Looking Ahead In Ukraine

I saw two tweets this morning that are concise summaries of Russia’s strategy. The first quotes a guy, Alexander Kots, who is probably the top Russian war correspondent:

Masno @NovichokRossiya

7:52 AM · Feb 28, 2024

Not news, but articulated in three concise paragraphs. The strategy, as it seems to me, is dictated by Russia’s desire to keep casualties down. So, identify and attack a vulnerable area, advance until serious defense is encountered, attriting the Ukrainians. Then halt before casualties get serious and apply the same procedure elsewhere, forcing Ukraine to shift forces and suffer heavy casualties while plugging gaps. Rinse and repeat.

Mikael Valtersson, Swedish air defense officer, draws out the intended effect in the longer term—which may not be as long as some think. Valtersson is suggesting that the accumulation of local Russian breakthroughs could lead “in the near future” to bigger breakthroughs that could morph into “big arrow” offensives. Ukraine, in the wake of the fall of Avdeyevka, has had difficulty stabilizing defenses and Valtersson believes that could snowball:

Mikael Valtersson @MikaelValterss1

I realise that many might think I'm unsensitive , but I must admit it's much more interesting to follow a war when there is some action and changes on the maps. A week's seesaw fight over a hole in the ground is boring, but now new settlements change hands every day, and I believe we might see even greater changes in the near future.

6:47 AM · Feb 28, 2024

toby @tbw24431703

What do you think will be the the next pivotal movement on the battlefield? Are we going to get any sny grand strategy such as with little saturn, operation Uranus, Prague offensive etc

Mikael Valtersson2h

Not yet. Initially RuAF will continue to grind down UkrAF, but now with the frontline moving faster westward.

These emerging realities are causing crazy talk in the West. We see the highest political levels meeting at the WH to try to pressure Congress into ill advised funding for Ukraine. Little Manny Macron in Paris is talking about sending French forces to Ukraine. But before we get there, another twitter exchange for perspective—Valtersson responds to a WaPo article quoted by Geroman:

Mikael Valtersson @MikaelValterss1

COMMENT FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN UKRAINE, FEB 28 2024

I can't vouch for the numbers, but I have a distinct feeling that the number of western fighters in Ukraine is decreasing. The number of non-european fighters might also be decreasing. I know Swedes that have returned from Ukraine because of halved salary. They couldn't afford to continue fighting for Ukraine. Another disheartening factor is high casualties and other dire prospects on the battlefield.

On the Russian side it has become much easier to recruit foreign fighters now, with good economic compensation, promise of citizenship and progress on the battlefield. The numbers are not public knowledge but I wouldn't be surprised if there are more foreign fighters in RuAF than in UkrAF. At the end of 2024 this figure might be two or three times as many foreign fighters on the Russian side than on the Ukrainian side.

-- GEROMAN -- time will tell -  -- @GeromanAT

 20,000 foreign mercenaries from more than 50 countries are fighting for the Ukrainian Armed Forces as part of the international legion, The Washington Post.

Keep that in mind if you read Andrew Korybko. I normally limit cites to Korybko because I regard his analysis as tending toward alarmist scenarios. In particular, he tends to play up the likelihood of Poland advancing into Western Ukraine, which I believe is unlikely—based, among other actual facts, on the Polish chief of staff publicly stating the Polish military isn’t prepared for such a venture. This, in spite of all the dumb ass things Polish officials have said (Pres. Duda: “Russia is a place that shouldn’t exist.”).

NATO's Debate Over Direct Military Intervention In Ukraine Shows Its Desperation

Korybko is certainly correct as far as the sense of desperation among the Western ruling classes is concerned. On the other hand, the professional military in EU/NATO nations are well aware that their militaries are simply not capable of what is being suggested: Intervening in Ukraine to stop Russia’s advance. Korybko presents this as an inevitability, but the reality is placed up front:

French President Macron hosted over 20 fellow European leaders in Paris on Monday to discuss their next moves in Ukraine, including the possibility of a conventional NATO intervention, which he said they hadn’t ruled out for reasons of “strategic ambiguity” despite not reaching a consensus on this. His Polish counterpart Duda also confirmed that this subject was the most heated part of their discussions. The very fact that this scenario is being officially considered shows how desperate NATO has become.

Russia’s victory in Avdeevka, which was the natural result of it winning the “race of logistics”/“war of attrition” with NATO, prompted policymakers to contemplate what they’ll do in the event that it achieves a breakthrough across the Line of Contact (LOC) and starts steamrolling through the rest of Ukraine. They hadn’t previously considered this to be a serious possibility until last summer’s failed counteroffensive exposed the weakness of their military-industrial complex and tactical-strategic planning.

So, you see the reality in the first sentence. Yes, these EU “leaders” gathered in Paris and discussed intervention in Ukraine. No, no consensus was reached—meaning, everyone present had cold feet. Nevertheless, the discussion was mentioned publicly for purposes of “strategic ambiguity.” I read that to mean that suggesting the purely theoretical possibility of NATO intervention—unsupported on a practical operational level—is supposed to scare the Russians into backing off from victory. In other words, it’s pure bluff. Then, in the second paragraph, we learn that these statements—made as a bluff—was prompted by the realization of the West’s military-industrial “weakness”. Read the rest, but I find it implausible.

Here’s more reality, and this will impact US policy on a global scale because it’s really the tip of an iceberg. This is the first portion of a much longer tweet that explains some of the dynamics behind the numbers:

Armchair Warlord @ArmchairW

According to widely-reported leaks the US Army missed its recruiting target by an enormous amount in FY23 and will shrink by some 24,000 people going into 2024 - over 5% of its end strength. Apparently most of the positions being cut are already empty.

It's no mystery why this is happening - most of the recruiting crisis is attributable to a catastrophic drop in accessions among white men. This is a huge demographic which disproportionately seeks to join the combat arms, so the impact to the Army's combat power is disproportionately large even in comparison to those bleak numbers. Big Army can cope about MEDPROS or the economy or how recruiters hate their lives but let's cut straight to the point:

The Army has a politics problem.

The Army has, rightly or wrongly, created the impression over the last several years that it is a strongly politically progressive organization through a large number of actions. Let me just list a few here:

- Enthusiastic embrace of DEI even under Trump

- Punitive COVID vaccination mandates

- Embracing left-wing culture war initiatives

- Senior leaders publicly undermining the Trump Admin

- Recruitment messaging aimed at fringe demographics

Talking about the exact politics of Generation Z misses the mark - the military is a family business. People are recruited by their family well before any recruiter ever talks to them. White male Zoomers may not think much about the above list, but their veteran fathers are enraged and unsupportive.

…

12:14 AM · Feb 28, 2024

Is that the military that’s going to war in Ukraine, in the Western Pacific, in the Middle East? Simultaneously? The idea of Macron as a new Napoleon leading a new multinational March on Moscow is, IMO, laughable. Ultimately, politics trumps cheap bluffs. Actual intervention in the form of boots on the ground is a political non-starter. NATO knows why Russia has maintained such a large reserve, including in Belarus. Putin has openly warned of the consequences—up to and including nuclear war. Political self preservation—or the hope for it—will dictate against such a move.