I spent a good part of today listening to all the usual suspects about the Venezuela situation. Many were, rightly, scathing regarding the stupidity of Rubio and Walz (at the UN) in their attempts to justify the Anglo-Zionist aggression. Rubio stumbled badly, but the two said essentially the same thing. The US will not allow adversaries like Russia and China to operate in “our hemisphere.” As all commentators pointed out, these talking points were clearly aimed at the low info crowd, who wouldn’t ask tough questions, like: What about our ops in the other hemisphere? In Ukraine, in the Middle East, in the Far East? What about Quemoy and Matsu?
Still, it all boiled down to, What next? As Doug Macgregor put it, we’re waging war without a strategy—SNAFU—so what comes next? Or as Chas Freeman put it, The dog finally caught the car—now what? The fact that the US has no plan for the ‘what’s next’ scenario has become painfully obvious within a single day. The Venezuelan regime hasn’t been changed or replaced—it’s hard to even claim that it’s been decapitated. There’s been a fair amount of jawboning from the American side, but nothing else, really. People are beginning to realize that, when push comes to shove, we won’t be “running” Venezuela—all the bluffing in the world won’t substitute for boots on the ground, and we ain’t goin’ there. Likewise, the initial euphoria over “free oil” (not kidding, I’ve seen that) will soon cool when people come to the realization that—whatever the truth about Venezuela’s reserves may be (see Joe’s comments)—increasing the production rate of Venezuela’s heavy crude is a gargantuan task that will take years to realize. And that would be in conditions of political stability. If things go to shit, we could see a drop of a product that the US badly needs—heavy crude is vital to the US transport, aviation, and military sectors. Things could really go south fast.
Armchair Warlord summed up some of these considerations:
1. Trump Doctrine. This operation was thematically similar to last summer’s attack on Iranian nuclear facilities - billed as a masterstroke, collapses under scrutiny, and gives Trump cover to disengage from a foreign adventure.
2. As an initial matter, this was all flagrantly illegal aggression against a sovereign state on pretenses so flimsy they’re not even legally cognizable. ...
3. This was not actually regime change. Maduro was not a totalitarian law unto himself, he’s an eminently replaceable Latin American kleptocrat. The Venezuelan government (to include its senior leadership) and military appear to be almost entirely intact. … In any event Trump discussing somehow picking a new government in Venezuela or exercising authority over the country’s governance is a fantasy at this point, we’re occupying nothing and we have no leverage.
4. ...
5. Trump has immediately pivoted to an offramp in the Caribbean despite the fact that absolutely none of the ostensible underlying causes of our intervention are remotely resolved at this point - drugs, oil, expropriation, etc. In fact he’s been quite clear the Chinese will get their oil, so he seems to consider the operation entirely concluded. As I mentioned above, this is identical to his offramp from the 12 Days’ War - conduct a strike on Iranian nuclear sites that was far less impactful than it was billed as to the American public and which was actually below the retaliatory threshold of the Iranians, and then immediately declare victory and leave. This operation feels exactly as choreographed as the denouement of the 12 Days’ War - conduct a flashy raid while the Venezuelan Army takes a siesta, get a scalp, declare victory and leave, after which the Venezuelan government shrugs and moves on. Perhaps the Venezuelan government will be persuaded to give US companies some oil concessions going forward.
Well, there’s always the possibility of some additional theft, but you get the point. The notion that Maduro was some sort of evil genius without whom the Bolivarian regime would collapse was always a fantasy. Other countries in the region will likely take note and shortly resume normal operations. Meanwhile, today Trump is warning pregnant women not to use Tylenol. Moving on down the off ramp?
But there are additional ‘What’s next’ considerations that Trump likely won’t be able to easily walk away from. What’s next actually appears to be another war on Iran—but one which could turn out to be a lot more serious than that twelve day one last summer. You had best believe that such an undertaking will keep the US military fully occupied for some little time. That will almost certainly not be an easy in and out. But then, what happens to all the talk of military action against Venezuela if the regime doesn’t toe an as yet not totally clear line? How about the threatened wars on Columbia, Nicaragua, Mexico, Canada, Denmark? Back burner time? And what happens if Russia and China act up? When last heard from, Russian and Chinese tankers were still headed for Venezuela.
If this sounds like biting off way too much to chew, you may be onto something.
All that said, I still hope Maduro gets nailed for what he did in Afghanistan:
Luke Gromen @LukeGromen
I hope they charge Maduro for all the opium he ran out of Afghanistan from 2002-2022 as well.
Chart source: UN (link below)
11:45 AM · Jan 5, 2026
If Trump were really serious about that drug narrative, he’d turn Venezuela over to the Taliban.
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Meryl Nass also commented on the chart of opium production in Afghanistan, noting, "Please note that the Taliban banned production in 2001 (before we attacked them) and in 2023-2025, after the US left. You can also see that after Obama took office, opium production rose."
I'm at the point where I see Trump as a deeply insecure leader, who takes every perceived affront against him as questioning the size of his manhood, and looks at the international stage from the perspective of where he can show off his toughness. Maduro's dance, Machado's non-rejection of the peace price in his favour etc.
Those surrounding him are using that insecurity and focus to pursue their own interests, i.e. if you want him to do something, present him with an opportunity to show off his magnificence.
The man is essentially a clown without much agency, and as such, the US seems in pretty much the same position as it was under the late Biden years.
I see Trump's antics as a distraction from the deafening silence of the parliament.
Meryl Nass also commented on the chart of opium production in Afghanistan, noting, "Please note that the Taliban banned production in 2001 (before we attacked them) and in 2023-2025, after the US left. You can also see that after Obama took office, opium production rose."
https://merylnass.substack.com/p/quickie-opium-production-in-afghanistan
I'm at the point where I see Trump as a deeply insecure leader, who takes every perceived affront against him as questioning the size of his manhood, and looks at the international stage from the perspective of where he can show off his toughness. Maduro's dance, Machado's non-rejection of the peace price in his favour etc.
Those surrounding him are using that insecurity and focus to pursue their own interests, i.e. if you want him to do something, present him with an opportunity to show off his magnificence.
The man is essentially a clown without much agency, and as such, the US seems in pretty much the same position as it was under the late Biden years.
I see Trump's antics as a distraction from the deafening silence of the parliament.