Was Sergei Millian An FBI Asset?

That’s the fascinating question that John D. O’Connor raises this morning:

Durham Investigation Intrigue: Sergei Millian, an FBI Plant?

It seems the forces weakening our country, to the delight of Vladimir Putin, come to a head in one Sergei Millian.

O’Connor makes some suppositions that, to my mind, go beyond the evidence and aren’t really necessary—from a conspiratorial point of view. The prime example is his assertion that the fact that Chuck Dolan was simultaneously Steele’s primary “source” while at the same time

[Dolan] was closely consulting with Russian “diplomats,” another word for “intelligence agents.”

It’s true that the line between “diplomats” and “intelligence agents” is a fuzzy one—and not just with regard to countries like Russia and China. Consider, to take one pertinent example, the career of Aussie “diplomat” Alexander Downer.

O’Connor asserts that Dolan’s contacts with Russian diplomats

shows direct collaboration between the Clinton campaign and the Russian government in fomenting a baseless charge [the Clinton Dossier].

But it doesn’t. It’s equally possible—and to my mind more probable—that the Clinton operatives dreamed it all up on their own. The role of people like Danchenko and/or Millian was simply to lend verisimilitude by garnishing the narrative with details (names of Russian officials, etc.) that would appear authentic. I don’t say that the notion of Clinton direct collaboration with Russia is impossible, but it’s not proven on the evidence of the Danchenko indictment and not necessary to the conspiracy Durham is unraveling. No doubt it’s worth looking into.

However, what I find most interesting is O’Connor’s view that Sergei Millian was an FBI asset who was specifically tasked with compromising George Papadopoulos. That narrative fits in well with the known fact that the FBI was targeting Papadopoulos throughout the Russia Hoax. It’s interesting, in that regard, to contrast the FBI’s approach to Papadopoulos with their approach to Carter Page, because the differences lend credibility to what O’Connor is asserting. While the FBI repeatedly attempted to implicate Papadopoulos in criminal activity, their use of Carter Page was largely limited to using Page’s known Russian connections in the Clinton Dossier to support the main narrative line of the Russian Hoax. The assertions about Page in the Dossier are, in the main, pure fiction rather than serious attempts to set him up. Nor were Stefan Halper’s contacts with Page much more than gentle probing to elicit statements that could perhaps be twisted or taken out of context. The differences in the approaches probably arises from the FBI’s knowledge that, while Papadopoulos was young and inexperienced, Page had many years of experience with intelligence services behind him and would not be so easily gulled. As it turned out, Papadopoulos showed exemplary caution and wasn’t about to used as anybody’s muggins.

In any event, O’Connor traces the various attempts to set Papadopoulos up. This narrative is incomplete, as O’Connor presents it. Significantly omitted are Papadopoulos’ contacts with the FBI legal attache in London as well as his attendance at a known intelligence training front institution in Rome before joining the Trump campaign—all most solicitously arranged for him, to his surprise, by these FBI connected individuals (I include the still missing Joseph Mifsud, who is mentioned by O’Connor).

Place those facts next to the event described by O’Connor that occurred on or about October 7, 2016:

Before the 2016 election, around October 7, Millian had offered Papadopoulos employment for $30,000 per month, to be paid by a former Russian energy minister (read: Kremlin agent), on the condition that Papadopoulos must also be working for an elected Trump. Papadopoulos suspected Millian was wearing a wire, because he wore a scarf in a warm room.

Again, O’Connor jumps to a conclusion that isn’t necessarily warranted—or fails to explain his meaning. Yes, in such a situation involving a corrupt quid pro quo it’s sensible to assume that the Russian energy minister would be acting as a “Kremlin agent”. That would certainly be the interpretation placed on it by the FBI and DoJ—and used to smear Trump as complicit. But that doesn’t mean—if this is O’Connor’s meaning—that Millian had any actual connections to any Russian energy minister. Nor does it mean that Papadopoulos would necessarily have been prosecuted, since that would involve revealing “sources and methods”. Trump was the ultimate target, and the goal of keeping Trump out of the White House could be accomplished by innuendo just as well.

On the other hand, O’Connor immediately follows up with a surmise that seems quite justified:

The day of this conversation, October 7, 2016, is key, because at that time the FBI was desperately scrambling for any illegality by a Trump agent to strengthen its weak FISA application. Without an illegal act, the FISA warrant for Carter Page as a suspected Russian agent was doomed.

This conversation certainly has the appearance, taking all the circumstances into account, of Millian conducting a consensual monitoring of his conversation with Papadopoulos (as Halper also did with Page). The intent of that conversation seems transparently clear. To get a FISA on a USPER it is necessary to have a suspected criminal violation of a US statute implicated along with clandestine intelligence activity. This conversation, had it proved successful, would have fulfilled those requirements to a “T.”

Note that O’Connor is almost certainly correct that the FISA would probably have gone forward against Page—although possibly against Papadopoulos as well. The involvement of Papadopoulos would have served to strengthen, in the mind of a FISC judge, the allegations that Carter Page was the direct connection between the Trump Campaign and “the Russians.”

Viewed from this perspective, the later very determined attempt to set Papadopoulos up violating US currency laws—initiated by Team Mueller—begins to look very much like an effort to discredit Papadopoulos and shut him up. Why? Sergei Millian turns out to be a very plausible answer.

And so O’Connor sums up:

We can see that Millian was but one of a parade of FBI assets sent toward Papadopoulos, but perhaps the most potentially compromising. That Millian was working for the FBI would explain why he would not be a source for Steele, from whom the FBI wanted distance for the sake of deniability. Thus, Dolan conveniently became the real source, while the seemingly Russia-connected Millian was the false front for the dossier.

To show corroboration of a reverse nature, let’s look at the FBI inspector general’s report on FISA abuse. Oddly, every key description of Millian is redacted. We are told in the report about “Source 2” and “Source 3,” the “Confidential Human Sources” who weaseled into Trumpland. But who is “Source 1”? Now, with the Danchenko indictment, we may have a good idea.

If we are correct, the FBI was entrapping the Trump campaign, falsely giving information to the FISA court and Congress, compromising the media, and lying to the American people. Yes, Clinton, through Steele, was lying to the FBI. But the FBI itself, to this day, has been lying about Sergei Millian, concealing the FBI’s role in a sickening takedown of a presidential campaign and later a president.

I will add that all this—including the back history of Carter Page with the FBI—raises important questions about the timing of the FBI’s first involvement in the Russia Hoax.

Stay tuned for further developments from John Durham.