Mercouris' Reflections On Israelis And Palestinians

Alexander Mercouris’ reflection on the current crisis in Israel/Palestine are well worth listening to—or reading, in my transcript below. They occur in the middle section of a much longer monologue. They reflect, in part, Dennis Ross’ views, which were expressed in an interview with Politico—especially with regard to Hamas itself as an organization. Read what Ross has to say about that, and the mistake that Ariel Sharon made, which Ross says actually empowered Hamas:

‘There’s Going to Be a Lot of Soul-Searching in Israel When This Is Over’

Former U.S. peace negotiator Dennis Ross weighs in on Hamas’ attack on Israel and the “missed opportunities” that led to the war.

With that, here’s my transcript of Mercouris. Mercouris begins this section after considering the various theories for ‘why now’—pressuring the Saudis, etc.—which he finds unconvincing:

I think a much more straightforward explanation is that Hamas has launched this operation because that is what Hamas does. It has achieved the position among the Palestinian community that it has done--and its dominant position in Gaza--precisely because of its unflinching, uncompromising towards Israel. I am sure that that is the sentiment of many of its supporters and members. And I think that Hamas really doesn't need these external prompts to launch this kind of operation. Besides, by launching an operation of this nature Hamas has sidelined and, perhaps, discredited even further the rival Palestinian leadership led by the nominal president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas.

So I don't think this needs to be analyzed in that way too deeply, and I would add, by the way--and this takes me back to what I said before--I think that from Hamas' point of view I would not be surprised if there are certain factions within Hamas which would not be averse to an attempted Israeli occupation of Gaza. A prolongation of the war, a war of resistance against the Israeli occupiers, as they would call it, in Gaza would actually play into Hamas' narrative and would consolidate their leadership of the Palestinian movement.

Lastly, when discussing Hamas and its motives, the capture of hostages is apparently intended to compel Israel to release prisoners--Hamas prisoners and other Palestinian prisoners that it holds--and, again, I would not discount that. I would suggest that that is actually an important motive. Some of these people that Israel holds are likely important, experienced cadres of Hamas. It's completely understandable that Hamas would want these people freed.

The third point I'm going to make is that one factor in the timing of this event is, perhaps, a general perception across the Middle East that the United States--and, by extension, its ally Israel--are weakening. The United States is perceived to have suffered a defeat in Iraq, and an even more serious defeat in Syria. It has seen its position increasingly marginalized, there's been a rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and beyond that there is a general sense that American power, globally, is weakening as well. And here I'm gonna say that the war in Ukraine, the failure of Ukraine's offensive, despite all of the weapons that were poured into Ukraine, the pictures of the burning tanks and the burning Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles, the reports of tens of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers killed or wounded, the sense that Russia--having absented itself from the global stage following the end of the Cold War--is now returning to it with growing force. But behind Russia stands China, as well. That sense of growing weakness on the part of the United States, growing confusion on the part of the president of the United States--he does not, to put it mildly, cut an impressive or authoritative figure on the world stage--all of that might have given the leadership of Hamas, and many other people amongst the Palestinian community, a sense that the tide is beginning to turn. And it is beginning to turn, finally, back in their favor. And that this is the moment, therefore, when they should act.

And this brings me to two further points. Firstly, it seems to me that Israel, also, needs to make some careful assessments of its own position. Now, there's been much discussion of Israel, there's been much discussion of the history of the founding of the State. I do not propose to discuss these issues in this program. They're always contentious. One is never able to satisfy everybody--that is an impossible task, and I'm not gonna do it in this program.

What I will say is this. Israel, for the first decades of its existence, faced a united Arab world. Then, in 1978, as a result of a treaty negotiated at Camp David with the mediation of the United States, Israel managed to achieve a peace treaty with the most powerful Arab state, which was Egypt. That enormously strengthened Israel's strategic position and, thereafter, that fact--together with the fact that Israel was in possession of nuclear weapons--in effect meant that Israel was no longer the beleaguered place that it had once been.

Since the things have not always gone well. There was a war in Lebanon in 1982 which didn't go well for Israel, over the course of which Israel suffered a major moral disaster when Christian militias allied to Israel carried out massacres in Palestinian refugee camps. And, of course, there was an even bigger disaster for Israel when Israel found itself locked in combat with various Shia militia groups in Lebanon, which eventually consolidated into Hezbollah, obliging Israel to retreat from Lebanon. And then there was a war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006, the consequences of which, by the way, should never be underestimated. In my opinion the Syrian War was a direct product of it, but again that is another story to discuss another day.

Anyway, all of that, cumulatively, shows that Israel, even during this period since the treaty with Egypt, has not been having things all its own way. But nonetheless, Israel's strategic position--if one discounts these defeats--has been improving. Support for Israel in the West has consolidated. I can remember that in the 1970s, for example, there were many people in the West, including within Western governments and Western political parties, who were deeply skeptical about Israel and its policies. You don't see or hear much of that anymore. Israel has been able to normalize relations with several other Arab states, it has forged peace treaties with Jordan as well as with Egypt and, during the period of Donald Trump's administration it has established diplomatic relations with some of the Arab Gulf States.

So Israel has enjoyed a period of security and stability during this period. But the one thing it has not done, and has shown little interest in doing, is to take steps to resolve the festering problem at its heart, which is the resolution of its relationship with the Palestinian community, which of course occupied the entirety of this territory before Israel itself was established. There have been attempts to do this, there were attempts at Oslo all those years ago. Yitzhak Rabin, the Israeli prime minister at that time, and Yassir Arafat and the PLO leadership. But in recent decades, as Israel has seemed more secure, as its overall position in the Middle East appeared to be normalizing, one has got the sense that the Israelis themselves have stopped thinking about this problem--and, to the extent that they do think about it, they think about it purely in what might be called 'police' terms. I use that word very carefully--one could come up with much stronger words.

So, we've had walls, we've had fortified borders, we've had extraordinary laws passed in Israel, we've had--in effect--all kinds of steps taken by Israel to control the Palestinian population, but never really to seek or forge a viable peace with them which shows any understanding of their concerns or their wider aspirations, or which recognizes their grievances. And the result is, in part, that this has opened space for organizations like Hamas to take root and it is leaving Israel with the problem that it is facing today.

I've always felt that Israel was wasting the best opportunity that it had, when it was in its strongest position to achieve peace. I understand that there are many people in Israel who will respond that seeking peace is a fool's errand, that the opponents that they face are implacable and will rest at nothing less than Israel's total destruction, and they will point to the fact that Hamas' found documents say as much. But I can't help myself but think that a lot more could have been done at that time--a serious effort to resolve this problem should have been sought, and Israeli politicians instead became complacent and didn't seek it. And that complacency appears to have spread to the Israeli military and to the Israeli intelligence agencies, which no doubt in part explains the extraordinary failure we have just seen.

Perhaps the most optimal moment is past, but Israel's position remains extremely strong. The global environment still remains favorable. The United States remains an ally. Europe--the doubts that existed appear to have gone. And Russia, which in the past supported the Arabs, is now--if not exactly a friend--at least a country that seeks good relations with Israel. So I think a serious effort to rethink relations with the Palestinians is now urgent.