Compare And Contrast: Macgregor and Mearsheimer

This afternoon Doug Macgregor published a new article at American Conservative. I was struck with a contrast in Macgregor’s article with a common view held by many other commentators on the Ukraine conflict. It’s common to encounter the view that, in the initial drive toward Kiev, Putin simply screwed up. He committed too few men for the task at hand and underestimated the Ukrainians. Macgregor’s version of this is interesting, although I think Mearsheimer’s current view is an improvement. Here’s the link:

Make Peace, You Fools!

Macgregor begins by recounting Douglas MacArthur’s big gamble in the Korean War—his successful gamble. That was his bold, encircling landing at Inchon, which flew in the face of the safer consensus of an incremental breakout from Pusan. That would have been a bit like the breakout from the Normandy beachhead. MacArthur was, by nature, a risk taker. Putin is not:

In February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin opted for incrementalism in his approach to the “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine. Putin committed fewer than 100,000 Russian troops to a shallow penetration attack on a broad front into a country the size of Texas. Having failed over a period of nearly 15 years to persuade Washington and the collective West of Moscow’s opposition to NATO’s advance to the east, Putin seems to have concluded that Washington and its NATO allies would prefer immediate negotiations to a destructive regional war with unknowable potential for escalation to the nuclear level.

Putin was wrong. He made a false assumption based on rational choice theory.

Yes and no, as Mearsheimer points out. Putin wasn’t exactly wrong. His goal was to get Ukraine to the negotiating table. He accomplished that goal and actually got Ukrainian signatures on a draft treaty. To that extent Putin’s strategy was a major success. It’s just that he underestimated the Neocon delusional commitment to destructive regional warfare. So Putin adapted.

Putin is not a risk-taker. [He] rapidly reoriented Russian forces to the strategic defense, an economy of force measure designed to minimize Russian losses while maximizing Ukrainian losses until Russian Forces could return to offensive operations. The Russian change in strategy has worked.

That strategy is the war of attrition, which Mearsheimer agrees has been a major success—although Mearsheimer seems to have come to a fuller appreciation of that success fairly recently. Macgregor, too, seems to be a proponent of the all out offensive.

... but the success is making the conflict currently more dangerous than at any point since it began in February 2022. Why? Defensive operations do not win wars, and Washington continues to believe Ukraine can win.

As a result, it is a good bet that Washington and its allies will continue to provide equipment and ammunition, though probably not in the quantities and of the quality they did in the recent past.

Here, again, I have to disagree with Macgregor—in spite of his insider contacts. There have been plenty of articles leaking that the US military understands full well that Ukraine can’t win and isn’t receiving the tools of warfare that could even make that arguably possible. The most recent such article was a major expose in the WSJ. The actual belief appears to be that the Ukrainians will somehow be able to inflict some significant damage on the Russians. That has turned out to be as deluded as the notion that the Ukrainians can win.

Macgregor then turns to Poland, which has been a major bugbear for him. Mearsheimer, too, is concerned at the prospect that NATO could become directly involved in Ukraine if Ukraine collapses. Macgregor paints a stark picture:

Warsaw, whose leadership of NATO’s anti-Russian crusade is prized in Washington, finds comfort in the Beltway’s belief in Russian military weakness. So much so, that Warsaw seems willing to risk direct confrontation with Moscow.

America’s proxy war with Russia has transformed Ukraine into a graveyard. Indulging Poland’s passion for war with Russia encourages Poland to follow the Ukrainian example. The very idea must leave Moscow no choice but to bring all of Russia’s military power to bear simultaneously against Ukraine, before the collective West stumbles into regional war. Make peace, you fools, before it’s too late.

Actually, Macgregor’s fear is that the Poles will try to be the tail wagging the American dog. In other words, he fears that the Poles will embark on a suicidal adventure in order to bring the US riding to their rescue—and full scale involvement in a crusade against Russia.

I remain skeptical. For all the bellicosity of the Polish regime, Polish public opinion is firmly, overwhelmingly, against such and adventure. Serving Polish officers have also exhibited a salutary degree of caution when it comes to all out war with Russia, despite their whole hearted support for the American adventure in Ukraine.