The Big Question Surfaces: Was The Prigozhin Farce A Western Intel Op?

As I expected (A Theory Of The Prigozhin Regime Change Farce), more and more commentators are openly asking what has seemed to me to be the obvious and key question. Larry Johnson frames the question in all its baldness this morning:

WAS PRIGOZHIN’S MUTINY A WESTERN INTELLIGENCE OP DERAILED BY RUSSIA’S SPIES?

I prefer the “regime change” narrative framing, because I believe that the circumstances point in that direction—that there was much more focus and organization behind this thing than “mutiny” or “uprising” would suggest. The rhetoric and coordinated actions all point toward the goal of regime change. And, after all, that was probably the only way for Prigozhin, ultimately, to ensure his personal safety in the aftermath.

In his article LJ considers various alternative theories—psyops, etc. I find none of them plausible. However, of most interest is the view of Stephen Bryen, which LJ presents first. As I’ve stated in the past, Bryen, in my view, maintains strong connections to circles that I consider to be Neocon, or Neoconnish. Nevertheless, he has for a long time argued strongly that this war on Russia is misguided. I was therefore interested to see that Bryen, in his most recent substack, argues for an explanation of the Prigozhin Farce that is similar to mine. Here’s how LJ presents Bryen’s view. As you’ll see, Bryen fleshes out my argument for the Western Intel connection, as well as more detail from an internal Russian standpoint. LJ quotes Bryen with regard to Prigozhin’s reported foreign contacts:

My friend, Steve Bryen, an old U.S. defense hand posted an excellent overview at his substack, “What Didn’t Happen in Russia — There was no uprising and Prigozhin couldn’t deliver what he promised.” Steve is still well-plugged into the U.S. intelligence and defense community and he drops a bit of a metaphorical bombshell by revealing Prigozhin was in contact with Ukrainian military intelligence:

To launch his operation, Prigozhin took a number of steps over a period of the past six or more months.  Among these were constant, and provably false, accusations that he was not getting enough ammunition to fight in Bakhmut.  Along with that, Prigozhin charged that the army leadership was corrupt, that they refused to defend his flanks during the Bakhmut operation, and that they were losing massively in the Ukraine war.  None of these accusations were true. . . .

It turns out, however, there was more to it than that.  Sources report that Prigozhin had been in touch with Ukrainian military intelligence (known as the HUR MO), at least since last January. Some sources say that he also flew to Africa, where Wagner forces are operational, to hold a meeting with Ukrainian intelligence officials.

Similarly there are reports that he also was talking to a number of special force units inside Russia, asking them to join him.

I believe that Steve’s sources on this are solid. Pay particular attention to the timing — i.e., a meeting in January. It was a month or so later that Prigozhin launches scathing verbal attacks on Russian Defense Minster Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov. Also, according to documents allegedly posted to Discord by Airman Jack Teixeira, Prigozhin provided Ukraine/NATO with locations of Russian units in the Donbass.

This is strong circumstantial evidence that Prigozhin not only went rogue, he became a traitor.

Now, LJ, in his article, leaves Bryen’s argument at that. He then argues that the information about Russian force deployments that Prigozhin is alleged to have passed on to the Ukrainians would have been “more of the same” intel that NATO was already providing. But Bryen’s argument is far more persuasive—in my view—than that quote might appear. Let’s look at it in more detail.

Here is a key observation:

Just as he was able to occupy the local Ministry of Defense headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, Prigozhin's aim apparently was to take over the Russian defense ministry in Moscow. He demanded the immediate resignations of the current defense minister, Sergei Shoigu, and the Chief of the General Staff of Russia's armed forces, Valery Gerasimov.

Demanding—at the point of a gun, recall that Russian military personnel were killed by Prigozhin’s men—the resignation of the top two military officers struck directly at Putin. Prigozhin may have claimed he wasn’t attempting a coup against Putin, but if Prigozhin had been able to force these resignations then, ipso facto, he would have usurped Putin’s authority and assumed control of the military. At least for the time being, which is what mattered. In such a situation could Putin have even relied on the FSB to continue to support him against the military? These two actions—toward the MoD in Rostov and in Moscow—were calculated to leave Putin in a highly vulnerable position. Self serving statements to the contrary were simply misdirection.

In the same way, Prigozhin’s fabrication of fake videos had nothing to do with “justice”. This was a tactic that was designed to provoke widespread outrage that, if successful, would have certainly ended up being directed at the person in overall charge: Putin.

From the standpoint of institutional connections, Bryen also points out that Wagner’s origins are to be found within Russian military intelligence, the GRU, which also controls the Spetsnaz special forces. Prigozhin’s deputy, Dmitry Utkin, who led the march on Moscow, was “a Spetsnaz special operator.” Couple that, says Bryen, with reports that Prigozhin had been in talks with elements of those special forces in an effort to recruit them to his side, and you have a strong case for regime change as the goal. Bryen states that some elements of the Spetsnaz had been “identified on the internet as pro-Prigozhin.” Where would the march on Moscow have led if those elements had come out in support of Prigozhin? Possibly:

there could have been a power struggle in the Army, perhaps also in the FSB, and possibly aimed not only at replacing the current military leadership, but really aimed at humiliating and replacing Putin.

As I said above, if the attempt to replace the current military leadership at the point of a gun had proved successful, that would have spelled the end of Putin.

Now, going back to the beginning, to Prigozhin’s claimed contacts with Ukrainian intelligence—and ipso facto with Western intelligence—the minute Prigozhin entered into such clandestine contacts he crossed a redline and became a traitor. Traitors are in no position to enforce their own redlines. His contacts—controllers? handlers"?—would have wanted far more than troop deployment information. Bryen suggests that Prigozhin would have been in a position to provide information about elements of the military and security services that might support a regime change scheme.

While it isn't possible to confirm any of this, it seems to be the case that Prigozhin was hoping for a general uprising, so that his March for Justice would be filled out by thousands of highly placed supporters, including the police, army and intelligence.

Bryen, of course, is aware of the seamy side of Prigozhin, his corruption and so forth. But his key point, as mine above, is that dealing with Ukrainian intelligence would inevitably end up in dealing with Western intel services. Remember, if those reports are true, then Prigozhin crossed a point of no return—once a traitor always a traitor:

But the real problem are the contacts Prigozhin had with Ukraine's secret intelligence services, his alleged offers to sell out Russian command centers, and his bargaining for support, not so much from Ukraine, but from the United States. It should surprise no one that the CIA was fully informed by their Ukrainian counterparts, who are desperate to see Russia's leaders overturned and NATO to come to their rescue.

Prigozhin offered a very good deal. In exchange for outside support he would take over Russia, reorient to the West, and leave Ukraine. The offer, at a critical moment when the Ukrainian offensive is faltering, was an offer hard to refuse.

Before I get to Bryen’s conclusion, I’ll briefly address the lenient treatment of Prigozhin—so far, because Putin has said that the perpetrators of the regime change scheme will be called to justice. As I’ve maintained elsewhere, I believe this has to do with the Russian mentality and the legend that has grown up around Wagner and its frontman, Prigozhin. Putin wished to avoid bloodshed and pitting Russians against one another. He was successful in doing that by a very clever handling of the coup, which he certainly knew was coming. Reports are that Putin’s ratings have risen from the 80s up to 90 percent in the wake of the Prigozhin farce. Unity has been maintained. However, as I said last night, it appears that there’s more to come—to maintain calm Putin, in his address to the nation, said only the minimum. There will be massive continuing investigations, and possibly purges. Here’s how Bryen explains that:

Putin has a major challenge now to deal with the dissidents in his regime who oppose him. While none of them came forward overtly, it appears likely the FSB and Putin know who Prigozhin was talking to. They will have to judge whether these individuals and organizations are reliable, or if they will have to be dealt with by Russian security.

Putin also has to crack down on the widespread sabotage in Russian cities. Not all this can be blamed on Ukrainians. Many of the perpetrators are Russians, and from the looks of it, they are professional, again pointing a finger at those in a position to carry out such attacks. Beyond sabotage, there have been a number of assassinations of prominent pro-Putin leaders. Putin must realize by now that he also is on the list and that the support for these attacks is mostly from internal sources.

The night of the long knives may happen soon if Putin is to survive as Russia's leader.

And checking in from Minsk: