Everyone’s talking about F-16s to Ukraine—or somewhere bordering Ukraine. Some say it’ll be a game changer—where have we heard that before?—and others say, Nay. I come down in the latter group. Here are some informed views, and the informed views tend toward the view that the use of F-16s against Russia will accomplish little beyond angering Russia further. In other words, it’s a bad idea.
Sy Hersh recently updated a substack to include comments by someone I took to be well connected in either DoD or the Intel Cabal regarding this scheme—”a knowledgeable American official”. In the earlier version the American official had focused on Eastern Europeans—led by the Poles—looking for a way out, an exit strategy, because even these fanatical Russia haters are seeing things headed south. In the update, among other things, the American official flat out states that the F-16s will be shot down by Russia “as soon as they get into the war zone.”
There is a reality that some elements in the American intelligence community can’t ignore, the official said, even if the White House is ignoring it: “Ukraine is running out of money and it is known that the next four or months are critical. And Eastern Europeans are talking about a deal.” The issue for them, the official told me, “is how to get the United States to stop supporting Zelensky,” The White House support goes beyond the needs of the war: “We are paying all of the retirement funds—the 401k’s—for Ukraine.”
And Zelensky wants more, the official said.
“Zelensky is telling us that if you want to win the war you’ve got to give me more money and more stuff. He tells us, ‘I’ve got to pay off the generals.’ He’s telling us”—if he is forced out of office—“he’s going to the highest bidder. He’d rather go to Italy than stay and possibly get killed by his own people.”
“All of this talk is being reported and is now flying around inside the American intelligence community, but, as usual,” the official said, “it’s not clear to the intelligence community what the president and his foreign policy aides in the White House know of the reality” of the European discussion about finding a way to end the war.
“We are still training Ukrainians how to fly our F-16s that will be shot down by Russia as soon as they get into the war zone. The mainstream press is dedicated to Biden and the war and Biden is still talking about the Great Satan in Moscow while the Russian economy is doing great.
Yesterday I was listening to Alexander Mercouris who was saying that, while this move angered the Russians, they don’t seem particularly concerned about the F-16s per se. I would add that the Russians have had recent and continuing experience with front line versions of the F-16 as flown by Turkey and Israel in the skies around Syria. They undoubtedly know a thing or two by now.
Also yesterday, Andrei Martyanov quoted Lt. Col. Daniel Davis, who pointed out some of the complexities of deploying modern aircraft to modern war zones, supposedly to be used by new and inexperienced pilots and ground crews:
For starters, it will take a long time to adequately train Ukrainian pilots and maintenance crews to be able to fly the jets into combat and keep them airworthy. In February, Undersecretary of Defense Colin Kahl said it would take between 18 and 24 months to get pilots and maintenance crews trained, airframes procured, and delivered on site for use. Yet a leaked Air Force assessment leaked last Thursday suggested the training time might be as few as four months. Even if that were true — and in all likelihood that would get pilots to a minimum capacity to fly the jets but be far from proficient in air-to-air combat — the process to identify F-16s from partner countries, get them airworthy, and then deliver them with the full contingent of maintenance supplies, spare parts, and ammunition, will likely take into 2024.
There is little likelihood, therefore, the fighters will see combat over the skies of Ukraine this year. Secondly, while the F-16 is clearly one of the best fourth-generation fighter jets in the world, its primary effectiveness is predicated on being one component in an integrated command and control battle management system of sensors. While the jet is capable of operating on its own, it is far less capable without additional acquisition assets, such as the E-3 Sentry AWACS. To date, there has been no discussion of providing this capability to Ukraine. Third, the F-16 is not a stealth aircraft. It was first delivered to the active Air Force in 1979, and it is vulnerable to Russian air defenses, such as the S-300 and more advanced S-400 air defense systems. One of the reasons the Ukrainian Air Force has played such a minimal role in this war has been their inability to neutralize the Russian air defense networks. While the F-16 is more capable than the MiG-29s the Ukrainians have been using, it is still vulnerable to attack by Russia’s air defenses.
By the way, what Davis says with regard to the F-16—that its real effectiveness comes from being “one component in an integrated command and control battle management system of sensors”—mirrors in a way the problem of the Patriot system. The Patriot is also designed to be just one part of a complex and multi-layered air defense system. It does not sound like that is the case in Ukraine—not by a long shot.
However, for a really deep dive into all the issues surrounding use of the F-16 against Russia, go to this substack:
A long thread on the challenges facing the Ukrainian Air Force *if* they receive F-16s anytime soon.
The author describes his credentials as follows:
I earned my Associates in Applied Science while on active duty in the US Air Force. That “science”? Aircraft Armament Maintenance. This is fancy speak for everything that makes other stuff blow up. We used to have a saying, “we kill people and break their shit” or “without Weapons, its just U.S. Air.” I served in the USAF from 2002 to 2014 as an aircraft maintenance Craftsman-level technician (Helper, Apprentice, Journeyman, Craftsman, Senior) on the flightline directly involved with gun, launcher, bomb racks, and countermeasures maintenance, inspection and fuzing/wiring of munitions, loading of munitions, performing pre-flight, thru-flight, post-flight, & post-firing inspections & maintenance on all of the previous items both conventional and nuclear, performed scheduled maintenance preventative maintenance, and some phased maintenance. My experience spans primarily F-16 C/D/CJ/DJ and F-15C/D/Es, though I do also have some gunship, helo, and UAV experience from my short stint in AFSOC. In addition, I assisted crew chiefs and avionics personnel in their tasks as needed, especially while deployed. I later worked in backshop maintenance on the M61A1 20mm gatling gun, then set maintenance priorities for all maintenance actions as an expeditor-- not just for armament, but also crew chiefs, avionics, and support facilities.
The thread is lengthy, but his initial and guiding point is simply this:
I feel there is a huge disconnect in the current discourse between flying fighter aircraft and what it actually takes for the aircraft to fly.
He starts out the section that is directly related to Ukrainian conditions by comparing the F-16 and the MiG-29 from the standpoint of utilizing less than perfect airfields. The F-16 comes out the loser, for a variety of reasons. It is not designed to take off and land on rough air strips or even roads and is highly vulnerable to FOD—foreign object damage. The MiG-29, by contrast, was designed with precautions against FOD. Moreover, it has two engines compared to the single engine of the F-16, giving it a measure of backup safety (he explains the circumstances, as well as the extraordinary measures that need to be taken to prepare an airstrip for use by F-16s).
Here’s one example of maintenance problems, again comparing the MiG to the F-16:
If your radar malfunctions in a MiG, you play “swap a box”: radar, control module, avionics boxes. You have plenty of all of these items on hand or close, and while inconvenient, is logistically do-able from any of a number of depots scattered across the country. Radar malfunctions on an F-16, sure you can play “swap-a-box” but your logistics chain is much longer & you cant haul an entire squadron of spare aircraft parts from one location to another because its all you have. To spare your ballooning logistics chain, you’re better off having specialists who can trouble shoot the issue to one, certain, spot, & replace just what needs replaced without guessing. We haven’t even delved into the technical data (instructions for how to do LITERALLY EVERYTHING), which is all written in English, even for Polish aircraft.
There’s lots more, but this will suffice as a sort of bottom line:
This isn’t a Patriot battery. This isn’t an armored vehicle. What happens when you screw up the maintenance on a Patriot launcher? It doesn’t work. What happens when you drop a screw in the engine bay of a Leopard? It’ll be there next time you tear it apart.
What happens when you flub the maintenance or drop a bolt in an F-16? The pilot may die and the aircraft may turn into a multi-million dollar lawn dart. Maintenance on these things is SERIOUS business. Do you know how much time on airframe your average USAF Staff Sergeant Crew Chief Craftsman has on the F-16? 10-12 years.
His concluding paragraphs are trenchant, to say the least:
The MiG-29 averages about 11 hrs of maintenance for every ONE hr of flight. The F-16? A whopping increase to 18.5 maintenance hrs for every one hr of flight time. These are per aircraft with experienced crews. These figures also assume decent airframe hours on the aircraft. There are no “cherry” low flight time F-16s for Ukraine. Any they get will be worn and require even more specialized maintenance. You can forget AMARG F-16s from the Boneyard in Tuscon too. While they are older models with less capability, aside from the handful kept in ready storage to replace unexpected losses, the remainder would require MONTHS to regenerate to combat ready status. In reality, the F-16s that Ukraine may get in the short term are high-hour, maintenance intensive Block 20, 30 or 40 models from European allies.
I also argue that the announcement may end up disappointing many pro-Ukrainian accounts when they realize there is fine print. This is a “long-term security package”— to me, this screams political double speak. In other words, “Yes, Ukraine is eventually getting F-16s but Maybe this year, maybe next, but most likely after the war is over.” Why? Maintenance training and suitable airfield availability. Unless they are planning on flying from airfields in Poland, which would put the east of Ukraine out of range (no aerial refueling capability, remember?) and risk Russian retaliation to a NATO member, or exposing their new fighters to Russian missile and drone attacks by using established airfields, there is very limited ability to utilize these effectively right now.
Regarding escalation, readers may recall that I recently wrote about John Helmer’s suggestion that NATO might turn an upcoming air war exercise into an attack on Russia. Citing Will Schryver, I maintained that I found this idea of escalation to be highly unlikely. Alexander Mercouris has argued over the last several days that the announcement of F-16s to Ukraine may be a somewhat different thing—a bluff wrapped in a threat of escalation. As already mentioned, Mercouris notes that the Russians appear to be entirely unfazed by the prospect of F-16s in the regional air space. However, Mercouris argues that this ploy may be a bluff. The idea is to communicate to Russia that, no matter how many Patriots or F-16s the Russians destroy, the US will always be ready to up the ante. The idea is to bluff the Russians into agreeing to a “frozen conflict” and establishment of a DMZ as in Korea.
I find this scenario to also be also highly improbable and, in fairness, Mercouris doesn’t argue that it is likely—he simply suggests that this is the Neocon strategy. As I’ve argued in the past, this Neocon fantasy tactic amounts to bluffing Russia into agreeing to be defeated while they’re actually winning. Not gonna happen, and I’m pleased to see that Doug Macgregor agrees with me (below). The whole thing is simply a non-starter, and yet that’s the best the Neocons can come up with. They remain fanatically committed to prosecuting this losing war against Russia.
Macgregor goes further and adds that, while Russia might be willing to grant a small sliver of Western Ukraine to Poland, Russia will certainly take Kharkov and Odessa and insist on a disarmed rump Ukraine, if it doesn’t actually push up to the Polish border (Mercouris agrees with this).
Macgregor’s other important point is that the US is finding itself unable to adequately support its war effort for the long term. The Russians are certainly aware of this. This argues strongly that, assuming as I do that the Russians will call the Neocon bluff, the US will ultimately forced to find some way out. Mercouris, along with Macgregor, calls all this “desperate” and “out of touch.” Sooner rather than later reality will force itself upon the American Empire’s war mindset.
You can get a development of these ideas in the video below. However, for now I want to turn to the Culture War, which Macgregor also articulates (beginning around 18:00). This is a useful reminder that the entire war on Russia is part of the Neocon/Globalist war on Western Civilization. It’s not just Russia—it’s us, too. The same people are behind it all and Macgregor traces the supremacy of this cabal back to the Clinton years. Here’s my transcript of the relevant part—you can’t get away from this connections:
[17:30] Anyone who walked into the Oval Office or into the conference rooms of the NSC staff and said the things that I do would be escorted off the grounds immediately. This is an ideologically pure organization that has decided that it is winning a war or must win a war against Russia in order to extend LGBTQRS-and-everything-else to the rest of the world. And that our way is the only way. It's us or destruction. There can be no compromise. We are right, we are morally superior, the Russians are evil and deserve to be destroyed. If you don't take that position, you are OUT. I saw this during the interventions in the Balkans. If you weren't willing to walk into the room with the various Clintonistas at that point, who were advocating bombing Serbia, and you didn't cheer it on--'I'm gonna get these Serbs and teach them a lesson and force diversity on them!' and so forth--if you didn't do that your were OUT. The same thing is true now. [18:40]
[19:00] The ideologues who are running the show now, who see themselves as morally superior, they remind me very much of the Bolsheviks in 1917, 18, and 19, who essentially just described the world as something that deserved to be ravaged and conquered as soon as possible, and raised armies for the purpose of doing it. ... They were unyielding, uncompromising, and that's who we have in Washington. ... These are people who are gonna force everyone down the road that they have decided is appropriate--domestically and overseas. I don't think it's gonna work. I think it's gonna collapse on them, but right now they're in charge. [19:38]
What seems very strange, if not downright perverse, is the Zhou-Zelensky relationship. Neither can stand up to the other and say, “I’m washing my hands of you. This war is over.” They can’t separate and call it off because each needs the other to keep the hideous anti-Russian sharade going, the $$ flowing into the overseas coffers, and lives of the citizenry be da—ed. What a vile and macabre duo - as Hersh comments, Zhou exists in his own ghoulish Neocon bubble, and it’s next to impossible for others, including Burns, to impress reality upon him. So Zelensky uses Zhou’s senility to prolong the agony of impending defeat, and Zhou uses Z as a poster boy for “democracy,” to cover his venality. When the break comes…well, as Mercouris would say, “we’ll just have to see.”
I think there was more driving the Serbia War, than the Social Justice angle.