The Balance Of Power Calculation

This afternoon I listened to Danny Davis with one of his regulars—Brit strategic thinker Steve Jermyn. The topic was a paper Jermyn just wrote:

The Balance of Power in the Russo-Ukraine War

I wonder whether this idea of calculating the balance of power among competing geopolitical players could also be described in terms of the Russian strategic concept of the correlation of forces? In any event, while Jermyn’s presentation if pretty common sensical, he does gather a lot of useful ideas—useful for analyzing the current geopolitical conflicts among competing poles of power—in one place. Especially useful is his stress on the importance of non-military factors in the calculation.

So, for example, Jermyn begins by pointing to the bizarre phenomenon of the NATO nations making all sorts of demands upon Russia—demands which they lack either the political or military leverage to impose upon Russia. Jermyn attributes this weirdness to an inability of the West to calculate the balance of power between themselves and Russia. I’m not entirely sure of that. It seems to me that the calculation isn’t actually all that difficult:

wouldn't a king setting out to meet another king in war first sit down and consider if he's able to oppose with ten thousand the one who's coming against him with twenty thousand? If he can't he sends a delegation to request peace terms while his enemy is still a long way off.

Perhaps it’s the case that the collective West is in the grip of an ideology that leads them to refuse to make such basic calculations.

Anyway, Jermyn argues that some very simple factors allow us to make the required calculation:

• Industrial capacity (not just GDP)

• Reliable supplies of cheap, high quality and plentiful energy

• Human resources—population, but also “political passion”, devotion to a cause, morale

• Geography and its effect on logistics

Applying these factors it’s child’s play to show that in the war on Russia the balance of power—in “foundational” terms—is all in Russia’s favor:

Russia, meanwhile, is demonstrating on the battlefield the analytic value of balance-of-power calculation. Industrially mobilised for its ‘special military operation’, ... The country is also a hydrocarbons superpower, wholly energy independent and watching ... as Europeans accelerate their industrial suicide with more boomerang energy sanctions. The geopolitical utility of Russia’s power is also clear. A major land power, it is operating on interior logistics lines that play to its strengths. Politically, Russians believe they are fighting an existential war against an expansionist West.

On this analysis, the balance-of-power – on the battlefield and at the negotiating table – overwhelmingly favours Russia.

And, in fact, Russia hasn’t yet fully mobilized for war. That should be extremely concerning for the Anglo-Zionists, because while America remains a great power, it operates under significant constraints:

Foundationally, the United States is much more powerful than Europe or Ukraine, but this is not a high bar. Industrially, the whole world knows there is a problem – a primary logic for tariffs is reindustrialisation. Energy is a much better, albeit far from perfect, story. Although an exporter of refined hydrocarbons, the United States is a net oil importer, ... More immediately pertinent is geopolitical utility. Ukraine is a long way from the American home and a predominantly land campaign. Politically, the Trump administration’s electoral base is against the war and the prospects of Congressional funding support continuing beyond June are uncertain.

We can see how these factors are affecting America’s capacity for power projection. While that capability remains considerable, economic and technological factors have combined to reveal the limits of American power. Both factors were at play in Trump’s ill advised war on faraway Yemen, which was the subject of an article in the NYT:

Why Trump Suddenly Declared Victory Over the Houthi Militia

The militant group in Yemen was still firing at ships and shooting down drones, while U.S. forces were burning through munitions.

In the article we see most of the above factors coming to the fore:

The sudden declaration of victory over the Houthis demonstrates how some members of the president’s national security team underestimated a group known for its resilience.

Significantly, the men also misjudged their boss’s tolerance for military conflict in the region, …

What’s more, Mr. Trump’s new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Dan Caine, was concerned that an extended campaign against the Houthis would drain military resources away from the Asia-Pacific region.

But the cost of the operation was staggering. The Pentagon had deployed two aircraft carriers, additional B-2 bombers and fighter jets, as well as Patriot and THAAD air defenses, to the Middle East, officials acknowledged privately. By the end of the first 30 days of the campaign, the cost had exceeded $1 billion, the officials said.

So many precision munitions were being used, especially advanced long-range ones, that some Pentagon contingency planners were growing increasingly concerned about overall stocks and the implications for any situation in which the United States might have to ward off an attempted invasion of Taiwan by China.

Fortunately for America, Oman was able to suggest a face saving off ramp. A bit like the Biblical king sending his peace delegation to seek terms—having assessed the balance of power. And that leads directly to Jermyn’s closing consideration: the balance of power calculus is important not only for waging war but—perhaps more importantly—for avoiding war or ending war. Jermyn confines his remarks to Russia, but the same would apply to most of the other potential conflicts the US is courting—China, Iran … Note in this closing quote that Jermyn appears to be thinking in terms of what I described above as a refusal to acknowledge reality for ideological reasons—ideological reasons that somehow trump the simple balance of power calculation: “accept geopolitical realities … rather than … cling to our failed political narrative.”

On this analysis, the balance-of-power – on the battlefield and at the negotiating table – overwhelmingly favours Russia.

If we recognise the West’s relative lack of power and accept the geopolitical realities on the ground, ..., rather than seeking to cling to our failed political narrative and delay the inevitable.

Our continued calls for Russia to accept terms that the West is unable to impose will need to cease. We will need to shift our position on the negotiation fundamentals. Russia too has legitimate security interests. Pushing NATO to Russia’s borders whilst wilfully ignoring their interests was always likely to lead to conflict. Wars are brought to a close by diplomacy.

The NYT article does name some of the advisers who failed Trump in the runup to the war on Yemen. Some are gone, all are discredited. Trump himself shifted—for today—from threatening Iran with war to more yackety yack about sanctions. That suggests that he may have learned something about the craziness of trying to scale up from a fruitless war on Yemen to an much bigger war against a far more capable adversary. Hopefully Trump has a better idea of where to look for advice now.