War Gaming

I spent much of the day listening to the usual suspects gaming out the likelihood of a major Anglo-Zionist attack on Iran. I’ve done some partial transcripts. Doug Macgregor, as you’ll see, is convinced that Trump will launch a major and very violent attack on Iran—with the window opening sometime after 1/25. Mac has been preaching this for years. On balance I agree—FWIW. On the other hand, I remain skeptical that the assembled forces are sufficient to achieve the decisive results Trump wants. There won’t be any surprise this time, and I’m skeptical that the US will do more than launch standoff attacks. No doubt such attacks can do major damage, but Iran is a very large country and its military assets are deeply hidden and protected. The US will run out of munitions sooner than the Iranians will—and then what?

Those considerations, plus straightforward risk/benefit analysis, lead Larry Wilkerson and Patrick Henningsen to be less certain. However, all agree that the deciding factor is not what Trump decides but what the Jewish Nationalists who bought Trump tell him to do.

Col Douglas Macgregor: TRUMP at DAVOS

Nobody in Iran is delusional. They know what’s coming. They know the Israelis and the United States are going to attack them. There’s no question in their minds. The only question is how does it begin? What triggers it? Nobody can say that with absolute certainty. Remember the last time around they showed up for talks with us and negotiations and in the midst of it the Israelis launched a surprise assault. This time around, I think the Iranians are going to be very prepared for all these possibilities.

Next Mac addresses the failed insurrection and Trump’s backout from attacking at that point:

Now, there’s something else that [General Keane] said. He said, ‘We had to bring in all this firepower.’ Because they thought they could get away with less. They thought they might be able to assist the forces on the ground trying to overthrow the government and that would not require as much military muscle. Well, that all fell apart. I don’t think the people in Washington recognize the extent to which they were delusional in their expectations, but now they’ve come around to understanding that you need a lot of firepower. So, you’ve got a lot more naval and air power involved. I’m sure we have some special ops on the ground, but I don’t think the special ops will be put at risk inside Iran in the way that we did it in Venezuela, because Iranians have a higher state of technology with which to defend themselves and alert themselves than was the case in Venezuela. But still, you’ll have some of that. Again, the only question is one of timing.

In this next paragraph, Mac makes an important point. Most people assume the goal is regime change. It’s not. It’s the breaking up of Iran into multiple fractious ethnic states. If that reminds you of the game plan for Russia, you’re onto something—it’s the same people gaming out our strategery.

Now, what is this going to produce? Is this going to cause Iran to be destroyed? Well, certainly within certain limitations. Yes, they want to destroy Iran. Most of all, they want to destroy the government. They want to split the country into smaller regions and parts. They want to encourage Kurds, for instance, to come in, as they did a week or two ago, and try to incite trouble, incite rebellions. They’ll go into the Azeri areas again, I’m sure, and try to do that. I don’t think it’ll work. I think the Iranian state will weather all of that, but I don’t know how they’ll weather everything else.

Now, as usual, Mac addresses the question of what Turkey will do. I think that situation has developed further and that Turkey may be closer to taking sides—within safe limits—this time. What has changed is the new strategic relationship that Turkey has with Pakistan and KSA. Both Turkey and KSA understand quite clearly that they are in the sights of the Jewish Nationalists—and in the case of KSA, they understand that a victory for the Anglo-Zionists could bring KSA under the thumb of the Gulf Arabs in the UAE. I’ve been writing about that lately. Today I saw a report that highlighted Saudi concerns that Israel and the UAE could institute a sea blockade on KSA. The dynamics here are very complicated, and it is in Iran’s interest to exploit all of them:

Iran’s Foriegn Minister on war with the USA:

‘If the US attacks Iran again, we will use all our capabilities

This war will be very bloody and messy, not a short-lived conflict and it will impact the region and people around the world’

And that brings us to the next question, which is probably the most important. Is everybody going to stand around and watch us utterly annihilate and pulverize Iran without interfering? I know that the Turks were involved in alerting the Iranians to the Kurdish group of fighters that tried--about 400 of them--to infiltrate into Iran a week and a half ago. I think the Turks have decided that while they may not like the Shia and the Iranian Shiites, nevertheless, they have no interest in seeing Iran be destroyed. What does that mean? Does that translate into anything? I don’t know. Remember, Mr. Erdogan wants to be on all sides of every issue and and straddle every fence he can.

But then Russia’s very concerned about its southern flank. Is Russia willing to let this go down without interference? What about China? If this turns out to be as horrendous an attack as I expect, then I would think the Straits of Hormuz would be closed. The Chinese import about a third of their oil from the Persian Gulf. If that’s closed, the Chinese cannot stand around and twiddle their thumbs. So, we don’t know what precisely will happen. These are not going to be automatic responses, but at some point, decisions will have to be made about how how much damage they’re willing to allow to be inflicted on Iran.

DD: And, Doug, what do you imagine the range of possibilities are for the Iranian regime if they started getting, not just a one-off 20 minute strike by the United States, but it’s actually a sustained attack by the US and Israel? What are the range of possibilities that they may do in retaliation?

I don’t have access to the intelligence that would help me know in detail, but I think the Iranians are comfortable with their ability to deal with Israel. And that means that if they’re compelled to do so, they’ll level the place. Very little doubt in my mind about that. The problem is us. The Iranians don’t think they can handle us. Now, they’ll try, but the quantum leap from Iranian military power to American military power is just too great. So, that raises the issue, if they can’t deal with us, if they can’t survive us if we commit everything that I think we’re prepared to commit, will they get help? And where will that help come from? And I think that help could come from Russia and potentially China. But when under what circumstances, it’s hard to tell.

DD: And what should the United States do right here if we’re actually interested in American national security interest and doing what’s good for America first, given all that’s happened and where things are right now, even in this 11th hour, what should the president do?

This is where Mac makes it clear that Trump is a captive. To put this more accurately, I don’t think Trump is hostage to Netanyahu, because Netanyahu didn’t buy Trump. Trump is hostage to the people who bought him, and those people support Netanyahu. And to make it worse, this is the most corrupt administration ever.

Well, I think the president should make it abundantly clear to the world and to Israel that he’s not going to support a massive strike on Iran. But I don’t think he has that flexibility. I think he is hostage to Mr. Netanyahu. You have to go back and revisit the election. How was he elected the way he was? How did he get the support that he got and the money that he got? Keep in mind that his personal wealth, I’m told, has tripled over the last 12 months. What I’m trying to tell you is that the financial powers backing him also control him in this connection. I don’t think he has the option of refusing to participate. I think that’s the problem here on this occasion.

I just think it’s going to be it’s going to be very dangerous. My greatest fear has always been that the Israelis would use a nuclear weapon, because they’re the ones who’ve made it abundantly clear, ‘You push us hard enough, that’s what we’ll do,’ and they don’t give a damn what anybody else says, does, or thinks, and they’ll treat anybody that opposes that as an enemy.

DD: And do you imagine that that’s part of their calculus already? Because they certainly would have to know, and one would imagine this might have been discussed by Netanyahu on December 28th when he came to Mar a Lago to talk with President Trump that, if they take this action against Iran, that it’s likely that Iran would strike even harder than they did in June of last year, as you just mentioned. It’s well known that Iran can deal significant damage to the Israeli side. To what extent do you think it’s possible that Netanyahu is okay with that and might use that as justification to use a nuclear weapon?

I don’t think he’s necessarily okay with it, but I think his expectation is that we will do much more damage this time around than we did the last time. In other words, we’ll be fully engaged from the outset. And that’s from what I’ve talked to sources in the region. That’s what they had hoped to happen in June, and when it didn’t, that’s one of the reasons why they decided to accept the ceasefire that President Trump is pushing.

DD: But you’re suggesting maybe this time if they get what they didn’t get in June, then it could just be a new ball game.

Yeah, I think I think that’s the viewpoint. And I think this will be a different ballgame. This will be much much more violent and much more damaging and much worse than anything we saw back in June.

DD: And let me ask you just kind of a final question here. There’s a lot of reports that many--if not even all of the Arab regimes in the region--don’t want this attack. Many of them don’t like Iran at all, but they value regional stability above everything else and feel like they can contain Iran. They don’t need this and they worry that this could cause lots of ripple effects. What do you think that the regimes of the region are going to think and how would they react to a strike of this size?

Well, I’m sure you’re right and I’m sure that they have expressed those views, but what can they do? These are very weak regimes. they are all sitting atop unruly societies that, under the right circumstances, would eagerly remove them. That’s particularly true, I think, in the Arabian Peninsula for many of them. It’s certainly true in North Africa, Sudan, and Egypt. So I think the problems at home and the weaknesses that they have make it very unlikely that they will put themselves at risk over a war between Israel and Iran.

DD: So Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, you think they would literally do nothing?

They would send strongly worded letters but that’s about all they would do. The only state that will participate in the sense that it will oppose us in anything we do or the Israelis is Iraq. Iraq is de facto an ally of Iran. And you know that from having been over there. That was one of the great achievements of the S to put Iran in total control of Iraq. But that was the only way to get order and that was important for Bush’s re-election. And so that’s what happened.

DD: From from what I’ve seen from some folks who have some understanding of the logistics and the deployment capabilities. Somewhere around the 25th or 26th of this month is when a window could first open. When it will be passed through anyone can say, but apparently there’s still another four or five days before we get to that danger zone, and then I guess anything is possible.

I think that’s true, and you’re right-- the logistical infrastructure and support structure has to be fully staffed and ready to go. It’s not. But it’s getting closer and that’s why you heard General Keane say what he did about the movement of forces. It’s not just forces. You’ve got to move a lot of supplies and ammunition, medical support, all these things.

DD: And just let me ask you as a last question here about the United States. This is in complete violation of the Constitution. And one may reasonably argue, as I do often, that the separation of powers has now vanished and there’s no rule of law. There’s nothing that would constrain the president from doing this because it is categorically against articles I and II of the constitution, for the president to just choose to go to war with another country that hasn’t already attacked us or is even threatening us. What reaction and result do you think this would have domestically in the United States if any?

Well, remember that Thomas Massie in many respects is the object lesson. If you speak up and express opposition to this kind of activity, this action, particularly in alignment with Israel, then the president of the United States calls you an anti-semite and a loser and a war fund is raised--$100 million plus--to support anybody-but-Massie, because that’s what’s important: to have 100% with AIPAC on the bill that guarantees—no questions asked—an immediate response. I think that’s where we are. So we can recite the Constitution all you like. I think money has drowned out that chorus.

DD: And in the event that things go south, if this doesn’t result in a clean victory and it does cost the United States, do you think that could change the calculation at home?

Yes, I think it could. But I also think that it would have to coincide with what I think is coming now anyway, which is the financial crisis, the internal economic upheaval that that will create. This is not like 2008. We smothered that particular fire with cash. So I think if the two coincide roughly and then American people will begin to say, ‘Wait a minute, this is wrong.’ But it’s back to something else you and I have discussed. Americans tend to underestimate, or not even understand, what war means. The last time we had a war in our country, on our soil, was the Civil War. Most people no longer have a memory of the Second World War. Vietnam--that’s over with. There’s very little memory of that. There’s no real understanding of it. And so until it gets very bad, no one will pay attention.

DD: Yeah, I can’t argue with that. That’s historically the way it’s happened. And I think the pain is going to be required to reteach that lesson. We just have to hope that it’s not a catastrophic lesson.

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Patrick Henningsen & Lt Col Daniel Davis: NEW Trends from DAVOS

If this happens, there’s no way to calculate what the fallout will be. And the most dangerous fallout of course is what the US and Israel might do if their hand is forced or their back is perceived to be against the wall. Will the US or will Israel deploy nuclear weapons-- either low yield or tactical nuclear weapons or major, full powered nuclear weapons--against Iran? If that happens, what’s the world going to do? Probably a lot of the world will do nothing. And what will China and Russia do? Well, that’s really upping the ante at that point. Now, is this administration capable of doing that or are they strong enough to restrain Israel from doing that?

DD: Let me ask you on that point there. This is all hypothetical at the moment, because it’s two and three rows chess moves down the road, but it’s entirely plausible. In the event that Israel used even a low-grade tactical nuke weapon, it still crosses the threshold--period. Psychological. How would that complicate any future for us to tell Russia they can’t use any tactical nuclear weapons in theirs, or that China can’t use tactical nuclear weapons on Taiwan, should it come to that?

In this next paragraph Henningsen basically states that what he refers to as “the US” is no longer an independent country. It’s been bought, as surely as Trump is buying Greenland. By Jewish Nationalists. We’ve been hijacked.

That’s a good point, Daniel. So, that changes the whole sort of calculus for the current state of international affairs. And it brings us into a new realm. And so, if that’s the problem, if it was just the US on its own--and this is the problem with Iran. This isn’t just Iran and the US. This is a threesome. This is Israel, the US, and Iran. If it was just Israel and Iran, it would be more straightforward, because then if the US was independent, it would intervene to prevent a nuclear weapon being deployed by the Israelis. But the US cannot intervene against Israel. If Israel decides that it’s going to do that, it will do it. And there’s nothing that the US can do to stop them, nor any other country. That’s the problem. Only maybe a major international coalition who had wind of it in advance could do some drastic move that would include Europe joining forces with Russia and China or something like that to basically condemn this. And India, who’s an ally of Israel also and a nuclear power, to condemn such an action.

Then we’re into a new era, I think, and maybe a more dangerous era, and it would really force a lot of countries to re-evaluate what they’re doing, and their relations with the United States and Israel as well. It would be a tremendous tragedy and a warning, also, to Arab countries who dared to stand up to whatever the orders or diktats are of the United States and Israel. And, of course, that probably makes a lot of people in Washington happy. But what would that do environmentally? What would that do in terms of fallout? If it’s a low yield tactical nuke and only--only!--100,000 people are killed.

It’s crazy to even have this discussion, but what’s allowable in the wake of Gaza? What is allowable in terms of human casualties? And the problem is, Israel has demonstrated that it has no regard for human life or civilian life.

DD: We have not seen the upper end of that casualty. I had Chas Freeman on the other day and he said that his best estimate, from what he’s seen, is that the casualty count of all the Palestinians together is probably closer to a half million—not 70 or 80,000 or something like that, and that clearly is not at the upper level. Many people know that and it has not stopped anybody from intervening to prevent further destruction as it continue on to this day. So that’s not a very optimistic.

Note in the next paragraph that Henningsen links deaths in Gaza and deaths in Ukraine. It’s not coincidence. The same people are behind the carnage in both locations. The difference is that they’re using Ukrainians as proxies and that the goal of slaughtering Russians—like Arabs—is falling short of their hopes.

That’s such an important point and Francesca Albenese, the UN special rapporteur on the occupied territories in Palestine, she’s putting the numbers up towards 200,000, for instance. I’ve seen other reports from Harvard Dataverse-- much higher, in fact. The problem is, because of the heavy political pressure to downplay the deaths in Gaza and to not recognize the fact that it is an ongoing genocide--and likewise to downplay the number of Ukrainian military casualties on the Ukrainian side--it basically suppresses the moral argument of whether this war is worth it or not in human costs. That’s the real price that’s being paid here.

And it means that the escalation ladder is open at that point.