Wheels Within Wheels?
We’re starting to hear voices suggesting that we go slow in judging what Team Trump is up to with the much ballyhooed Ukraine ceasefire. Jeffrey Sachs, in speaking with Judge Nap this morning, cautiously suggested that there may be more going on behind the scenes than we know. Now Gilbert Doctorow—who will be talking with the Judge early tomorrow—is coming around to that view. For the last few weeks Doctorow has been touting Trump’s cleverness, but his initial reaction to yesterday’s “ceasefire” announcement was anything but positive:
The Financial Times’ photo of Marco Rubio leaving the negotiating session today with Ukrainians in Jedda projects the satisfaction of a job well done as he buttons his jacket. However, the text suggests that somehow Rubio has dropped the ball and is missing the big picture.
The American side claims to be so encouraged by the results of the day that they are immediately reinstating Ukrainian access to American intelligence for targeting and air defense as well as restarting delivery of the military hardware to Kiev.
What do they think they achieved? It would appear that they believe they have moved the Ukrainians beyond the notion of a partial ceasefire for 30 days which they brought with them to Jedda to a full cease fire for the same period. The only problem with this ‘progress’ is that the Russians have made it crystal clear that they are uninterested in any cease fire and seek direct move to peace negotiations.
Logically what will happen next following the Russian nyet is that the White House will impose new sanctions on Russia and the war will continue indefinitely – until the Russians smash the Ukrainian forces into submission.
…
That was yesterday. Today, Doctorow has changed his tune.
Doctorow reviews all the disturbing aspects of what we know from the public statements:
Last evening I remarked that Rubio was clearly satisfied with what was agreed in Jedda. The immediate U.S. decision to restore Ukrainian access to U.S. intelligence and to restart deliveries of arms to Ukraine seemed to confirm this. Of course, this very decision makes the U.S. bid to play the role of honest broker all the more problematic. American assistance to Kiev in these matters makes it a co-belligerent and that normally excludes claims to be a neutral observer.
In other words, what we know from the public statements affirms Trump’s ownership of the war and looks like real bad faith dealing with the Russians. On reflection, however, Doctorow argues that, if that’s really what happened it doesn’t make any sense—there’s nothing new, so why does Rubio seem so optimistic? Other commentators, like Scott Ritter, have argued that Trump is following bad advice from stupid advisers. But Doctorow is on record stating his belief that Trump is not dumb enough to be snookered by the likes of Keith Kellogg—even if the public statements look exactly like Kellogg’s plan.
And so Doctorow argues that the only way to make sense of this is to assume that there were assurances made to the Russians on some bottom line concessions that the Ukrainian side—notably, without Zelensky present—had committed themselves to. Before I get to Doctorow’s argument, I’ll offer one possibility. Might it be possible that the restoration of intel and weapons comes with real strings attached—the restoration only of defensive oriented intel and systems? I did hear some hint of that the other day. And Doctorow believes he detects a related hint that the Ukrainians may have committed to key concessions:
The first hint is in the statement that was kept from view in most Western reporting: that during the cease fire there would be an immediate start to negotiations over a durable peace.
This by itself also would not make much sense as an incentive to bring in the Russians. We must assume that some discussions took place over what concessions the Ukrainians are prepared to make to arrive at a peace with Russia, and that these concessions represent a big step forward from all the nonsensical ‘peace plans’ put forward by Zelensky over the past couple of years, all of which amounted to Russian capitulation.
The key here is that for this explanation to make sense and have any prospect of success, there must be really substantive and new commitments by the Ukrainians. In the next two paragraphs Doctorow describe the constraints that Putin faces in agreeing to any ceasefire—having been burnt in the past by agreeing to commitments like the Minsk agreements, in which the other side proved untrustworthy.
For my part, I’ll add this bit of speculation to Doctorow’s. Has Trump made guarantees that could lead Putin to trust him? Was that what Trump’s tough treatment of Zelensky and the support cutoff supposed to prove to Putin? And is the resumption or restoration ploy we’re now seeing a face saving measure that will give cover for Trump for the concessions he will be making? Back to Doctorow:
I make these guesses so as to better understand what may motivate Vladimir Putin to respond positively to the American-Ukrainian cease fire proposal.
The problem in Moscow now is that for Putin to agree to a cease fire after having repeatedly excluded this step without Ukrainian withdrawal from the 4 oblasts of Donbas-Novaya Rossiya that are now part of the Russian Federation would be very hard for him to explain to his own hardliners among Russian patriots. We will see in the coming days if there are any leaks coming from Moscow on what is new on the table in the American proposal to justify a change of heart.
It all seems almost Byzantine—or worse, Trumpian—but not impossible. After all, Trump did say yesterday that he thought a deal was 75% done—the toughest part, at that. Anyone who has had any dealings with Slavs will know that the toughest part was always going to be getting the Ukrainians to go along.
We shall see, soon enough.
Please note, Trump has still taken ownership of the war on Russia. In a very real way that adds weight to Doctorow's general argument because he's so heavily invested now that he can't afford to walk away--he needs to resolve it. That's the logical argument.
It seems clear now that the Ukrainians accepted a ceasefire with baseline concessions attached that Trump hopes will entice Russian to the table--to hammer out a permanent settlement. But Russia may also insist on further negotiations (with the US) *before* any ceasefire and talks. Doctorow points to the recent Ukraine drone attacks on civilian targets as a reason that Russia could advance for not stopping before complete demilitarization. Putin will be under great pressure to reject this initial US offer, but will want to keep doors open if Trump's offer looks remotely plausible and in good faith. Trump obviously thinks he has made significant moves to demonstrate his good faith--voting with Russia at the UN, cutting off aid to Ukraine for a time (and to what extent going forward remains unclear), cooperating with Russia re Syria, etc. But Putin can't afford to put all his eggs in the Trump basket, so will be cautious and could reject Trump's offer at this point. If possible, Putin would probably prefer to continue talking rather than simply reject the offer. Trump, otoh, is pressuring for quick movement for his own reasons. Putin, by continuing talking, could provide Trump with some cover, some plausible appearance of progress.