Triggered by a comment from Yancey Ward, I did a search to find out what I could regarding the current state of Hezbollah’s air defenses. It’s a timely topic because, if Hezbollah opens a northern front with Israel as threatened, Israel—based on its 2006 experience—would likely prefer to spar with Hezbollah at long range, rather than via a land invasion. Hezbollah, I surmised, has probably been preparing for such an eventuality. Most searches that I framed returned results dealing with Israeli defenses against Hezbollah missiles. However, I did come up with an article from just four months ago. That article—from which I’ll quote the two concluding paragraphs—confirms that Hezbollah has been busily beefing up its air defenses for at least the last four years:
Hezbollahs Growing Air Defence Capabilities Raise Concerns For Israeli Air Force In Lebanon
The growing threat posed by Hezbollah’s air defence systems has prompted the Israeli army to reassess its strategy. Initially considering the possibility of targeting Hezbollah’s air defence systems, the Israeli military subsequently removed the issue from its agenda. This decision likely stems from the realization that Hezbollah’s capabilities have significantly advanced while attempting such a strike could trigger a dangerous escalation.
Hezbollah’s doubling of air defense systems and the subsequent restriction it poses to the Israeli Air Force’s freedom of action in Lebanon has become a cause for concern in the Israeli military establishment. With Hezbollah acquiring Russian and Iranian air defense systems and demonstrating an ability to shoot down Israeli drones, the strategic balance in the region is shifting. The Israeli army’s dilemma in balancing the need for security with concerns of escalation underscores the complexity of the situation. As Hezbollah continues to enhance its air defence capabilities, it remains to be seen how this dynamic will evolve and impact the already tense relationship between Israel and Lebanon.
In past years, ten years or more ago, one would have expected the Israelis to immediately strike at Hezbollah’s new defenses. The fact that Israel felt compelled to back off from its usual aggressive approach suggests that Hezbollah’s capabilities have “significantly advanced” beyond any point that limited strikes could address. That’s something to keep in mind as the current crisis unfolds. It also reminds one of Alastair Crooke’s suspicion that Hezbollah could have some surprises up its sleeve. That it hasn’t revealed the full extent of its upgrades.
Earlier this afternoon I listened to a video with Max Blumenthal—yes, Sid “Vicious” Blumenthal’s son. The interview and a text summary of much of what was discussed (with Stephen Gardner) appears here:
Journalist Max Blumenthal breaks down Israel’s massive influence over US foreign policy
Journalist Max Blumenthal warns that the conflict in Israel is 'moving to a hot war much faster than the Russia-Ukraine situation.'
The interview is 47 minutes long. Roughly the first half, or a bit less, is devoted to Blumenthal’s summary of Palestinian - Israeli relations. The remainder is devoted to Israel’s influence on US politics, which translates into influence on foreign policy. I found it rather informative and interesting:
Must read by Arnaud Bertrand at MoA. He goes out on a limb where I'd hesitate to go. Some highlights:
https://www.moonofalabama.org/2023/10/arnaud-bertrand-how-israel-stepped-into-a-trap.html#more
One of the more interesting arguments I've been seeing A LOT on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is: "Hamas undoubtedly predicted Israel's massive retaliation, that makes them all the more guilty for sacrificing Palestinian lives".
What people don't realize is that the fact this reaction - the massive collective punishment - was indeed immensely predictable says just as much about Israel than it does about Hamas.
It says a lot about Israel for 3 reasons. 1) It says a lot about Israel's image that it was expected to react with massive collective punishment, violating international law. 2) It also says a lot about Israel's inability to think strategically that it would react in exactly the way its adversary predicted it to. Revenge is not a strategy, in fact it is the opposite of strategic. And, lastly 3) it says a lot that Israel doesn't seem to have learned a thing from the US's immense mistakes in its post 9-11 response.
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from where I am standing, Israel is losing big time by playing into the hand of its adversary. Even Europe - Europe! - is on the verge today of breaking ranks ... This is on top of renewed support for the Palestinian cause by the Muslim world,
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This war also reveals something interesting, and I'll end with this. It reveals how much power and influence the wider West has lost in driving the global conversation. ... Today by contrast it is so overwhelming that even Europe - Europe! - feels compelled to dissent. Which of course they'd never do out of pure morality, they do so because they have their back against the wall, ... Heck we just saw that the US asked China - China! - to "use its influence to push for calm in the Middle-East": this would have been absolutely unthinkable 22 years ago,
Sensible article by LJ:
https://sonar21.com/is-israel-unprepared-to-fight-hamas/
Supply shortages, lack of training and/or experience, inherent difficulty of urban combat ...