Ukraine: Recasting And Forecasting 2023

Will Schryver features a 23 part tweet today, which he has helpfully made into an unrolled page. He titles it simply:

Ukraine War Update

I would characterize it as an attempt to understand the present in terms of the past (recasting), and then to apply what we learn from that exercise to the future. I’m going to present what I consider the major points from that thread, while freely interpolating my own views. So …

Looking backwards, Schryver suggests that by mid-2022 the Russians—having by then destroyed most of the first Ukrainian army—were confronted with a major escalation on the part of the US/NATO. That was the introduction of HIMARS missile systems and M777 howitzers. The concern wasn’t so much with some incredible potency of these systems as it was with the fact that the US was clearly seeking to continue the war well beyond when it should have ended, based on the military facts on the ground. And the US was willing to commit relatively advanced weapon systems to that effort—systems that the Russians would have known could only be operated effectively with direct US/NATO involvement. As Schryver puts it, the US had clearly signaled that its proxy war on Russia would become an “escalatory duel.”

The Russians responded cautiously. In the face of new “offensives” in the Fall of 2022 by the reconstituted Ukrainian army (AFU), Russia chose to withdraw to shorter, more easily defensible, lines—while inflicting massive casualties (Kherson and Kharkov regions). At the same time, however, they continued one of their stated major goals, liberating the entirety of Donbass, through the principle of “economy of force.” Here I’ll quote Schryver’s explanation:

the Russians have continued to fight the AFU with a pronounced economy of force.

Coupled with Russia’s overwhelming firepower advantage, this economy of force – impressively exemplified by their tactics in the battles for Soledar, Bakhmut, and Kreminna – has inflicted ever-escalating losses on the Ukrainian forces.

This economy of force has been fueled by a massive military buildup, both on the industrial level of weapons and munitions supply but also with the buildup of trained reserves. The use of overwhelming firepower has been combined with a somewhat parsimonious commitment of troops to the actual Donbass combat. However, the reserves have been undergoing intensive training and retraining for months, as well as being rotated through combat duties in Donbass in order to gain valuable experience. If and when these reserves are committed, they will be veterans in a sense that cannot be applied to the AFU draftees. The Russians have been careful to avoid depleting this supremely important resource, trained and experienced personnel, preferring to work slowly and to rely on firepower.

The patient application of firepower has depleted much of the AFU’s more advanced systems, with the result that Russia is now deploying ever more effective systems of its own—glide bombs and MLRS systems that far surpass NATO systems in virtually all performance parameters. They are now also revealing more of their electronic warfare (EW) capabilities—to the dismay of Western analysts:

Even more concerning for the NATO/AFU war planners is that, thanks to the recent intel “leaks”, everyone now knows the Russians are jamming US/NATO GPS-guided munitions via ECM, and also shooting down HIMARS rockets and HARMS missiles with ever-increasing regularity.

Now, anyone who has paid attention to Douglas Macgregor’s updates on the war will be aware that Russia has amassed an enormous force in Belarus. What is going on with that force—beyond continual training? Why is it there? To open a second or third front at some point? Schryver’s explanation goes back to his initial observation regarding Russia’s careful and cautious response to the US/NATO escalation mid-2022. Like me, Schryver believes that a full NATO intervention in Ukraine is too crazy to be plausible—unless the Neocon crazies gain full control over the Pentagon. They don’t have that yet and, as we’ve maintained over the months, the Pentagon appears to be pushing back against deeper involvement to the extent that it’s able.

Here is Schryver’s explanation for the Russian force in Belarus, and he ties it in to the recent Pentagon leaks:

Concurrently, the Russians have built up a *very* significant force in Belarus, even as the full military alliance between Russia and Belarus was solidified.

This force is almost certainly viewed as “first responders” to a NATO advance from Poland and/or the Baltics.

Now, as I have always argued since even before this war’s formal commencement in late February 2022, I think there is virtually zero possibility the US/NATO will directly intervene in this war – UNLESS the #EmpireAtAllCosts cult seizes the reins of military power in America.

I don’t believe that state of affairs yet prevails.

But I *do* believe there are two very powerful factions contesting the point. The recent “Pentagon Leaks” are almost certainly related to this ongoing struggle.

This is, therefore, the moment of greatest danger yet.

Direct NATO intervention in this war would, of course, be utter madness.

The Russians have been preparing for it for at least 9 months, with the overwhelming majority of their potential force retained in reserve, under constant training.

All of this appears plausible to me, in line with what we know about the actual facts. Regarding the Pentagon leaks, I think the major question that is raised remains: Who benefits? I say that because, for all we’ve learned about the handling of classified documents, it still seems implausible that Teixeira could have done this without the involvement—whether known to him or not—of others. That, of course, gets into conspiracy theory. I’m usually reluctant to go in that direction, but 1) We’ve seen too much in the nature of high level collusion over the past years—since, say, 2016—to readily discount conspiracies of interest that are quite complex, and 2) the alternative of Teixeira acting alone requires a level of incompetence that is very difficult to explain. In that regard, I cite the Dreizinreport from 4/12—meaning, somewhat dated for this fast moving story. Nevertheless, Dreizin (and I’m not a big fan, generally) makes arguments that appear to me to still be valid and to require an answer or explanation.

The core of Dreizin’s argument begins by distinguishing two “tranches” of leaked documents, which are distinct and should have distinct limitations for access:

(1) the Ukraine war “daily data digests“…..

…..and (2) the various memos and diplomatic-intelligence sitreps, in their entirety…..

…

(1) is almost all logistics and military planning…..

…..while (2) is closer to foreign policy and foreign intelligence gathering.

Dreizin then immediately adds:

The files under (2) would not be distributed to the same circle or at/for the same meetings or even, held in the same “library” or database as the files under (1).

What this means It’s not some junior-level ”Bradley Manning” type of leaker. After what Manning did, long ago they’ve surely compartmentalized. No, the leaker has access to the mother lode. It’s likely to be a senior or, otherwise a very-well plugged-in person in the hierarchy.

This makes strong sense to me. No matter what classifications a person may have, the extent of access will still depend on “need to know”—that’s the point about “compartmentalization. Would Teixeira’s need to know have run to both 1) and 2)—essentially, access to the full range of docs on a subject matter basis? We on the outside can’t be sure that Teixeira had such an implausible and recklessly negligent scope of access, but as an investigator that’s probably the first thing that I would want to nail down. Presumably it’s a pretty simple matter for the investigators to establish an audit trail that would confirm—or not—Teixeira’s access to the docs in question. That’s basic, given that Teixeira’s job description doesn’t seem to cover such activities on his part. Failure to confirm Teixeira’s access to those specific docs would be a huge red flag. But, by the same token it should also be perfectly possible—just a bit more time consuming—to construct an audit trail for everyone in the universe who accessed those documents. As well as any actions that Teixeira or anyone else took with regard to those docs.

The bottom line issue remains: Who benefits? Clearly, these leaks work against the credibility of those directing Zhou regime policy decisions. The beneficiaries would have to be those in the Pentagon and Intel Deep State who question the wisdom of those decisions. Teixeira could have simply been in sympathy with that second viewpoint—he’s reported to have been an anti-war libertarian, if you can believe “reporting” from the MSM would have clearly been colluding with the Deep State—but acting on his own. But I want verification.