On Polish Imperial Ambitions

This morning Larry Johnson features an article by Michał Krupa, whom I take to be an American expat living in Poland. The article is an exposition of an essay by “Professor Stanisław Bieleń, eminent University of Warsaw scholar of Internationals Relations.” The title of Krupa’s piece suggests one of the themes of Bieleń’s essay—the misguided Polish policy of seeking to weaken its hated centuries long adversary, Russia, by enlisting as the unswerving vassal of the American Deep State. Bieleń believes that behind this misguided policy is the Polish desire to once again play a role in great power geopolitics:

SUBSERVIENCE TO WASHINGTON DOES NOT A SUPERPOWER MAKE

That is, indeed, one of Bieleń’s main points—the need for Poles to get over the fact that there is no room for Poland in Great Power politics, and that taking sides needlessly poses great risks for Poland. Specifically, siding with the US/UK Neocons by getting involved in a war on Russia sets Poland up for a possible serious bruising. Needlessly.

Another point, related to the first, is that Poland has no hope for an independent role as a power center. Any hope of that has been destroyed, he maintains, by the current government’s policies that have antagonized most neighboring countries. Bieleń’s solution seems to be for Poland to submerge itself in the EU, which he—apparently—views as a possible independent ‘power center’. This would free Poland from being a pawn in Great Power politics—the most realistic goal for Poland.

The paradox in Bieleń’s policy proposal is that he freely admits that Western Europeans don’t actually care about Poland and, to the extent that they ever think about Poland, it’s with disdain and exasperation. In point of fact, Poland would probably have more to gain from good relations with Russia (a point that Bieleń doesn’t explicitly urge but would probably concede) simply because Poland has more to offer Russia in geopolitical terms than it can offer to the EU. President Putin for years pursued a policy of reconciliation with Poland, and one can safely assume that policy was based on Russian self interest.

In any event, the essay should prove interesting to readers, as the war on Russia appears to be reaching an inflexion point. While Poland is still officially all in against Russia, internal tensions in Poland are increasing. These tensions are based on a recognition that Poland may have painted itself into a corner—incurring Russia’s wrath with no concrete benefit—and exasperation with the flood of Ukrainians into Poland. It also was written against the explicit backdrop of the current governments outspoken plans to become a European superpower through the purchase of (mostly) US weapons systems. Another bit of delusion.

The original essay can be found here:

Bieleń: Imperial obsessions

I’ve presented an edited version of the essay in translation. It’s basically an auto-translation, but I compared it to the original and adapted it to better English usage.

Before we get to the actual essay, I was amused at the use of a Jan Matejko painting as the backdrop to the title. The specific painting, Stephen Báthory at Pskov, appears to have been chosen to remind Polish readers of their own romantic—but now deeply unrealistic—yearning for importance on the world stage. It was painted in 1872 at a time when most of Poland was part of the Russian Empire. It portrays King Stephen Bathory, scourge of the Muscovites, receiving a groveling Muscovite embassy, suing for peace.

Stephen Báthory at Pskov or Báthory at Pskov (Polish - Stefan Batory pod Pskowem) is a partially allegorical and historically inaccurate painting from 1872 by the Polish artist Jan Matejko, now in the collections of the Royal Castle in Warsaw, Poland. It shows people of the Russian tsar Ivan the Terrible kneeling before the Polish king Stephen Báthory at Pskov during the final period of peace negotiations at the end of the 1578-1582 Livonian campaign. It also shows the papal legate, the black-robed Jesuit Antonio Possevino.

Báthory, one of the greatest kings of Poland, was actually a Hungarian from Transylvania who was elected king of Poland. Báthory is the Hungarian spelling of his name.

So, here we go.

The concept of "empire"--as used by Polish politicians, as well as by uncritical manipulators--has in recent years become synonymous with "the sum of all evil", identified with demonic Russia and, of course, with its leader (lately designated with the obligatory title of "dictator", as if he were the only ruler of this type in the world, and as if, instead of being president, he held an odious office under that title [dictator]).

An increasing number of manipulated citizens succumb to the "temptation" of assuming that the designation "empire" captures the essence of "hostile" Russia in all its dimensions, thus exempting them from any effort at independent thought. In addition, for those more educated in history, the fact that all empires are "mortal" is a comforting thought, since it implies that the days (years, centuries?) of Russia are numbered as well.

A discussion of the origin and nature of empires, and their positive role in history as the origin of great civilizations, follows. Bieleń then distinguishes between two types of empire, the first under the Latin title of 'imperium' and the second by a Polish cognate for 'Caesar', cesarstwo. The Russian cognate, of course, is 'tsar'. By 'imperium' Bieleń means "the highest monarch in the hierarchy of monarchs." The second term designates a state that is basically a superpower and is headed by a 'cesarz' or 'tsar', by which Bieleń means a 'strongman'.

In Western Europe, the idea of ​​empire, associated with the Roman political and legal tradition and the Christian religion, meant a certain moral and legal order amidst the chaos of warring kings and princes. Thus, the empire had ordering and unifying functions.

"The Post-Imperial Complex"

One could ask whether the historical Republic of Poland, once one of the largest European countries, did not meet the criteria of an imperial form of statehood. Isn't blaming Russia for imperial tendencies an echo of the old 'post-imperial complex', expressed in a romantic ecstasy of regret and even fury that the Muscovites succeeded and the Sarmatians lost everything?

This complex can also be expressed in resentment and in "dreams of power", which in the form of various threads, projects, visions and concepts of the first half of the 20th century were best shown by Adam Danek in the book entitled "Dreams of Power" (Kraków 2021). One might wish that the author had taken a closer look at quite contemporary dreams of a return to the greatness and power of the Republic of Poland, if only in the context of the war in Ukraine. After all, there is no shortage of various claims based on Jagiellonian, Promethean, 'Intermarium' or pseudo-power myths. These claims have been expressed by various prominent figures, but lack any historically conditioned reflection. Polish politicians from various camps behave and speak as if they had never heard about the discrediting of Polish imperial ideas. The fall of the Commonwealth at the end of the 18th century [the partitions of Poland], which had never been able to consolidate into an empire, is still a source of shame and historical trauma to this day.

A note on the term ‘Intermarium’, referring to the land ‘between the seas’: the land between the Baltic and Black seas which Poland occupied at its greatest historical extent. Piłsudski dreamed of reestablishing such a realm after WW1, which was at least a contributing factor to the Polish - Soviet War. You can read about it here: Intermarium. If you follow the link you’ll be able to read about the various incarnations of the Intermarium concept since WW2, usually spearheaded by Poland. Here’s a link to a book by a Polish-American on the same topic: Intermarium: The Land between the Black and Baltic Seas. It’s pretty typical of this type of neo-imperial romanticism among some Poles:

Karl A. Roider Jr. reviewed Intermarium for the Sarmatian Review. He describes the main theme of the book as a struggle between the democratic Polish model and the Russian totalitarian model over the Intermarium which per Chodakiewicz's includes the Baltic States, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova.

It’s the kind of stuff that fuels Russian suspicion of Poland.

A derivative, or rather a function, of empires is imperialism. It is a practice of international relations that boils down to competition for influence, division of lands and resources, economic and ideological primacy. Again, this is not an exclusive feature of modern Russia. Imperialist tendencies accompany all powers to a greater or lesser extent. At the same time, some powers hide them under the guise of democracy and civilizing missions, others under the pretext of defending their countrymen, and others in order to restore historical greatness and glory. Added to this are entirely new forms of imperialist manifestation through transnational corporations that actually serve the selfish interests of the great powers. ...

There is no doubt that post-imperial nations maintain their geopolitical ambitions largely because of their imperialist heritage (looting, exploitation, conquest). Expansion motivated by economic profit or political dominance justifies the aggressiveness of the great powers, including the use of military means. The military involvement of the USA and Russia in the post-Cold War period puts them under the same negative assessments, both from the point of view of morality and international law. Unfortunately, the propaganda machines of the West (most of which are under the control of American capital) have created an almost perfect image of a "pro-peaceful" America, as opposed to the aggressive behavior of Russia.

From the Polish political perspective, the terms 'empire' and 'imperialism' have exclusively negative connotations. Every empire is inherently evil, even though Poland's own history is sometimes portrayed as imperial. As historical curiosities, this problem was once pointed out by Michael Morys-Twarowski ("The Polish Empire. All Countries Conquered by the Republic", Kraków 2016). In official Polish historiography, the former Commonwealth is shown as an “empire without fault”, although researchers such as Daniel Beauvois have exposed its oppressive face (“Ukrainian Triangle”, Lublin 2005).

The twentieth century briefly provided hope for rebuilding Poland's position as a center of power, but the geopolitics of the time did not give the Second Polish Republic any chance for such a status. After World War II, the Polish state held a limited sovereignty and became the subject of the hegemonic policy of the USSR. Dreams of expansion and spatial grandeur were replaced by a more or less clumsy Realpolitik. However, it offered a chance to rebuild in a new territorial shape ...

The return of "imperial" thinking

Leaving the Soviet sphere of influence and choosing a western (Euro-Atlantic) orientation gave hope for new geopolitical prospects for Poland. However, it soon turned out that the alleged geopolitical pluralism within Western communities is determined by the "EU empire" (Jan Zielonka, Tomasz Gabiś), with Germany playing a dominant role under NATO's "protective umbrella" and the hegemony of the United States. Due to NATO's expansion towards the post-Soviet East, Poland again found itself on the frontline of clashes between two different imperialisms. The geopolitics of fear, threats of encirclement or attack by enemies, loss of territory and foreign infiltration returned. It is difficult for the average observer to distinguish the obsessions expressed by politicians on this background from the reality, especially since neither side is idle in terms of propaganda manipulations.

Telling Poland that in the context of Ukraine it has become a power in the region is nothing more than harnessing Poland to the chariot of hegemonic US policy. America took advantage of Russia's weakness and found new spaces for imperialist expansion in post-Soviet areas. It needs many obedient states to pursue its strategic interests. Poland, still stuck in the satellite mentality of hostility towards Russia, sensing betrayal and threats on all sides, became an excellent executor of instructions coming from across the ocean. One of the most important policy goals of successive governments in Poland has been to contain the power of Russia. Hence the arms madness, active participation in inciting anti-Russian sentiments, and uncritical identification with the victim of a war that is not ours.

Blocking Russia's expansion with the participation of the Western alliance on the one hand, and assuming the role of a link integrating the Eastern European region on the other, means that Poland has adopted a strategy that leads inevitably to permanent confrontation. This exposes Poland to the highest risk, and the status of the outpost and traveling salesman of Anglo-Saxon interests will make our country the first target for destruction in the event of war. One can often get the impression that our rulers quite carelessly, due to their own weakness and incompetence, ignorance or even thoughtlessness, are allowing themselves to be used as a means, rather than an independent subject in the game of great empires.

Poland must perceive its position and international roles through the prism of historical experience. Even if we go back to Poland's imperial past it is worth noting that, at the beginning of the modern order of sovereign states, the then Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was not 'invited' to the Westphalian system in 1648. Poland does not exist in the historical memory of European powers. This is mainly due to the fact that Poland did not exist as an independent state throughout the 19th century, when imperial and imperial hierarchies were being established in Europe. It may sound painful, but Western Europe, including Russia, not to mention America, is not used to Polish leadership aspirations, and even less to superpower aspirations.

The above considerations show the need to revise Poland's international policy. This is also influenced by the negative experience of the war in Ukraine. Powerfully armed by the West and flaunting its heroic ideology, Ukraine is beginning to treat Poland as a rival, the manifestations of which are already visible both in the rhetorical and factual spheres. You really have to be blind to insist on a selfless policy of altruism that was wrong from the start. Naive illusions about a great Polish-Ukrainian partnership require deep re-evaluation.

For the future, Poland needs a coherent debate on the differences of interests and threats from our Ukrainian neighbor. We must not limit or gag the discussion based on the threat of an imperial Russia, as this is irrational and harmful to ourselves. The sooner we get rid of our imperial obsessions with Russia and unrealistic leadership claims, the more effectively we will be able to defend our own existential interests.

Realism instead of dreams

Bieleń concludes by sketching out the realistic considerations that should direct Poland's foreign policy.

First, he states point blank that Poland needs to give up its dreams of empire. From a geographic standpoint there is simply no realistic possibility for an imperial role for Poland in Eastern Europe. It's territory, while ample for its population, is simply too limited (and, I would add, the addition of any amount of Western Ukraine would not change that consideration, but would add the negative of a substantial and intensely anti-Polish population). Nor can Poland's economy support a "dynamic policy of gathering [other countries] around itself."

Finally, Poland lacks an "ideological" message that would make Poland an attractive "center" for other countries. Western Europe has its ideology of neoliberalism, and Russia (and other Eurasian countries) have their separate traditions. Some Poles would appeal to the supposed "ecumenism" of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which also incorporated large Belarussian, Ukrainian, and Jewish populations. The problem is that these notions are rooted in romantic visions of the past, not reality. The current reality is this:

"... no one finds the Polish specificity attractive. In addition, there are deep, historically conditioned prejudices against Polishness in the Eastern Borderlands, which pushes the eastern neighbors away from Poland even more. It seems that due to its erroneous eastern policy, the Third Polish Republic has irretrievably lost its chances for any leadership roles."

In other words, the current Polish government (the Third Republic) has antagonized most neighboring countries. And despite Polish support for Ukraine, Ukraine is already reverting to form--antagonism to Poland. Poland has isolated itself. Western Europeans despise Poland's traditional culture, making Poland a poor fit in the EU, and Poland has no prospects of becoming an independent power center--mass purchase of weaponry won't accomplish that.

Bieleń's conclusion contains, from my standpoint, a number of contradictions--it's nowhere near as realistic as he believes it to be. He has already been clear that Poland needs to free itself from vassaldom to the Anglosphere. The alternative he favors is an embrace of the EU on terms that that the EU can accept. Bieleń places the blame for Poland's current poor fit with the EU on Poland's reflexive anti-imperialism. This, he says, makes Poles suspicious of EU domination (and, while he doesn't say this, it leads Poles to seek security in the Anglosphere alliance, playing the Anglosphere off against the EU). In point of fact, he does acknowledge the possibility of a revived German imperium in the future. However, he makes no mention of two additional factors: first, Poland's deep cultural differences with the West, and second, the changing dynamics of the EU economy as a result of the war on Russia. He obviously, if somewhat gingerly, wants Poland to rethink its reflexive hostility to Russia, but doesn't explain how this is possible if Poland aligns with an EU that is dominated by the Anglosphere. Paradoxically, as Putin’s Polish policy over the years demonstrates, Russia is actually more open to treating Poland on equal-ish terms than is the EU.

Despite some limitations, one hopes that his essay will provide food for debate in the Polish public square. Only an open debate will help Poland move forward as a sovereign nation, rather than a proxy or tool for Western interests.