Russia's Asymmetrical Advantage

I ran across an interesting link this morning while reading Moon of Alabama. Moon’s post—'Drinking The Kool-Aid' On The War In Ukraine—is interesting in its own right for students of military affairs. However, the link—which is to a blog post dating back to 2016—is critically important for understanding the dynamics of the West’s war against Russia and Russia’s responses.

The blog post focuses on electronic warfare, and the author is at pains to disabuse his readers of the notion that Russia is backward in military capabilities. Yes, Russia—as of 2016—may have lagged in certain categories of hardware, but not all. And, on the other hand, Russia—again, as of 2016—held certain critical advantages:

To Exploit U.S. Gaps, Russia Preps for Electronic Warfare

Much has been written about the weakness of the Russian military. Commentators describe it as a “paper tiger” that would not be effective against the more advanced weaponry of NATO. ...

When it comes to traditional conventional weapons there is much truth to these assertions. However, these claims of Washington’s military superiority overlook a key fact. In the event of a war, Moscow possesses some critical asymmetrical advantages vis-à-vis the United States that the Kremlin would surely seek to exploit.

Russia’s electronic warfare strategy in Ukraine is one example of this.

The author is referring to the conflict in the Donbass which, as of 2016, had been going on for two years. Already at that point observers had become aware of significant Russian capabilities in the field of electronic warfare. The US had been preparing the Ukrainian military for war with Russia since at least 2008 and had been supplying Ukraine with modern electronic equipment. Imagine how disconcerting it was, therefore, to discover that Russia had effective counters that could render opposing militaries blind:

On at least three separate occasions the OSCE reported its monitoring drones were subjected to military-grade electronic warfare while flying over territory controlled by the Russian-supported separatists. In each case, they were rendered blind and forced to end their missions.

Russia’s use of electronic warfare in Ukraine represents just the tip of the iceberg.

Since that time, of course, there have been developments in both the West as well as in Russia with regard to military capabilities. The West has consistently shrunk its militaries in terms of manpower, but its reliance on “high tech” weaponry—which is also “high cost”—has led to a shrinkage in armaments as well. This deficiency when it comes to conventional warfare has been one of the glaring lessons of the current conflict in Ukraine. Obviously, Russia has paid close attention to the West’s reliance on communications and electronics in general. We have little to fear in that regard from third world or even second world militaries, and have paid little attention to the possibility of conventional war with a peer or near-peer power—like Russia. Russia, by contrast has focused on that possibility:

Russia’s advanced electronic warfare capabilities elucidates a broader point. The U.S. military’s superiority depends on advanced communications and electronics, yet these expensive advanced systems are highly susceptible to Russia’s advanced jamming abilities.

Worse, defensive measures—as so often—are far less expensive to develop that offensive systems:

These systems are also much less expensive to produce than many of the advanced weapons deployed by the United States. For example, a single Richag-AV radar system costs only $10 million — expensive in absolute terms but a cheap asymmetrical capability in relative terms.

And this realization came at a time when the West was already aware that Russia had developed and deployed a formidable air defense system—no doubt based on the observation that the American way of war is heavily dependent on air power. Bear in mind that, while the US has fielded new systems in the field of air power since 2016, Russia has also significantly upped its game in terms of air defense. That upping of its game has come from an already high level:

While the commander of U.S. Army units in Europe, Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, calls Russia’s electronic warfare capabilities “eye-watering,” Russia’s cyber warfare capabilities are the Kremlin’s ultimate asymmetric tool.

I’m obviously not in a position to make comparisons. DoD has been known to exaggerate threats to obtain extra new funding. On the other hand, the Russians have not been bashful—since about 2018—in touting their capabilities.

The West has learned the hard way that Russia’s focus on artillery of all sorts—including sophisticated guided munitions—has paid dividends, as has Russia’s care in amassing vast quantities of munitions, both tube launched as well as missile launched. Knowledgeable military analysts make no bones about it: The West, including America, is no longer capable of engaging in a conventional war with Russia on equal terms. Not in terms of equipment but also not in terms of training. The Russian advantage in asymmetrical warfare and electronic counter measures—which has been amply demonstrated in Ukraine—adds significantly to the overall Russian advantage in conventional warfare.

However, Russia has also paid close attention to the development of cutting edge new technologies, as well as upgrading existing systems. An example of upgrading would be the S-400 system, which has been deployed (but not used) in Syria and has been used in Ukraine.

The obvious example of a cutting edge new technological development is in the field of hypersonic missiles. Russia has deployed both surface to surface (including submarine launched) as well as air to surface hypersonic missiles since 2018. These missiles are also nuclear capable. It is concerning, of course, that Russia has multiple operational hypersonic systems, while the US remains in the developmental stage—with multiple failed tests. Just as concerning is that, while the US struggles to develop even a single hypersonic system, Russia has already deployed a hypersonic system that is claimed to be capable of defending against hypersonic missiles: the hypersonic S-500:

The S-500 is designed for intercepting and destroying intercontinental ballistic missiles, as well as hypersonic cruise missiles and aircraft, for air defense against Airborne Early Warning and Control and for jamming aircraft.

In other words, the S-500 can take out the heart of our air power operations, and we have absolutely no way of stopping it.

With a planned range of 600 km (370 mi) for anti-ballistic missile (ABM) and 500 km (310 mi) for air defense, the S-500 would be able to detect and simultaneously engage up to 10 ballistic hypersonic targets flying at a speed of 5 kilometres per second (3.1 mi/s) to a limit of 7 km/s (4.3 mi/s). It also aims at destroying hypersonic cruise missiles and other aerial targets at speeds of higher than Mach 5, as well as spacecraft. The altitude of a target engaged can be as high as 180–200 km (110–120 mi). It is effective against ballistic missiles with a launch range of 3,500 km (2,200 mi), the radar reaches a radius of 3,000 km (1,300 km for the EPR 0,1 square meter). Other targets it has been announced to defend against include unmanned aerial vehicles, low Earth orbit satellites, space weapons launched from hypersonic aircraft, and hypersonic orbital platforms.

Again, the S-500 is capable of taking out most, if not all, of our most advanced surveillance and targeting capabilities. We have no defense to this.

The system is mobile and has rapid deployability. Experts believe that the system's capabilities can affect enemy intercontinental ballistic missiles at the middle and end portions of flight, but reports by Almaz-Antey say that the external target-designation system (RLS Voronezh-DM and missile defence system A-135 radar Don-2N) will be capable of mid-early flight portion interceptions of enemy ballistic missiles, which is one of the final stages of the S-500 project. It is to have a response time of less than 4 seconds (Compared to the S-400's less than 10)

The bottom line is that when Putin says—as he recently did—that Russia has really hardly begun to use its capabilities, that’s not a bluff. It’s very clear that, with the failure of sanctions shock and awe, the West is very much in the realm of bluff with its military support of Ukraine. It seems ill advised not only on the economic level—as Germany is learning—but also on the military level.