Unequal Negotiating

We’ll get to what unequal negotiating might look like, but first …

Yesterday I came across a new search engine—new to me. It’s called Freespoke and it’s owned by Todd Ricketts. Here’s what Wikipedia has to say:

Todd M. Ricketts (born September 23, 1969) is an American businessman and politician who is a co-owner of the Chicago Cubs, a member of the TD Ameritrade board of directors, and a former Republican National Committee Finance Chairman.

As of 2022, Ricketts is a co-founder (with Kristin Jackson) of the alternative search engine Freespoke, a service purporting to be "a search engine and news aggregator without suppression, cancellation of stories, or digital tracking of users."

There’s lots more about Ricketts at the Wikipedia page, nothing more about Freespoke. You can find some more links re Kristin Jackson at this page.

So far I like it, but I don’t have much experience with it or knowledge about it. If anyone can provide more information …

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Now. The day before yesterday naked capitalism asked a very relevant question, which is becoming all the more relevant as complications in geopolitics multiply:

What Happens When Trump’s “Negotiations” Over Ukraine Quickly Hit the Wall?

The answer Yves Smith gives is based on the contention that Trump will be unable to deliver either Ukraine or NATO as part of any deal with Putin—which will make any deal impossible. Smith, no fan of Trump, fears that Trump will “lash out” irrationally. I’m not sure of any of that, so won’t address it. However, I do want to reproduce Smith’s reflections on the difficult position that Trump will find himself in. None of it will come as news to readers, but it’s very well presented. It’s a useful reminder, with the caveat that a lot can change between now and then—whenever “then” turns out to be. Smith rightly emphasizes what we have also emphasized: Russia’s preconditions to negotiations have evolved into what, for practical purposes, amount to unconditional surrender. Surrender, and then we can pause the war and talk about life going forward after the preconditions have been met. But those preconditions put the whole Ukraine proxy project in a completely untenable position.

That’s what happens in unequal negotiations, when one side holds all the high cards and the side with the low cards keeps raising the stakes. We can argue about whether Trump would have avoided this situation had the American Ruling Class not staged their coup, but it is what he is now inheriting. It’s unreasonable to expect Putin to behave in any other way than he has repeatedly stated that he will, since he has his own domestic constituency to satisfy.

Oddly, even Russia-sympathetic commentators seem loath to take Putin and other top Russia officials at their word with respect to Ukraine. Russia’s demand for no NATO, no way, no how, ever in Ukraine means a very fast impasse for any Trump negotiation attempts. As we will explain, Trump can’t deliver NATO nor can he deliver Ukraine. Having Ukraine renounce NATO is one of Putin’s preconditions to negotiations and a pause in hostilities. The “nyet means nyet” of now CIA Director Bill Burns famed 2008 memo on Russian opposition to Ukraine in NATO is as firm as ever. Yet it has still not been accepted by Team West.

I regard this next paragraph as fairly shrewd and based in Russian rhetoric and behavior up to this point.

Russia nevertheless has incentives to some negotiation-like activities. Putin has repeatedly maintained he is willing to negotiate, and it would behoove the Russian side to go though the motions a bit, even if that means broken-recording what they have already said, if nothing else to keep the good will of key economic partners like China and India. They are not comfortable with Russia slowly gobbling up a neighbor, even with Putin’s repeated explanations as to why the West has turned Ukraine into an existential threat to Russia. The Western media may give Russia an unexpected helping hand. Since most mainstream media outlets are predisposed to treat willingness to discuss positions as an admission of Russian weakness, the press is likely to hype any exchanges as amounting to more than they really do.

So expect a bit of talking theater to try to minimize embarrassment for the Trump side. As Alexander Mercouris has pointed out, for US officials to exit the Biden cone of silence with respect to Russia would be a marked step forward.

But even before getting to the elephant in the room, that Putin has set what for Ukraine, the US and NATO is an impossibly high bar for commencing “talks”: that Ukraine formally drop its plans for joining NATO and withdraw all its troops from the four oblasts that Russia has designated as part of Russia. That means their original administrative boundaries, which was beyond what Russia then and even now occupies. Only then would Russia halt combat operations.1

... So there is no reason, as many observers weirdly seem to assume, that there is any deal to be had, now or any time soon.

But not all talks are created equal. For broader political purposes, Russia can be expected to indulge in some sessions of Trump officials and Russian officials “talking” past each other to get through to the Trump team that Putin really means what he has repeatedly said.

Putin is unusually transparent for a world leader in setting forth his positions and explaining why Russia regards them as necessary.

Note in this next paragraph that Putin is being presented not only as transparent but also as having been supremely confident in the eventual outcome—right from the beginning. He was willing to accept a deal at Istanbul that included limited Russian accommodations, if that would have prevented the humanitarian catastrophe of the war that we have now seen, but it’s only reasonable for him to require the recalcitrant side—the Anglo-Zionists and their proxies—to now make all the concessions as the price to pay for their unreasonableness.

Remember that early in the Special Military Operation, Putin had also warned that the longer the war went on, “the more difficult it will be for them to negotiate with us.” This pointed to the reality that as Russia made progress on the battlefield, it would increase its demands in light of its improved bargaining position. Putin and others in top roles have reiterated this notion in a coded manner, that any negotiations must reflect realities on the ground,

So what does Trump do when he can no longer hide the fact that his repeated and loud pledges that he could quickly and easily end the war in Ukraine have all come to naught? ...

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Why Trump Cannot Deliver a Settlement

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Remember, Trump has no negotiating leverage here. He played the money card prematurely by saying no more serious funding of Ukraine. Even if Trump were to attempt a flip-flop, Republicans in Congress, who recognize Ukraine has become a losing cause in their districts, are not certain to follow. If anyone in Ukraine is in contact with reality, they also know US weapons stocks are low and the US has competing priorities in terms of what theater to supply.

So nothing will change with Ukraine until there is a Russian-forced regime change, say by military/political collapse that leads to a puppet-like government or Russia imposing terms ...

Recall that yesterday I argued that Trump is significantly responsible for the current situation—not completely, but significantly. I don’t believe that he’s a war monger, or an inhuman monster. It’s simply that, as a politician, he’s subject to the same pressures that every American politician is subject to when it comes to foreign policy. American politicians are constrained by the way our politics have evolved to calculate for the short term only—to satisfy the demands of the Israel Lobby and the Deep State, even though those demands take no account of real American interests—which leads the country into long term dead ends. The same dynamic plays out in domestic policy, where the president—a short term office—is unreasonably held responsible by the public for the long term messes that the public’s elected representatives create. The president is thus constrained to act for the domestic short term, with long term consequences. The point is that Trump will face a real dilemma when push comes to shove with the Russians. The good news is that the Russians are actually very interested in a deal—from their perspective. They will not seek to embarrass Trump. The bad news, as above, is that they will continue to be adamant regarding their perspective.

I will posit that Trump has, in many respects, been playing his weak hand well during this transition phase—balancing some clownish appointments to satisfy clownish supporters with signals of a realistic approach to the nation’s many problems. Much will depend on how realistic the public’s expectations are and how willing the public is to endorse a restart that takes into account—however dimly perceived—the changing geopolitical circumstances that the US finds itself in. The deft use of frontmen, especially Musk, to exert public pressure is encouraging, but it won’t be easy.