Will Israel Start A War With Iran Before Trump Is Inaugurated?

Yesterday, in an article at AmCon, Doug Macgregor made a cogent case that Netanyahu will start a war with Iran before Trump is inaugurated. He went on to expand on that case in interviews with Judge Nap and Danny Davis. The short version of his case can be summarized briefly:

• Netanyahu fears that, as president, Trump will elude entrapment in such a war by opting for sanctions—thus thwarting Netanyahu’s designs.

• Netanyahu believes that the fall of Assad provides Israel with a “window of opportunity” to launch a full scale war that will entrap Trump before Trump is even inaugurated—thus leaving Trump with no choice but to sign on to a crazy war that offers no benefits for America.

I freely grant that this construct makes sense, but I retain serious reservations. To get to those reservations, let’s first provide a slightly long version of Macgregor’s case—in his own (excerpted) words. I’ll interject a few comments and later expand on them:

Iran: America’s Next War Of Choice

The U.S. is at risk of being buffaloed into a bloody war of regional realignment in the wake of Syria’s collapse.

First a quibble. Macgregor’s entire case presumes that Netanyahu will seek to “buffalo” the US into a war that is against America’s interests and that Netanyahu fears Trump will seek to avoid. That’s not how I understand the idea of a “war of choice”. The whole idea is to leave Trump—politically, due to the hold of The Israel Lobby over US policy—with no choice.

Netanyahu’s top priority is the destruction of Iran before Russia wraps up its victory in Ukraine and Syria becomes a new battleground for Turks and Israelis. ... Israeli forces and Turkish auxiliaries (i.e. the Islamist terrorists who sacked Syria) are already staring at each other across a demarcation line that runs east–west just south of Damascus. Netanyahu harbors no illusions about the conflict between Ankara’s long-term strategic aims in the region and Jerusalem’s determination to claim the Syrian spoils of war.

Macgregor is absolutely spot on here, regarding Netanyahu’s priority, and probably regarding the timing as well—before Russia can be fully freed from the Ukraine conflict. Further, he’s right that the Israelis must understand that they are facing a far greater threat than Iran, in the rise of Turkey as a proximate, next door, threat with ambitions to hegemony over Israel—based on historical precedents that Erdogan himself has repeatedly cited.

Trump now confronts the dangerous distraction of wars he did not start, wars that will bring his administration and his country no strategic benefit.

And, of course, a war with Iran will present Trump not only with no benefits, it will also present great risks to America.

Starting the war sooner, rather than later, is critical for Netanyahu. War with Iran presents Trump with a strategic fait accompli.

This is the very heart of Macgregor’s case. In my intro, above, I added the rationale as Netanyahu’s fear that Trump will opt for sanctions rather than war—based on Macgregor’s oral presentations. Again, he’s certainly correct. But here the difficulties arise. Macgregor is solid on the dangers for America in failing to manage its decline from world hegemony, but …

Washington’s refusal to acknowledge the fundamental shifts in power and wealth lie at the heart of much of the Biden administration’s foreign policy failure.

An American failure to manage its own transition to multipolarity will create more chaos and ignite a major war in the Middle East, not to mention a full blown war with Russia, and, eventually, China.

How are we to envision these wars—as serial conflicts or as simultaneous? Note that the US has avoided direct conflicts while the war on Russia continues. That suggests serial wars. The problem with scenario is twofold. First, can the US actually make it through one such war in good enough shape to make it to the second, much less the third war? The reality is that the US, still in the midst of a proxy war on Russia, is in a poor condition to get involved in any wars beyond proxy wars that represent no win situations. Second, the idea that, for example, China and Russia would sit by idly and allow the US a free hand against Iran seems dubious at best. And that spells doom for American hegemony—sooner rather than later.

Washington seems blithely oblivious to Syria’s destruction and the emergence of joint Israeli-Turkish hegemony across the Near East. The disintegration of Syria does, however, open up a short window of opportunity for Tel Aviv to attack Iran.

Macgregor’s argument here rests on the belief that the Zhou regime launched the destruction of Syria without understanding the broader effects that would have on the greater Middle East. That may well be true. However, the idea that the result has been to establish—even temporarily—a “joint Israeli-Turkish hegemony across the Near East” is impossible to accept. The idea of such a hegemony presupposes that Israel and Turkey would act cooperatively across the Near East, but there appears to be no basis for that presupposition. In fact, the concept that there is even a limited joint hegemony in just the Syrian region also seems dubious. Again, more on that below. But the greatest difficulty is the further presupposition that Israel has any reliable basis for predicting how Turkey would act in the eventuality of an Israel - Iran war. Is Israel really ready to risk its existence on the idea that Erdogan would never take advantage of such a war to expand Turkey’s area of active control right up to Israel’s borders?

I’ll finish this part with a final solid prediction by Macgregor:

One predictable consequence of an attack on Iran will be a solidifying of the Chinese-brokered Iran-Saudi rapprochement—and a hardening of the blocs in the Greater Middle East, which will see Iran, backed by Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, set against a temporary Israel-Turkish bloc backed by Washington and its European vassals.

Iran is not Iraq: At 90 million people, it is double Iraq’s population, has a more developed economy, and has more powerful allies than Saddam Hussein ever did. Contrary to neoconservative expectations, there are no cake-walks in the greater Middle East.

My caveat regarding Macgregor’s prediction is based on two ideas. The first is that there really is no “joint hegemony” at all between Turkey and Israel—not even simply in Syria. Turkey has repeatedly protested Israel’s actions, so clearly any understanding is a very loose affair, indeed. Neither player—Netanyahu or Erdogan—is trustworthy, in any event. To act in so momentous a manner as starting a war with Iran without US involvement right from the start looks to me like a risk too far.

So, the second part of my caveat is that Israel would be going into such a war without the ability to prosecute it successfully. I believe Macgregor recognizes that, too, because he did speak of the US being forced to intervene on Israel’s behalf. That presents a grave political problem for any US president—it would go well beyond the type of unconstitutional acts of war that the US has already engaged in because it would risk serious losses. Macgregor recognizes that, too, but doesn’t see any of that as the deterrent that I see in it.

Macgregor, in his oral presentations, also pointed to an important event that undermines his own case—from my perspective. He recounted that, immediately after Assad’s departure, Turkey’s intel chief came to Damascus and prayed at the Umayyad Mosque. Macgregor rightly describes this as conveying an important message from Turkey: The Empire has returned—not just the Ottoman Empire but Turkey as the successor caliphate to the Umayyad Caliphate, whose capital was Damascus. From that standpoint, consider how Turkey views Israel’s threatening military moves in southern Syria, close to Damascus. It doesn’t take much imagination.

In that context, and to underline that Turkey is acting independently, rather than as a joint hegemon, here are two recent statements by Erdogan. Yes, Erdogan’s words probably apply to the Kurds, but anyone who thinks they don’t also apply to Israel needs to reconsider. Palestine was a part of the Ottoman Empire until the end of WW1, and no Turk will have forgotten that. Erdogan, in my view, has staked Turkey’s claim to Syria—ALL of Syria. Israel knows this and I find it hard to believe that they will act in disregard of this fact—certainly not without ironclad US guarantees.

Gönül Tol @gonultol

Erdogan says “Turkey is bigger than Turkey and we, as a nation, cannot limit our horizon to 782,000 square kilometers.” He says this in reference to Syria. From his point of view, timing is perfect to launch an operation against YPG.

MenchOsint @MenchOsint

Erdogan: "Turkey will never compromise on Syria's territorial integrity, unity and unitary structure.

From the first day, we expressed our position on separatist tendencies [this would apply to the Kurds] and announced it to the whole world, and we showed our firmness in this context.

At this stage, Türkiye will stand by the Syrian people and make all necessary contributions, as it has done since the beginning of the conflict.

From here I would like to address the following message to our Syrian brothers and sisters:

This is a critical period in which we need to act with unity, solidarity, consensus and deliberation.

I believe from the bottom of my heart that the Syrian people, with their insight and discernment, will manage this stage successfully, God willing.

12:19 PM · Dec 18, 2024

I can’t believe that Erdogan is excepting areas seized by Israel from the “need to act with unity, solidarity, consensus and deliberation.” There is essentially no government in Syria at this point. The situation seems to me to be far too fluid for Israel to take on a new war while this situation remains—as it will for well beyond Trump’s inauguration.

Well, never say never remains the final caveat.