Fog Of War: Iranian Air Defense

Yesterday I took issue with Danny Davis’ assessment that Iran’s air defense system had been “shredded”.

I just got done listening to Danny Davis saying that Iran’s air defense system had been “shredded.” I very much doubt that, although damage was unquestionably done. The reason I doubt that is because there were no reports of Israeli manned fighters actually penetrating Iranian air space in any significant way—all damage was done via standoff weapons from outside Iranian air space or by drones. Smaller drones suitable for assassinations or for unhardened targets were launched from inside Iran—we’re getting reports that the Iranian security services are, belatedly, locating and seizing a lot of these drones. The larger attack drones were probably launched from Azerbaijan, Iraqi Kurdistan, and possibly from the Gulf region. In the latter stages of the war Iran was achieving success in shooting down these drones.

Iran is a vast and mountainous country. It seems significant that the current drone activities are directed at urban areas and involve smallish quadcopter drones. This suggests the purpose is to assess the current state of Iranian air defenses in these areas, which are likely to be targeted again. However, that may not presage attacks via manned aircraft. More advanced air defense missiles can easily be secreted in mountainous areas to scan approaches from outside Iranian air space, making attempts to penetrate Iranian air space by manned aircraft dangerous. That explains the reliance on standoff weapons and drones in this first stage of the war. It remains to be seen what systems the Iranians acquire from Russia and China, and whether in the next round they decide to engage aircraft outside their own air space.

I’ll make a few more observations on this matter.

First, if Iran’s air defense had truly been “shredded” and Israel had the ability to roam Iran’s skies at will, we would have seen a a very visible full court press to locate and eliminate Iran’s supply of advanced ballistic missiles. I would guess that in that circumstance the US would have joined in the hunt. I’m not at all convinced that Iran’s apparent rationing of those advanced missiles signaled full USraeli control of Iran’s skies. Iran’s primary targets were not the Israeli civilian population nor military equipment per se. Iran’s primary targets was the strategic infrastructure of the Israeli war machine. Those were virtually all static sites and were limited in number. Iran was able to attack those sites to devastating effect while conserving it’s stock of missiles for further war, perhaps including the US in an even bigger way.

Second, I referred to Iran as a mountainous country. More accurately, Iran is in large part a plateau that is rimmed by rugged and high mountains. That rim runs around Iran’s borders—especially to the north, west, and south. It is next to impossible to locate mobile air defense units in those environments. USrael would have been very leery of attempting to penetrate Iranian air space through that environment, for fear of being “ambushed”. Further, I would be very surprised to learn that Russia did not give Iran a heads up regarding impending attacks by manned aircraft—that would have been easily within Russian capabilities. USrael would also be aware of that factor. Thus, the use of standoff weapons and drones that may have had a lower detectability (but which were increasingly being intercepted as time went on). The Iranian decision not to attempt to shoot down American tankers over Iraq—which would have conclusively stopped the Israeli offensive—was probably for strategic reasons.

Why am I reprising all of this?

This morning DD Geopolitics ran with a story—featuring a relatively detailed map—that purported to show the way in which Israel penetrated Iranian air space. DD Geopolitics is openly what I would call a “consortium.” My take is that Thomas Keith is also a consortium, but not openly—more or less in the same way that “sundance” fronts for a consortium. Will Schryver links to the original source and acerbically dresses down DD Geopolitics:

Will Schryver @imetatronink

The source cited here (@Soheil2N) does not claim that Israeli aircraft entered Iranian airspace. In fact, it speaks only of the direction from which stand-off weapons were fired into Iran.

The signal to noise ratio on @DD_Geopolitics has decreased considerably in recent months.

Quote

DD Geopolitics @DD_Geopolitics

13h

 The main flight paths Israeli jets used to enter Iranian airspace during the recent strikes:

— Tehran & Karaj targets were hit from the Caspian Sea direction, with jets entering Iranian airspace through Azerbaijan.

— Tabriz & surrounding areas were struck by aircraft entering from northern Iraq.

— Kermanshah & Khorramabad targets were attacked from western Iraq, due to their proximity to the border.

— Isfahan, Natanz, and Arak sites were hit by jets that penetrated deep inside Iran, exploiting a weakened air defense corridor. The use of short-range Spice-1000 bombs near Esfahan confirms close-range overflight deep inside Iranian territory.

This map shows both ballistic missile launch points and air-launched attack routes, highlighting the multi-vector approach used during the raids.



10:01 PM · Jun 28, 2025

Here’s the original source writing in English (the original was in what I take to be Farsi):

𔓙ســـهیل @Soheil2N

I never made such a claim. All of them are routes used by Israeli fighter jets. Routes one and four were also used for launching stand-off ballistic missiles.

6:14 AM · Jun 29, 2025

I’m not suggesting that Iran’s air defense system operated optimally, nor that it suffered no damage. What I understand from perusing the internet is that much of that air defense system surrounding primary target areas near major cities was suppressed electronically. That was overcome as time passed.

Now, I can’t vouch for the truth of this next item, although I suspect that—allowing for exaggeration—there is significant truth in it:

Iran engaged under 5% of defensive might against Israel; true strength yet to show: Senior cmdr.

Brigadier General Mohammad-Reza Naghdi, the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC)’s deputy commander for coordination, made the remarks during a televised interview on Saturday.

“Less than five percent of our country’s defensive capacity was actually activated” during the Islamic Republic’s counterstrikes against the regime, he noted.

“And by ‘activated’ I do not mean ‘spent.’ It merely means that five percent of our defense units became engaged with the enemy,” the official stated.

“This means our principal capabilities remain untouched and have not entered the fray at all,” he noted, reasserting, “The full magnitude of our forces has yet to reveal itself; it has not even come onto the stage [yet].”

Patarames comments on this claim and tempers it:

Patarames @Pataramesh

Two points:

- There is no such thing as 'sneaky' in warfare

- Only if you have assured passive protection, like in the case with Iran's missile cities, can you have the luxury to not fully commit to a conflict.

Yes the 'sneaky' Israeli surprise attack, prepared for years, incentivized  Iran’s missile units to not operate at full force

 5% of the units committed, while 95% weathered the storm of FPV drones, Spike ATGMs, miniature cruise-missiles?

Maybe, but certainly less than ~1/3 of the units

An important consideration to keep in mind going forward: Iran has received considerable assistance already from Russia and China. For example, my understanding is that the guidance for Iranian missiles is provided by dual use tech from China. I suspect—based on the rapid fire trips to Moscow and Beijing by top Iranian officials—that Iran understands that its strategy of hunkering down and reacting with ballistic missiles, while it proved effective, is definitely not optimal. I don’t know about China’s system, but the Russian system of integrating manned aircraft into the air defense system, will probably be attractive to Iran going forward.

MenchOsint makes a valid point in this regard:

MenchOsint @MenchOsint

10h

That massive Mossad sabotage operation left Iran in a difficult position to defend the country... without this we would have certainly seen some F-16 & F-35 down, and the Ballistic Missile salvos would have been more intense/accurate.

It’s likely that the Mossad/CIA sabotage network was fully activated, and thus has been mostly used up. To the extent that it hasn’t been expended, Iran has learned what it must do. In a second round USrael will lack that advantage—for the most part.