest members of NATO’s eastward expansion to the borders of Russia:

The Great Northern War resulted from Sweden’s determination to dominate the Baltic Sea—to the detriment of other Baltic nations and the total exclusion of Russia from an outlet to the Baltic.

Today Glenn Diesen reviews more of that history in the light of the Scandinavian countries’ determination—in a new formal alliance with the US—to once again deny Russia an outlet to the sea. Diesen, a Norwegian, attributes this shortsighted view to a “tribalist” mentality and an inability to discern the clear conflict of interests between Scandinavia and the Anglo-Zionist Empire. Having described the alarming US militarization of Scandinavian space—something the Scandinavians themselves are largely incapable of accomplishing, Diesen presents the conflict of interests:

Trapped in the tribal mindset of “us” versus “them”, the Scandinavians exaggerate what “we” have in common, and dismiss any commonality with “them”. It is assumed that the US shares the interests of Scandinavia, and is selflessly building a military presence there to provide security. The US has a security strategy based on hegemony, which is dependent on weakening all emerging rivals. The US Security Strategy of 2002 explicitly linked national security to global dominance as the objective to “dissuade future military competition” should be achieved by advancing “the unparalleled strength of the United States armed forces, and their forward presence”.[15] While Scandinavia has an interest in maintaining peaceful borders with Russia, the US has defined its interests in destabilising Russian borders.[16] Peacetime alliances are reliant on perpetuating conflicts rather than solving them as conflict ensures loyalty from the protectorate and the containment of the adversary. In his famous work on how to advance and perpetuate US global hegemony, Brzezinski wrote the US must “prevent collusion and maintain security dependence among the vassals, to keep tributaries pliant and protected, and keep the barbarians from coming together”.[17]

He then goes on to describe a common lack of “political imagination in Scandinavian countries that fails to recognize changing circumstances—including the changing character of NATO itself. Trapped in their curiously ahistorical tribal mindset, and in defiance of what Diesen characterizes as “common sense”, Scandinavians seem to see Russians as a threat by the very “otherness” of Russians, and fail to see that their own actions—directed by US interests—are posing an existential threat to Russia:

The Scandinavians have been reliant on the US for security since the end of the Second World War, and they simply do not have the political imagination for other security arrangements. If it worked during then, why should it not work now? As security competition is no longer a consideration, the Scandinavians conveniently neglect that NATO was a status quo actor during the Cold War, while after the Cold War it became a revisionist actor by expanding and attacking other countries in what NATO refers to as “out-of-area” operations.

It’s a smart article. Diesen covers the decades long success of Scandinavian (Sweden, Finland) neutrality, and contrasts it with the current embrace of an aggressively hostile stance toward Russia. However, here I’d like to include Diesen’s review of history, which sheds light on Russian concerns. In particular, Diesen describes the efforts of the West over the course of quite a few centuries to exclude Russia from sea access—in the Baltic Sea, in the Black Sea, and now increasingly in the Arctic. This has been a motive factor in many of the numerous foreign invasions of Russia—something Russia is forced to be mindful of, but toward which the West exhibits a callous insensitivity. This myopia threatens a reenactment of past historical strategies.

Diesen begins this historical section by describing how restricting Russian access to the seas is a direct—and intended—threat to Russia’s economic development. How the Scandinavian countries can imagine that their aggression against Russia will end well for them is anyone’s guess.

Ever since Kievan Rus disintegrated in the 13^th century [under the Mongol onslaught] and the Russians lost their presence on the Dnieper River, a key security challenge for Russia has been its lack of reliable access to the world seas. Furthermore, economic development is also dependent on reliable access to the seas as they are the arteries of international trade. Similarly, hegemonic powers have always been required to dominate the seas, while Russia can be contained, weakened and defeated by restricting its access.

Sweden was initially such a great power. In the 16^th, 17^th and 18^th centuries, Sweden sought to restrict the access of Russia in the Baltic Sea, while also attempting to encroach upon Russia’s Arctic port in Arkhangelsk. During the “The Time of Trouble” (Смута) that involved the Swedish occupation of Russia, resulted in the death of approximately 1/3 of Russia’s entire population. The conflict ended with the Treaty of Stolbova in 1617, which involved Russian territorial concessions that cut off Russia’s access to the Baltic Sea. Russia’s isolation lasted until the time of Peter the Great, who eventually defeated Sweden in the Great Northern War in 1721. The war ended Sweden’s era as a great power, while Russia became a great power and a European power due to its unrestricted access to the Baltic Sea.

Yet, the dominant maritime powers, Britain and then the US, pursued similar attempts to limit Russia’s access to the world’s oceans over the next three centuries. During the Crimean War (1853-56), European diplomats were explicit that the objective was to push Russia back into Asia and exclude it from European affairs.[1] This explains Russia’s fierce response to the Western-backed coup in Ukraine in 2014 as Russia responded by seizing Crimea in fear of losing its strategic Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol to NATO. The US sabotage of the Minsk agreement (2015-2022) and the Istanbul peace agreement (2022) was similarly motivated by the goal of arming Ukraine to take back Crimea and make Sevastopol a NATO naval base. NATO’s Deputy Secretary-General acknowledged in July 2022 that the war in Ukraine is mostly about control over the Black Sea.

The militarisation and vassalisation of Scandinavia [by the Anglo-Zionists] are important to challenge Russia’s access to the two other seas on Russia’s Western borders – the Baltic Sea and the Arctic. Former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen optimistically announced that NATO expansion in Scandinavia would enable NATO to block Russia’s access to the Baltic Sea in a conflict: “After the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, the Baltic Sea will now be a NATO sea… if we wish, we can block all entry and exit to Russia through St. Petersburg”.[2] Poland and the Baltic States have also begun to casually refer to the Baltic Sea as a “NATO sea”. The Financial Times argues that “Denmark could block Russian oil tankers from reaching markets” as part of sanctions.[3] A NATO Colonel Also argued that the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad would come under much greater pressure and become a “problem” for Russia: “The ascension of Finland and the upcoming ascension of Sweden will totally change the setup in the Baltic Sea region. Russia will experience Kaliningrad being surrounded”.[4]

“Ascension” when “accession” is meant is one of my pet peeves.

Sweden’s NATO membership now threatens to reverse the outcome of the Great Northern War in 1721, which by implication would destroy the foundations of Russian security. The Battle of Poltova is recognised to have been the largest and most decisive battle of the Great Northern War that resulted in Sweden’s defeat. The videos emerging of Swedish casualties in the recent Russian missile strike on Poltova are therefore very symbolic of the militarisation of Scandinavia. 

America’s attack on Nord Stream demonstrated how control over the Baltic Sea is important to cut Russian-German economic connectivity. The US has attempted to blame the Ukrainians for the attack, suggesting that “the CIA warned Zelensky’s office to stop the operation”.[5] The admission of knowing about the attack before it happened is nonetheless interesting as the US and NATO blamed Russia for the attack and used it as a reason to intensify the naval control over the Baltic Sea and escalate the Ukraine War. This is an admission that the US lied to their own public and the world, and used the lie to escalate their wider war on Russia. The attack also demonstrates that the Americans will treat the Europeans as proxies just like they used the Ukrainians, while the Europeans would not stand up for their interests but silently accept an ally destroying their own vital energy infrastructure. The revelation also demonstrated that the people we generously refer to as journalists will not ask any critical questions or discuss objective reality if it challenges the war narrative.

The short version is simply that, since the Middle Ages, Russia has been in a struggle to break out of the geographical stranglehold that has held back its development. The antics of the Scandinavian countries are a reminder to Russia that this current war is an existential struggle for Russia.