The topic of John Helmer—a Western journalist who is a long time resident in Russia, and commentator on international affairs—has been on my mind this past week. This was a result of at least two recent articles by Helmer that advance themes that are typical of Helmer’s journalism. Some readers may be familiar with Helmer as highly recommended by Alexander Mercouris, on whose show Helmer recently appeared. I don’t share Mercouris’ opinion of Helmer and didn’t waste time watching that. Briefly, Helmer’s Russian sources appear to me to reflect the tradition of Russian “Doomerism”, a term readers may have noticed in recent posts about the Kursk incursion. By “Doomerism” I simply refer to the tendency among Russian nationalists to fear betrayal from within and to see any seeming setback on the battlefield as evidence of betrayal. And, of course, Putin himself is typically seen by these commentators as the key source of betrayal of Russia. Prigozhin appealed directly to that tendency in the Russian psyche, and Simplicius—as an example—sometimes indulges in that direction, although Simplicius generally exercises his critical faculties to avoid extremes.
In general, my criticism of this tendency is, as expressed in a recent post, that it blinds itself to the global character of this war and instead focuses solely on winning the war in Ukraine as rapidly as possible. To my mind, Putin shows a very sound grasp of the bigger picture in all its complexity, which these people have blinded themselves to.
I had been wondering for several days whether it would be worthwhile to critique Helmer’s recent articles. The downside is that it would distract from more serious matters. Fortunately, Will Schryver picked up the ball and launched, to my mind, a devastating attack on Helmer generally. Like Schryver I have, at times, made use of Helmer, particularly in areas such as international finance. For readers who may have been wondering about Helmer—who he is, who his sources are, etc.—here is Schryver’s most recent of several posts directed at Helmer.
Will Schryver @imetatronink
John Helmer Interview
I just finished watching John Helmer @bears_with interviewed on The Duran (linked below).
As some may be aware, John and I engaged in a somewhat acrimonious exchange the other day.
I confess I do not follow Helmer closely, although I have read several of his Dances with Bears articles over the years.
In my view, Helmer is an interesting source when it comes to things he actually knows about. But, as was confirmed yet again to me by this most recent interview, I think Helmer often veers off into subject matter where his actual knowledge is limited, and where his prejudices lead him to false interpretations.
I also believe, as I wrote a few days ago, that he often embellishes rumors, and fallaciously appeals to the imagined authority of unreliable sources within Russia.
Helmer is like a great many Russians and Russophiles who tend to have a very narrow perspective on the hard realities of the geopolitical complexities of our day. This typically manifests itself in what I regard as misconceived and unwarranted criticism of Vladimir Putin.
I have written on this topic several times over the past few years.
As it pertains to the most recent controversy over the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk region, Helmer believes the Russian military was largely cognizant of the AFU buildup in Sumy, and desired to act preemptively, but that their hands were tied by Putin's shortsightedness and reluctance to act boldly and decisively against both Ukraine and its NATO allies.
Helmer consistently paints a picture of Putin's alleged ineptitude, indecisiveness, and vacillations hamstringing the Russian high command. He appears to believe Putin is a weak character who will always be inclined to yield to western pressure and intimidation, and that he will ultimately lead Russia into a resolution of this war that leaves Russia's proclaimed objectives unfulfilled.
In my view, this is utter nonsense.
I address this topic at some length in my late December 2022 article entitled In for A Pound .
I also expand upon these concepts in Part 2 of my analysis of Tucker Carlson's interview of Vladimir Putin in February 2024.
Indeed, it is this latter article that most directly addresses what I consider to be Helmer's misconceptions and misinterpretations in relation to Vladimir Putin. I am confident Helmer will refuse to read either of my articles linked above, but I recommend them to the rest of you.
I remain convinced this war will be decided on the battlefield, and that Russia will dictate hard terms to the west and the remnant of the hapless Ukrainians who chose to destroy their own people in service to the rapidly crumbling Anglo-American empire.
1:58 PM · Aug 30, 2024
My only quibble with Schryver’s critique here is the reference to the “Anglo-American empire”, where I would prefer to refer to the “Anglo-Zionist empire.”
Today Larry Johnson writes about the pickup in the Donbass offensive, and in doing so says something that explains why people like Schryver would have thought the war should have been over sooner:
https://sonar21.com/russias-donbass-offensive-picking-up-steam/
If this was a boxing match and there was a competent referee, this war would be called over — Technical Knock Out (TKO). The carnage Russia is inflicting on Ukraine is growing with each passing day. A year ago, the Russian Ministry of Defense reported an average of 700 Ukrainian casualties a day. Now, that number exceeds 2,000 a day — killed and wounded. The problem confronting Ukrainian commanders is the lack of trained reserves that could be plugged into failing battle lines. Ukraine has no viable system or plan in place to recruit and train 30,000 new soldiers every month. The reality is that Ukraine is throwing an untrained, unprepared cadre of men and women — many who were “press-ganged” into service — into combat, where they face well-trained and equipped Russian forces.
What Schryver--and quite a few others--didn't take into account was 1) the utter depravity of the Anglo-Zionist willingness to destroy Ukraine for their own goals, and 2) the utter depravity of Ukraine's rulers in going along with the national suicide of Ukraine.
"Helmer believes the Russian military was largely cognizant of the AFU buildup in Sumy, and desired to act preemptively, but that their hands were tied by Putin's shortsightedness and reluctance to act boldly and decisively against both Ukraine and its NATO allies."
Hard to see how they could miss the buildup, but I draw a different conclusion, having no opinion of Putin to colour my assessment. I think it was a trap. I can't prove it of course, but it's a strategy that Russia/CCCP has used in the past which is straight out of Sun Tzu: appear weak where you are strong. Draw the enemy in, then surround him.
Notice they didn't have to pull anyone from down south to counter it. Notice how quickly they evacuated the population. Notice that the attackers are now trapped and can't retreat or be resupplied. To free them you'd have to mount another assault, which would end the same way.
An attack on the assembly point in Sumy would have gotten some of them, the rest would have scattered and any damaged equipment could be recovered later. By drawing them into a cauldron you get them all, including mercenary prisoners which scores political points. Also notice the recent prisoner swap where Russia got some of the guys from Kursk back. Normally you'd want the one's who've been captive the longest, not recently captured. Perhaps a small consolation for allowing them to be overrun in an operation they no doubt weren't aware of.
It was a significant force, and it was entirely lost. Well played I would say. Of course no one is going to admit this, and Putin appears suitably outraged and now has an excuse to up the ante, which gets the hawks off his back while at the same time building public support for a more forceful approach, which we're starting to see now.
Again, just my opinion, but it does seem to have worked out rather well for Russia.