The Duran guys have a fairly sophisticated discussion today regarding all the recent buzz about a ceasefire in Ukraine. You can find their video on Youtube—it’s only about a half an hour long: UKRAINE ceasefire and the negotiation trap. What I’ll do in the first part of this post is present a mix of their ideas with a few additions of my own, trying to keep it succinct.
We start with the obvious. Ukraine is losing America’s proxy war against Russia, and may not make it to the November elections. To the extent that the American public has been paying attention, most know that this war is, in fact, an American war. That means that a Ukrainian defeat will be perceived as an American defeat or, more precisely, a Dem defeat. Yes, I know that many of the most vociferous war mongers have been GOPers, but that’s not how politics works. That being the case, the motive for some sort of ceasefire is fairly clear: 1) prevent a disaster for the Dems before the election, and 2) possibly even sell this as a win for Kama Sutra. The goal is to thwart Trump, more than it is to help the Dems, per se. A pre-election swap-out of Zhou could play into this, but that’s more speculative.
More from Captain Obvious. The Russians aren’t about to agree to any ceasefire when they’re on the cusp of a huge strategic victory over the Anglo-Zionists. They may have been willing in the early going of the war, but at this point Putin cannot do that for both strategic and domestic reasons. The catch for Russia is that some of their allies are none too keen on the whole idea of solving international affairs through warfare, and so Russia has to pretend to be still open to negotiations. It’s a game for the benefit of its three biggest international partners: China, India, and Brazil—BRIC.
Despite all you may have heard from John Mearsheimer about the China Threat, China happens to be one of those countries that would have preferred something other than a war in Ukraine. It’s not that China has any illusions about the Anglo-Zionists, but they’d rather make commerce. Thus China has attempted to intercede, but it’s important to bear in mind that China has done this strictly on its own account. Xi owes nothing to the Anglo-Zionists in a political sense. His power base is strictly based in China. Putin has had to play along with the Chinese, but he has also had a strong hand to play, as well—thanks to continual ham handed Anglo-Zionist attempts to bully China and even threats of war on China by 2025. Putin’s backing has been invaluable for China in that regard. Ukrainian intransigence—again, mandated by the Anglo-Zionists—was the last straw for the Chinese. They’re now out of the ceasefire game.
Matters are a bit different with India and Brazil. India’s Modi is susceptible to pressure from the Anglo-Zionists to a certain extent. As we discussed the other day, that doesn’t mean that India is about to fall in line with sanctions against Russia—far from it. For starters, India is heavily dependent on Russian energy supplies as well as Russian military technology. Nevertheless, the ueber wealthy India expat execs in the US tech sector do wield influence in Indian politics and do favor close Indian - Anglo-Zionist ties. This explains why Modi made his trip to Kiev—where the exchanges, however, were nowhere near as cordial as they were once he moved on to Moscow. It appears that Modi surely understands the game that’s being played.
With Brazil’s Lula matters are a bit different. Normally you would have expected that the leftist Lula would have been eager to please Putin. However, we’re learning that Lula may owe his election to Anglo-Zionist support. The Anglo-Zionists may be rabidly anti-Russian, but they’re also rabidly infected with TDS. Lula’s opponent, Bolsonaro, was a bit of a South American Trump, so he had to go. Brazil is a bit too big and unwieldy for the usual Latin American regime change operation—Brazil is a far cry from Honduras—so Anglo-Zionist support had to be somewhat discrete, although the preference was clear. As a result, Lula has been surprisingly standoffish with Putin, and Putin has had to play along with this.
The result is that, for strategic geopolitical reasons, Putin has felt it necessary to repeat, every now and then, that Russia has always been open to negotiations and still is. And just to prove the point—or, maybe, to provide Modi and Lula with a bit of cover—Putin set out the preconditions for the start of negotiations. Those preconditions amounted to Ukrainian capitulation before negotiations even began—something the Anglo-Zionists could never allow. People like John Helmer were unable to grok this Putinesque judo move, but that’s what it was. That’s where matters stand, and on the battlefield the Russian military continues to make steady progress, with the news from the fronts—multiple fronts—becoming more dire by the day.
Now, it’s been some time since I’ve quoted one of Friend George’s missives. As it happens, yesterday’s plays into this whole theme. I’ll excerpt it here—see what you think:
Official Russian statements and documents are exquisitely designed. They want to be listened to with care, and “care” means that you will want to judge your own thinking on the relevant topics by asking whether the Russian statements make sense to you, and if/when they do not make sense, store them in the special place called “do not forget”, just in case subsequent events shed light on the intended message that then does finally make sense. You might call this the “Munich 2007 Rule”: Those who didn’t understand Putin then are coming to understand him now. They don’t like it but their obstinacy does not save them. That means that official Russian statements or documents want to be treated as a voice in a dialogue. Those who do not wish to do that or who are incapable of doing it do cannot accuse the Russians of any aggression or crime with any legitimacy.
Well, things are coming to a head. The target date in the US elections. All of a sudden, there is renewed talk of reviving negotiations with Russia over Ukraine. I’ll make some remarks about our Indian diplomat friend, MKB, in a moment (Russia offsets Ukraine’s Kursk offensive, September 8, 2024 by M. K. BHADRAKUMAR). Even Scholz has spoken with Zelensky and he thinks now is a time to move to peace. We have been through this before. Trump gave a speech to the Economic Club in New York, where he was asked about sanctions. Here is a video clip of his answer:
Trump Vows To Remove All Sanctions On Russia Amid Ukraine War, Cites This Reason
Trump contends that he applied sanctions tactically and removed them as quickly as possible because sanctions harm the dollar over the long run. Moreover, “we are losing Russia, we are losing Iran, and the Chinese want to make their currency dominant... which would be the equivalent of losing a war.”
I present two comments on what Trump said. One by an idiot and one by Dmitry Medvedev.
First, the idiot:
Dances_with_Bears @bears_with
Trump announces bribe to oligarchs, Central Bank, Kremlin to stop Russian General Staff offensive to Kiev, Lvov, Odessa before November 5: sanctions relief in exchange for Istanbul-II and Russian acceptance of US dollar dominance]
“Dances with Bears,” just in case your memory is a bit leaky, is John Helmer. Those of you who understand spoken English are invited to listen to the video clip I linked. Helmer offers us an interpretation, one that rests on two specific assumptions: Trump does not know that Ukraine is approaching collapse and that this collapse may well occur before November 5. (There is no evidence that Putin or the General Staff are fine tuning the timing of Ukraine military operations to keep a negotiation window open following November 5, in which Russia would make any concessions.) In the video clip, you will hear Trump say explicitly that the number of Ukrainian causalities is far higher than his New York audience is being told. He does not cite any numbers but he speaks as if his information is authoritative. Not long ago, Trump was asked whether he is still receiving intelligence briefings from the “IC”, and he responded that he has refused these briefings because “I know what’s going on” and because the IC people leak items from their briefings and then accuse the recipient of being responsible for the leak. That is quite subtle because the second part of reply is simple – he prefers not being subjected to entrapment – but the first part revives the old agonizing shrieks of the IC that Trump doesn’t trust them. So in fact, the issue of sanctions – listen to the clip – is embedded in the conflicts all over the world, all of which have as their trajectory the weakening of the position of the dollar, and all of which are the topics of incompetence of the IC. Trump therefore claimed he would lift sanctions on both Russia and Iran.
The second assumption is that Trump believes that the US or NATO have any leverage over what happens now in Ukraine. That assumption includes the sub-assumption that Trump does not know that all the hectic activity – Ramstein – occurring now is a PR farce. If he does not know that it is a PR farce, he will not have seen the window of opportunity to softly convey the “big picture” to the Economics Club, which is that all current trajectories point to a diminution of US power, which is ultimately based on the trust and confidence in the dollar.
The logic of Medvedev’s response is faultless. I could play the “journalist” and pick out relevant sections of his Telegram message, but I prefer to give you the whole thing:
https://t.me/medvedev_telegramE/24
Out of spite for the current administration, Donald Trump has threatened to lift sanctions against Russia. But will he really do it if elected?
No, of course not. For all his apparent bravado as an “outsider”, Trump is ultimately an establishment insider. Yes, he is an eccentric narcissist, but he is also a pragmatist. As a businessman, Trump understands that sanctions harm the dollar’s dominance in the world. However, that’s insufficient reason to stage a revolution in the United States and go against the anti-Russian line of the notorious Deep State, which is much stronger than any Trump.
But what about Harris? You shouldn’t expect any surprises from her. She is inexperienced and, according to her enemies, just plain stupid. Beautiful meaningless speeches and boring “correct” answers to questions will be prepared for her, which she will read off a teleprompter while laughing contagiously.
There were sanctions against the USSR throughout the 20th century, and they’ve returned on an unprecedented scale in the 21st. So, it’s sanctions forever. Or rather, until the US collapses during an imminent new civil war. After all, Hollywood makes films about this for a reason.
You may not immediately notice that Medvedev’s message is “layered,” or, to use a perhaps better analogy, it resembles a Möbius strip. It seems to be a “strip” in the sense of a logical band with a beginning and an end, but the beginning and the end meet with a twist.
Firstly, let’s imagine that Medvedev decided to ignore what Trump said. Is that possible? – No, it is not possible. The Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council has to respond. Russia has to respond. Russia and Trump are therefore talking to each other. There are laws against that in the US, i.e., a “private person” conducting a private foreign policy, but no one is trying to take Trump to court over that.
Various responses are logically possible but they are actually forbidden. Could Medvedev have said, “hmmm, Trump has an interesting insight, i.e, that the US has been shooting itself in the foot with the sanctions, so maybe we can get along with him”? No, Medvedev could say no such thing because the immediate issue is the Drang toward negotiations over Ukraine, and by admitting that Trump has an interesting insight Medvedev would be conceding that Trump has leverage in that negotiation process. So Medvedev is actually responding to John Helmer: Russia is not susceptible to blackmail, but that is not equivalent to saying that Medvedev accuses Trump of attempting to blackmail Russia.
It may be useful to know that this aspect of Medvedev’s message is classic Russian foreign policy. Years ago, Lavrov articulated the point: Sanctions against Russia are nothing that Russia will ever negotiate about. Russia will never sit at a negotiating table and request that sanctions be lifted in exchange for some other quid pro quo. Those who have applied sanctions can lift them if they wish, but Russia will never ask them to do that and will therefore never use the carrot of sanctions in any bargaining process.
In fact, Medvedev does not accuse Trump of trying to blackmail Russia. His message is quite simple and it is an intelligence assessment: “...Trump understands that sanctions harm the dollar’s dominance in the world. However, that’s insufficient reason to stage a revolution in the United States and go against the anti-Russian line of the notorious Deep State, which is much stronger than any Trump.”
If that is simply true, as Medvedev represents the case of the power of the Deep State versus Trump, then Trump will not be President of the United States. Oh, but wait a second: they did try to kill him. That is rather desperate because it indicates that there is little room for “compromise” between Trump and the Deep State. I have discussed the theatrics around this issue. The attempted assassination triggered the ultimate decision in favor of J.D. Vance versus Mike Pompeo as VP. I have not discussed the further theatrics: RFK Jr testified that he talked to Trump just hours, 2 hours, after the attempt. Ergo, the attempted assassination triggered RFK Jr to join with Trump. – Was this all planned?
On the other hand -- Möbius strip – Medvedev inserts something into his message that a large conglomeration of people are beginning to realize or suspect, and it sends them into paroxysms of rage: “For all his apparent bravado as an ‘outsider’, Trump is ultimately an establishment insider.”
I have always insisted that Trump is an institutional figure. He was “chosen.” – The audience of the Economic Club in New York did not seem to be anti-Russian. Had that been the case, the question of sanctions would not have been raised. How convenient that was, to have a member of the audience raise the question of sanctions. Trump gave a big speech and didn’t touch the issue. The orchestration made it look as if it was a key issue on the minds of business people. Oh, wow! Business people have a “big picture” view of the world?! Since when do we expect such things from such a group?
Then, however, there is a direct relationship between the issue of sanctions – Russia and Iran – and lifting sanctions because the role of the dollar – its dominance is over – is endangered, and the collapse of America in civil war if the Deep State anti-Russia faction were to win out. Medvedev, therefore, did what he had to do. He had to respond to Trump. But he left the ultimate fight undecided because that is a battle where Russia has no leverage.
If Friend George’s contention that Trump is fronting for some faction of the ruling class reminds you to some extent of Tom Luongo and the Theory of Everything—remember?—well …
November? Sometimes it seems less than two months off. Other times it seems like an eternity.
Yowzers!
“Or rather, until the US collapses during an imminent new civil war. After all, Hollywood makes films about this for a reason.”
Caution about Indians not born in India and Indian ex-pats actually living in US/Canada/England: they are not generally pro-Modi, though they don’t talk about it publicly, and they have virtually zero impact on what Modi and the current regime does. India wants to be seen as something of a peacemaker. Importantly, Hinduism, not secular western forces, is rising rapidly in India. Just as the ROC is in Russia and spiritually is rapidly rising in China: their public talk about “morality” being the basis of politics and culture.
The Indians in Silicon Valley, as an example, have more sway on the West than India, and the more secular one is, the less connected to India one is likely to be. The Indians around the world that are still connected to India, as a culture, they even have an app to stay connected, tend to be lower down the economic scale and spread out around the world.