Two Days Later, Clarity Re Waltz?

Via Simplicius. Here’s the 25 words or less version. Waltz was caught using an Israeli modification of SIGNAL that had archiving capabilities that raised major security concerns—including re Israeli spying. What a surprise.

AF Post @AFpost

Former National Security Advisor Mike Waltz was caught using TM SGNL, an Israeli-modified version of Signal with archiving features, to receive and relay potentially classified info.

8:56 PM · May 2, 2025

• Mike Waltz, former National Security Advisor under Trump (Jan-May 2025), was photographed using TM SGNL, an Israeli-modified version of the Signal app, which archives messages—potentially compromising classified info, as seen in a Reuters image from a Trump cabinet meeting.

• TM SGNL, developed by TeleMessage, has ties to the Israel Defense Forces through its CEO Guy Levit, who previously led an IDF Intelligence unit, raising concerns about foreign influence in U.S. national security communications.

• The leak of Waltz’s use of TM SGNL coincides with his and Alex Wong’s exit from their roles on May 1, 2025, following Signal group chat leaks, highlighting vulnerabilities in secure communication channels for U.S. officials.

What’s tmSGL and why does our government use it

TM SGNL is a modified version of the popular encrypted messaging app Signal, developed by the Israeli company TeleMessage. Unlike the standard Signal app, which prioritizes end-to-end encryption and user privacy by not storing messages on external servers, TM SGNL is designed to archive messages. This archiving feature allows for the retention and potential retrieval of communications, which can be critical for compliance with legal or regulatory requirements, such as the U.S. federal records laws that mandate the preservation of official government communications.

What is TM SGNL?

• Origin and Purpose: TM SGNL is part of TeleMessage’s “Signal Capture” suite, which modifies the open-source Signal platform to add archiving capabilities. TeleMessage markets this to governments and corporations that need to retain records of encrypted communications for compliance, auditing, or legal purposes.

• Key Features: It retains the core encryption of Signal but adds a layer that copies messages to external servers or devices for storage. A notable detail from the X post and related web results is the “Verify your TM SGNL PIN” prompt seen on Mike Waltz’s phone, indicating it’s a distinct app from the official Signal version.

• Israeli Connection: TeleMessage has ties to Israeli intelligence. Its leadership, including Vice President of Business Development Gil Shapira and Vice President of Corporate Strategy Nir Elperin, have backgrounds in the Israeli Air Force and Elite Military Intelligence Unit, respectively. This raises concerns about potential vulnerabilities, given Israel’s global leadership in spyware and digital forensics.

Why Does the U.S. Government Use TM SGNL?

The U.S. government’s use of TM SGNL stems from a combination of legal requirements and practical needs, but it also introduces significant risks, as highlighted in the X post and related discussions:

1. Federal Records Compliance:

   • U.S. federal law, specifically the Federal Records Act, requires government officials to preserve official communications, including those conducted via messaging apps. Standard Signal doesn’t archive messages, which makes it non-compliant for official use since messages are not retained once deleted or if a device is lost.

   • TM SGNL addresses this by enabling the archiving of encrypted messages, ensuring that communications can be stored and accessed later if needed for transparency, audits, or legal investigations.

2. Secure Communication Needs:

   • Signal is widely regarded as one of the most secure messaging apps due to its end-to-end encryption and open-source code, which has been audited for security. Government officials, like Mike Waltz, often need secure channels to discuss sensitive or classified information.

   • TM SGNL allows the government to use a familiar, encrypted platform like Signal while meeting archiving requirements, theoretically balancing security with compliance.

3. Procurement and Adoption:

   • Federal procurement records, as noted in web results from 404 Media and Newsweek, show that the U.S. government has purchased licenses from TeleMessage for archiving encrypted messaging services like Signal and WhatsApp. This suggests a deliberate choice to integrate TM SGNL into official workflows, likely for agencies or officials handling sensitive communications.

Concerns and Risks

While TM SGNL solves the archiving problem, its use by the U.S. government—especially by high-ranking officials like the National Security Advisor—raises several red flags, as evident from the X post and related commentary:

• Security Vulnerabilities:

  • The standard Signal app is designed to minimize data retention, ensuring that messages are only stored on users’ devices. TM SGNL’s archiving feature introduces a new point of vulnerability by copying messages to external servers, which could be targeted by hackers or foreign intelligence.

  • A Signal spokesperson, quoted in the Drop Site News article, emphasized that they “cannot guarantee the privacy or security properties of unofficial versions of Signal,” highlighting the risk of using a modified app like TM SGNL for classified communications.

• Israeli Ties and Potential Espionage:

  • TeleMessage’s connections to Israeli intelligence, as noted in the web results, are a significant concern. Israel is a close U.S. ally but has a history of conducting intelligence operations against the U.S., such as the Jonathan Pollard espionage case in the 1980s. The country also leads the world in exports of spyware and digital forensics tools, including the infamous Pegasus software by NSO Group.

  • The X post and replies reflect public suspicion, with users like

    @Kirchenkampf

    suggesting that Mossad (Israel’s intelligence agency) could be monitoring U.S. government communications through apps like TM SGNL. While there’s no direct evidence of this in the provided data, the perception of risk is heightened by TeleMessage’s leadership having served in Israeli military intelligence units.

• Classified Information at Risk:

  • The X post notes that Mike Waltz was using TM SGNL to “receive and relay potentially classified info.” This is particularly alarming given prior reports (from Newsweek) that Waltz and other Trump administration officials used Signal to discuss classified military operations, even inadvertently including a journalist in one such chat.

  • Archiving classified messages on a third-party system, especially one with foreign ties, increases the risk of unauthorized access, whether through hacking, insider threats, or foreign intelligence operations.

• Lack of Oversight and Transparency:

  • The use of TM SGNL by high-ranking officials like Waltz, as revealed in the Reuters photograph, suggests a lack of stringent oversight on the tools used for sensitive communications. The fact that Waltz was using this app during a cabinet meeting, as reported by 404 Media, and that its use only came to light through a photograph, indicates potential gaps in security protocols.

Broader Context and Public Reaction

The X post by @AFpost and its replies reveal a mix of outrage, sarcasm, and concern among users: …

Why This Matters

The use of TM SGNL by the U.S. government, as exposed in this case with Mike Waltz, highlights a tension between the need for secure communication and the legal requirement to archive records. While TM SGNL addresses the latter, it potentially undermines the former by introducing vulnerabilities—particularly given its foreign origins and the sensitivity of the information being discussed. For an official like Waltz, who was National Security Advisor until May 1, 2025, and was handling potentially classified information, the stakes are extraordinarily high.

In summary, TM SGNL is a tool meant to bridge the gap between secure messaging and federal record-keeping, but its use by the U.S. government, especially in contexts involving classified information, raises serious security and geopolitical concerns. The government likely adopted it for practical reasons, but the risks—especially with a company tied to Israeli intelligence—have sparked significant backlash and questions about whether such tools are appropriate for high-stakes national security communications.

Lots of articles out now.