Russia - Ukraine: Geo-Strategic Considerations

I have two posts in mind for today because I want to push some information and opinion out in more manageable bites. We’ve referred in the past to the historical background to the current conflict which goes back in one sense or another to Napoleonic times. Bear with me—the historical perspective is useful.

Look at it this way. By the time of Napoleon’s Russian campaign the partitions of Poland had been completed. Russia was now bordering on Western Europe—or Central Europe, if you prefer—with no buffering state in between. For a graphic illustration of the meaning of this, here’s a map that was featured at naked capitalism yesterday. This is the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at its greatest extent in the 17th century. You can see at a glance how close Poland approached to the reality of an Intermarium—a kingdom stretching from sea (Baltic) to sea (Black):

In reality, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was a ramshackle political structure which was vulnerable to pressure from hostile neighbors. This reality came to light especially during The Deluge. (For a typical, but still eye opening, example of Polish - Ukrainian relations as they continued up until March of this year, cf. Batoh massacre.) While Poland seemingly recovered from The Deluge, it was the beginning of the end. There was a gradual contraction of Poland’s borders over the ensuing century, but the serious territorial collapse—and final extinction—of the Polish kingdom began in 1772.

As you can see from this map, the Russian Empire acquired the lion’s share of Poland. In the wake of the Napoleonic wars Russia pushed its borders even further west into the former Polish heartland (including Warsaw). For an account of this history as it lives in much of the popular Russian imagination even today, see the account at naked capitalism: Anschluss, Again — Anticipating Poland’s Strategy in Russia’s Intelligence Assessment. While I have strongly criticized the current Polish government’s stance toward Russia, I have to say that I regard Russian attitudes as expressed in that article as bordering on fantasy.

That situation held until WW1, with Russia smack up against Germany. The result of the Polish partitions and the vast westward expansion of the Russian Empire was a growing recognition of—and concern over—the long term strategic threat posed by a modernizing Russia, possessed of vast agricultural, mineral, and human resources. That concern was expressed, for example, in the Crimean War (1853-1856), in which England, France, and the Ottoman Empire teamed up against Russia in the effort to confine Russia’s navy to the Black Sea and to stop Russia’s expansion into formerly Ottoman lands in the Balkans.

So, with that lengthy background, consider the following twitter thread regarding the Montreux Convention. As you can see from the article, the MC (1936) was another attempt spearheaded by Britain to confine the Russian navy to the Black Sea, to prevent Russia from extending its influence into the Mediterranean. However, the strategic considerations were complex, leading to Britain and France making concessions to both the USSR and Turkey from what the Western powers might have preferred in a maximal sense. Why the concessions? For reasons that are still relevant to NATO (which, of course, didn’t exist in 1936):

Britain's willingness to make concessions has been attributed to a desire to avoid Turkey being driven to ally itself with or to fall under the influence of Adolf Hitler or Benito Mussolini. It was thus the first in a series of steps by Britain and France to ensure that Turkey would either remain neutral or tilt towards the Western Allies in the event of any future conflict with the Axis.

Now, the result of the MC has endured to the present, with the difference that Turkey became a member of NATO after WW2. A further difference is that the United States (which, for historical reasons, was not a signatory) has stepped into the shoes of the former Western powers, at least in terms of taking the lead in seeking the most restrictive interpretations of the MC with regard to Russia, while at the same time seeking to project its own naval power into the Black Sea (especially since Russia’s war with Georgia in 2008). That dynamic is very much a factor in the current Russia - Ukraine conflict, in that the US and UK had assisted Ukraine to upgrade its ports to handle their naval vessels—within about 190 miles of the main Russian naval base at Sevastopol.

The West has realised that Russia is winning on the battlefield and is making diplomatic efforts to prevent #Russia from cutting off #Ukraine from the Black Sea.

The Black Sea is a springboard for influencing the Middle East and circumventing the Montreux Convention.

#Russia's direct link to #Transnistria and the loss of Odessa and Nikolaev would almost completely nullify #Ukraine's value to the West and fundamentally change the geopolitical map.

Therefore, Western leaders are now suddenly announcing that it is necessary to stop hostilities and for the sake of peace #Ukraine has to give up part of its territory which is currently under Russia's control.

But this is just a deception. The ceasefire is only needed in order to pump #Ukraine with western weapons and to train Ukrainian soldiers to use NATO equipment.

This is why the Russian Special military operation must continue without pauses till all objectives are achieved.

This should suggest why the US is, belatedly, upset with regard to Russia’s obvious aim to cut Ukraine off from the Black Sea. Russia’s rationale is fairly reasonable, in that historically Odessa has been a Russian city ever since the Turks were expelled. In a prudential light, if the US and NATO wanted to preserve Ukraine’s outlet to the Black Sea, a more conciliatory approach to Russia might have been advisable, rather than the repeated provocations. Inserting modern NATO naval vessels into the Black Sea seems to be a pretty obvious signal that NATO aims to bottle up the Black Sea fleet. You can argue what you want about that, but making your intent so obvious was bound to lead what we’re seeing now. Compounding NATO concerns is the increasing geopolitical cooperation between Russian and NATO member Turkey. Unlike other NATO countries, it’s difficult for the West to simply strongarm Turkey.

Balancing this Black Sea situation is the standoff at the other end of the old Polish “Intermarium”—the Baltic Sea. Russia’s access to the Atlantic Ocean is constrained at both ends of the Intermarium by narrow straits—the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits in Turkey and the Skaggerak between Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. Sweden, while not a NATO member, has long acted in concert with NATO. Denmark and Norway, as well as Germany, have very capable navies to police the Baltic and even the Arctic Sea—Russia’s only other reliable access to the Atlantic. The US and UK navies further strengthen the NATO naval presence directed at Russia. The entry of the Baltic countries, and the attempted entry of Sweden and Finland, to NATO would constrict Russia even more severely in the Baltic.

Of course, neighborly relations work both ways. The Russian complaint is that they have sought improved neighborly relations ever since the end of the Cold War, and have been rebuffed—at the instigation of the US and the UK—at every step of the way. Further, not only have Russia’s attempts to integrate itself into the European political economy been rebuffed, but NATO and the Globalist order in general has assumed an ever more threatening stance toward Russia, culminating with the US inspired coup in Ukraine in 2014. From the Russian perspective, they are faced with NATO efforts to set up the capability for naval blockades as well as open efforts to suppress Russian economic development.

What accounts for the determined hostility of the West toward Russia?

Larry Johnson offered an explanation yesterday:

WHY THE WEST LUSTS AFTER UKRAINE

Johnson offers a snapshot of Ukraine’s potential wealth in terms of resources. Now, as Johnson recognizes, much of that potential wealth is located in areas that have, arguably, been traditionally Russian—such as the Donbass and Novorossiya. Check it out. I’ll simply quote the concluding paragraph, which explains the West’s fear of Russia. That fear of Russian domination isn’t entirely unreasonable, but the response of the West is also arguably unconstructive:

If you have labored under the false narrative that Russia is an economic midget trying to play with the so-called “first world big boys”, these facts show that you have been fed a massive, false narrative. Russia’s natural resources exceed those of Ukraine. A united Russia and Ukraine represents a true economic powerhouse. Those two countries actually make things and have the internal resources necessary to produce them. The United States and Europe do not. And there are no stashes of alternative supplies in other countries capable of replacing what Russia and Ukraine mine and harvest. This is why the United States and Europe are desperate to weaken Russia. The writing is on the wall for all to read.

Russia understands the dynamics that are at play. The West, especially the US, wants to maintain Russia as a type of colony of the West—a supplier of natural resources but not an equal partner. The obvious fear is that Russia is potentially too powerful to remain an equal partner—which is Russia’s promise and its curse, depending on your point of view. The US has undercut itself by outsourcing its own economy, even as Russia seeks to develop its own manufacturing base.