Taking Issue With Macgregor's Take On Trump

Regular readers will be aware that I frequently agree with the military analyses offered by Doug Macgregor. I have on occasion been accused of uncritically accepting his views. I still do generally agree with him, but I found myself yesterday taking issue with Macgregor’s assessment of President Trump, in conversation with Judge Nap. I do so with some trepidation, since Macgregor has dealt with Trump previously on a personal basis and in a professional capacity. On the other hand, Macgregor’s “brief” (his words) interaction with Trump 1.0 was in a very different context than the current context. Then, Trump was in the closing days of an administration marked by a full attack on him by all possible means by the Ruling Class and the Permanent Government of the Deep State. Today, Trump is triumphantly returning to the Oval Office after a landslide electoral victory over a political establishment that is in disarray. The very different reception afforded to Trump this time is irrefutable evidence that this time does bid fair to be different.

When you sort Macgregor’s presentation out, what we’re left with is a Trump who is basically out of touch—misinformed by those around him—and obsessed with getting a quick ‘win’, looking to the short term to the neglect of the consequences of his actions. Since the idea of the ‘win’ comes up repeatedly in Macgregor’s narrative, I’ll quote him:

I think the the Trump team and The Supporting Cast is very interested in a win--in other words, whatever they do whatever the president does it has to be portrayed as a quote unquote win for for president Trump.

Remember we got to go back to this view of, 'it's got to be a win, the the president needs a win, we need a win, how do we get a win?'

Remember, Donald Trump is about winning. If you can't say it's a win he's not terribly interested in the subject, …

Right now we're still stuck with 'it has to be a win,’ …

Macgregor maintains that this emphasis on the quick win is what’s behind several of Trump’s “land grab” initiatives—especially the Greenland one. It will lead Trump to “lose interest” in Ukraine when he figures out that there’s no possibility of a win. Lastly, he contends that the Gaza ceasefire is another manifestation of this ‘it has to be a win’ mentality—the public image of Trump ‘bullying’ Netanyahu is a cover for a darker quid pro quo that will lead America into a disastrous war on Iran. Netanyahu is still running the show, and Trump remains in thrall to the Zionist money that was so key to his landslide win.

Admittedly, Macgregor makes some persuasive points. However, on closer examination his case may not be as strong as he believes and, in some respects, may contain internal contradictions. Let’s look at it more closely.

First, regarding the 'it has to be a win’ mentality. Is this not, in effect, another way of framing the American political wisdom that a new administration needs to ‘hit the ground running’? Needs to show results in the ‘First 100 Days’? In assessing this real political need, I think we need to grant that Trump has always presented big picture policies that will not be achievable overnight. Consider the border. Yes, taking the first step in any policy can be touted as a win, but a gigantic project of that sort can go awry in the succeeding months and years. In other words, this—like many other Trumpian initiatives—is not simply short term non-strategic thinking. MAGA really is a vision that is strategic in nature. The difference in Trump 1.0 and 2.0 can also be seen in the personnel moves we’ve noted—Trump is clearly determined to take control over the permanent governing bureaucracy and to transform it. That, also is a clear indication—a very important one—that he has a handle on what needs to be done and is not simply obsessed on a quick ‘win’ or two.

Turning to Greenland, in that light, it’s important to recall that the Greenland gambit is not some spur of the moment thing. It was a big deal during Trump 1.0—with the difference that it was laughed off the political playing field then. This is now. Trump hasn’t lost sight of Greenland, and is willing to take political flack to bring it once more to the fore. This suggests to me that there is real strategic thinking behind the Greenland gambit—it’s part of a long term plan that fits into the overall concept of MAGA. Now everyone is free to disagree. Many think this idea presents a bullying Uncle Sam from which they recoil in, if not dismay, then in distaste. For my part, whatever the practicalities, I believe it makes long term strategic sense on multiple levels. And if we makes allowances for the hyperbolic nature of Trumpian rhetoric, the idea of a fundamental rethinking of the US - Canada relationship—which amounts to Canada finally gaining independence from the British Empire—that makes sense too. A glance at an Arctic polar view of the world should convince any open minded person. However, my point is not to argue for the policy itself. My point is to argue that Trump is actually a big picture geopolitical thinker.

The same is true of Trump’s thinking on Russia. Once again, while one must be skeptical of the 24 hour peace plan—or even the new 100 day or six month versions—one thing is clear. Trump’s latest Russian initiative is no more than a continuation of the ideas he presented during Trump 1.0. So, once again, we see that Trump has geopolitical ideas that have endured through the years, and that suggests considerable reflection on the subjet. Consider. Trump 1.0 began with Trump’s idea of scrapping the entire NATO concept—maybe even NATO itself—and entering into some sort of partnership with Russia. That proposal was drowned in a chorus of Anglo-Zionist outrage and the Russia Hoax. Now comes Trump 2.0 and Trump, far from looking elsewhere for a quick ‘win’, has returned to Russia and, even before inauguration has publicly acknowledged Russia’s legitimate security interests in Ukraine. Is that not, implicitly, a return to the notion that American can enter into some sort of partnership with Russia? Once again we see continuity of thought and persistence. The difference this time around is that Trump appears to believe that he has the political muscle now to face down the Ruling Class.

That brings us to Macgregor’s nay saying with regard to the Gaza ceasefire, but also with regard to the Middle East more generally—especially Iran. Before we dive into that, it may be well to tackle the matter of whether and to what degree Trump is being misinformed by those around him—it will have a bearing on what follows.

There’s no question that Trump has presented views of the war on Russia that are simply counterfactual. In that regard, his expressed views mirror those of Rubio in his confirmation testimony, which we addressed just the other day and of the other clown, Waltz. Those views mirror the propaganda line of the Zhou regime and of the Anglo-Zionists more generally—that Russia has suffered massive losses, that there may yet be some way to “stabilize” the Ukraine front. On this score Macgregor is undoubtedly correct. The war has been lost, the US has no leverage to use against Russia, there is no ‘win’ in sight. However …

Macgregor does believe that Trump has received some “ground truth” from the Pentagon:

… he's surrounded by people who are not telling him the truth, who are pretending that the Ukrainian Army is a stalwart organization that, the Russians have taken heavy losses, that they're running out of people and all this nonsense--none of which is true. As long as he listens to them it's going to be harder and harder for him to come to terms with reality, and the reality very simply is we have no leverage and Moscow has no particular incentive to listen to anything we say.

I also think Donald Trump has gotten some ground truth from the Department of Defense and you and I know that the lone voices in this Wilderness that have cautioned against unrestricted flows of armaments and ammunition and capabilities from the United States to Ukraine, have said on more than one occasion we're dangerously close to having nothing with which to fight a war ourselves. I think that word has reached to president Trump …

With that in mind, consider Trump’s acknowledgement of Russia’s legitimate security interests in Ukraine and Eastern Europe. Is Trump not implicitly admitting that the war is lost and that the US must make signficant concessions if it is going to play any constructive role in building an enduring peace and security arrangement? I think so. Then again, while I criticized some of what Rubion said in his confirmation testimony, I also pointed to a key portion of that testimony that seems to me to be in agreement with Trump’s views on Russian security—which should hardly be surprising:

The US Congress has appropriated almost $175 billion in aid to Ukraine since the conflict escalated in February 2022, of which about $65 billion has been direct military assistance. Yet the outgoing administration “never clearly delineated what the end goal of the conflict was,” Rubio told the senators.

“What exactly were we funding? What exactly were we putting money towards? On many occasions it sounded like ‘however much it takes for however long it takes’. That is not a realistic or prudent position,” he said.

What I’m suggesting is that, while Trump’s publicly expressed views may—to some extent—reflect current Anglo-Zionist talking points, his bottom line actually reflects a better informed understanding of the situation. If he really believed that Russia was staggering on its feet from massive losses, would he also be acknowledging wide ranging and legitimate Russian security interests? I suspect not. Add to that that Macgregor believes Trump is aware of the current state of the US military—that it is not in a position to be waging major wars.

On to the Middle East.

Macgregor pooh-poohs the Gaza ceasefire, expressing the view that Netanyahu still “runs the show” and that the agreement is a cover for—my words—a betrayal of American interests. My response is that I believe Netanyahu’s political (and legal) position is too difficult for him to engage in this type of charade that, by all accounts, would need to extend for up to six weeks before ripping off the mask. I’m not saying the ceasefire will hold, but I am saying that I do believe Netanyahu was forced into against his own perceived interests. Israeli public opinion is unrelenting in presenting this agreement as a catastrophe. For example:

For the first time, Israel just lost a war

This is what Hamas won in this war:

1. It turned world opinion against Israel.

2. It has negotiated the release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, many of whom have been sentenced to life terms.

2. While some of its leaders were killed, they will be replaced with new ones.

3. While many of its fighters were killed, according press reports, Hamas has been rebuilding its fighting wing, which now has 12,000 soldiers in Gaza.

4. Hamas has proved that Israel is willing to give up huge amounts to get a small amount in return.

5. Hamas gets to claim proudly that the October 7, 2023 massacre brought about terrific results. In fact, Israel is weaker now than it was on October 6, 2023.

6. It really pays to take hostages.

7. While much of Gaza has been destroyed, the world is about to provide huge sums in order to rebuild it. One can expect that a significant amount of these sums will indirectly wind up in Hamas’ coffers.

8. Hamas will still control Gaza. UNRWA will remain as it has been.

9. The war has created a serious rift between Israel and the United States.

10. Initially, Hamas will only have to release three hostages. It will have to release 4 more hostages shortly after that. During phase one of the deal, only a total of 33 hostages will be released. Israel may trade more Palestinian prisoners being held by Hamas for more hostages after that. Thus, at the end of phase one of the deal, Hamas will be able to continue to hold roughly 30 hostages, some of whom may already be dead.

10. Israel has failed in its objectives as stated at the beginning of the war, which included the total elimination of Hamas in Gaza.

11. It pays to commit war crimes, including not only the war crimes that Hamas committed during the October 7th massacre, but by firing thousands of missiles into Israel, every one of them a war crime.

12. The cost to Israel of this war has been enormous. Not only has Hamas been able to kill over 400 Israeli soldiers in Gaza since the October 7th massacre, but Israel’s national debt has increased substantially and its economy has been hurt as well. It has been estimated that Israel’s economic activity has been reduced over 20% by the war.

13. While Israel will get some respite from Hamas forces in Gaza, it still has the remaining parts of Iran’s axis of resistance, including the Houthis and Hamas on the West Bank, and Iran, to deal with.

14. Israel will begin to to withdraw its troops from Gaza and, for now, the killing will cease.

What Israel has obtained that it did NOT have on October 6, 2023.

1. Almost nothing.

I find it difficult to believe that The Israel Lobby would willingly allow Trump this much freedom—which suggests that Trump is acting on his own or, as I have speculated, with the blessing of Jewish interests who believe that Netanyahu’s war is a disaster for the Jewish brand. We’re all familiar with the Netanyahu mantra over the decades:

ADAM @AdameMedia

 Netanyahu in the 80's brags about how they control America:

"We own the senate, the congress, and we have a strong Jewish lobby on our side.

America won't force us into anything."

Half a dozen wars ago..

From

Censored Men

10:21 AM · Jan 15, 2025

I don’t think it’s in Netanyahu’s “personality” to willingly execute this type of ceasefire climbdown, even as a subterfuge for the war on Iran that Macgregor is predicting. Does this mean that The Israel Lobby has lost control of American foreign policy and is left with this?

Megatron @Megatron_ron

How about instead of shutting down TikTok, we shut down the Jewish owned OnlyFans & PornHub? Or someone is afraid to do it?

Last edited6:38 AM · Jan 17, 2025

No, I’m not saying The Israel Lobby has been defanged. Macgregor pitches this hard—it’s really the core of his argument. Regarding the possibility—Macgregor pretty much calls it a lead pipe cinch—of a secret side deal in general:

I don't see why anyone is surprised by it. I'm not even sure that it's the secret that everyone thinks. I think this is completely consistent with President Trump's approach to foreign and defense policy. This is the Israel First Administration. I think probably the most interesting comment is the one that I think you broadcast earlier last week of Kash Patel talking about the FBI, and then saying, 'but Israel is our first priority'. So I find nothing surprising in that, particularly given the enormous amounts of money that have been poured into the Trump campaign by the Zionist community.

But Macgregor goes well beyond generalities. He’s quite specific:

I think behind the scenes president Trump and his administration may well have agreed to a joint attack with Israel against Iran, and that's going to be an Air and and Naval power attack, largely aircraft and missiles. I'm fairly certain that that agreement was reached and in return for that I think Mr Netanyahu was willing to go along with this short-term ceasefire because he would like to have some measure of quiet on his flanks while he goes after Iran with our substantial help.

The Pegasus revelation [or, perhaps, claim] is disturbing but not surprising, given the people currently interested in going after anyone, anywhere in the world, who is construed as an anti-Semite. And of course that term is used effectively against anybody that doesn't want to unconditionally support Israel. I think this is where we're headed, just as I am convinced we're headed to war with Iran.

If this were indeed the case, The Israel Lobby and the Israeli media should be performing cartwheels, or engaging in some celebratory dance like the one Mike Pompeo does when he learns of ongoing genocides. Or at least exhibiting more restraint in the rhetoric department. Instead, Trump is being accused of outright lying—as if Netanyahu alone is allowed that privilege. Subterfuge? I’m not so sure. I can certainly see why someone would believe Trump had lied but, again, he may have signaled this. Recall that during the campaign Trump stated several times that Netanyahu needed to “get this done” quickly—specifically, before Trump got into office. Yes, he also talked about “hell to pay”—but that was addressed to Hamas. He never said he would give Netanyahu a blank check—or a blanker check, if that were possible. He said Netanyahu better get this over with. Call that a clue. Netanyahu didn’t follow Trump’s pointed and repeated admonition. Yes, Trump was playing his cards close to the vest, but who’s really to blame for reading into his words something that wasn’t there?

But I also want to take issue with Macgregor’s claim that a US attack on Iran is all but a done deal. Recall that Macgregor said, up front, that he thinks the Pentagon has given Trump a pretty realistic appraisal of the dangerous state of affairs regarding the lack of preparedness of the US for a major war. And isn’t that the point of the Hegseth nomination? To purge the military of deadweight and DEI and whip it into shape again? Now, Macregor was speaking in the context of war with Russia, but later he adds:

… he thinks he's going to reshape the Middle East to Israel's satisfaction. I don't think that's going to work and I think there's a tendency to dismiss out of hand the very high probability that if we attack Iran with the Israelis that the Russians will actually intervene to support the Iranians. The damage we're doing to ourselves in the Middle East is not widely appreciated inside the United States.

First of all, if Trump has been given an accurate accounting of US military (lack of) preparedness in the face of known threats—as Macgregor himself maintains—then doesn’t it stand to reason that Trump would have also been brought up to speed on Iran’s capabilities? After all, if US carrier battle groups are having to give Yemen a very wide berth, surely that—as well as the extreme vulnerability of Middle East bases to serious missile attacks—would be part of any accurate briefing. Couple that with the briefings on Russian capabilities and the signing today of the comprehensive pact between Russia and Iran, how could Trump possibly be unaware that any attack on Iran—even a standoff attack—would be a disaster rather than a quick ‘win’?

The fact is that, during the campaign, Trump also expressed interest in developing good relations with Iran. That seems to me to be another clue. My bottom line is that Trump is well aware that MAGA cannot move forward on the all important domestic front—where there will be another major election in two years—if the US is embroiled in any major war. Let alone a major Middle Eastern war that could shut off the Persian Gulf spigot and lead Russia to more aggressive military actions. MAGA, as I understand it, is about America at home, not an Empire abroad. That’s exactly why Trump has repeatedly talked about junking NATO.

At this point I’m gonna say Trump is being cagey, not treacherous. I may not be happy with everything he does, but I do think Macgregor is failing to read the entirety of the evidence that’s out there.

See what you think.