Neocon Myths

Former British diplomat, Alistair Crooke, has put together an article—followed by an interview with Andrew Napolitano—that help to place Neocon thinking within a context that fits into American culture. I think most of us are dimly aware that Russophobia in Europe has more to do with nationalism and historical grievances and ambitions than with ideology. For Americans of that inclination, ideological thinking looms larger.

The article can be found here:

Europe Has Lost Its Guiding Myth

As you can see, it’s not about Neoconism specifically, although the second half does focus on that. Crooke begins that second half with a discussion of myth as a way that humans express their understanding of reality, then moves on to ideological constructs that govern our contemporary world. These are topics that I covered at great length early on in the life of Meaning in History, and I’ve included some links that I considered relevant.

Historian Paul Veyne, a towering figure in the history of the ancient Roman world, once posed the question: Did the Greeks Believe in Their Myths? All societies, he wrote, contrive to some notional distinction between ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’, but in the end, according to him, this too, is just another ‘fishbowl’, the one we happen to inhabit, and it is in no way superior, as a matter of epistemology, to the fishbowl in which ancient Greeks lived and made sense of their world, in no small part through myths and stories about the gods.

In respect to the myth of the Roman Empire which nourishes U.S. foreign policy, Veyne’s position is profoundly contrarian. For his basic claim is that Roman imperialism had little to do with statecraft, nor economic predation or the assertion of control and the demand of obedience, but rather that was motivated by a collective wish to create a world in which Romans might be left alone, not simply secure, but undisturbed. That is all.

Paradoxically, this account would place the American traditionalist ‘Right’ – which leans to a Burkean-Buchanan perspective –closer to that of Veyne’s Roman ‘reality’ that to that of the neo-cons: i.e. what most Americans wish is for America to be left alone, and to be secure.

Yes, the gods and myths were tangible to the Ancients. They lived through them. The point here is Veyne’s warning against our ‘lazy treating’ of ancient Romans as versions of ourselves, caught up in different contexts, to be sure, but essentially interchangeable with us.

I’m not sure why Crooke chose the word “tangible”. I would have said something like “suffused with meaning”, “real” in that sense of communicating meaning. In origin, and properly speaking, the mythical way of thinking is an expression of an insight into the structure and nature of reality—not something that can be “touched”. This is to be distinguished from later literary constructions that are labeled as myths, and that ancients such as Plato inveighed against. G. K. Chesterton discusses this distinction in The Everlasting Man. For a more technical discussion, see Mircea Eliade’s writings, especially the seminal Myth of the Eternal Return.

Chesterton's Thomist View of Myth

Mark Wauck

Sep 7, 2011

G. K. Chesterton's magnum opus, The Everlasting Man , amounts to a theory of man in history from a Christian apologetic perspective. The overarching theme is that what could be called the "methodology" of the Christian revelation--God's self revelation in Jesus rather than in a book--is remarkably "in tune with" human nature as we see it in history. While it would be unwise to seek a complete theory of man in a book of apologetics--we cannot expect to find anything quite like Eliade's theory of archaic ontology--The Everlasting Man is, like so many of Chesterton's works, shot through with keen insights that repay careful study. This is particularly true of Chesterton's reflections on the nature of mythology and its relation to Christianity, a topic that is central to his overall argument. For Chesterton, to understand myth is to understand man, …

In the two paragraphs that follow—which should, perhaps, be inverted—you can see that “tangible” doesn’t express Crooke’s actual understanding.

Did the Greeks believe in their Myths? Veyne’s short answer is ‘no’. The public spectacle of authority was an end in itself. It was artifice without an audience – as an expression of authority beyond question. There was no ‘public sphere’, indeed no ‘public’ as such. The state was instrumentalist. Its role was to mediate and keep the Empire aligned and attuned with these invisible and powerful forces.

The gods and myths were understood by the Ancients in a way that is almost wholly alien to us today: They were energetic invisible forces that carried distinct qualities that both shaped the world and carried meaning. Today, we have lost the ability to read the world symbolically – symbols have become rigid ‘things’.

I believe that what Crooke is saying here is that the modern tendency is to treat “myths” as symbolic narratives, in which the symbols are equated on a one to one basis with concepts. In other words, we tend to treat myths and symbols as allegories that can almost literally be translated into a conceptual discourse, rather than narratives within which intelligibility—meaning—can be “seen”.

The implication of Veyne’s analysis is that Rome is false as a comparison to support the ‘myth’ of the inevitability of U.S. primacy: The ‘mythical’ neo-con approach of course is instrumentalised to convince us all that U.S. primacy is ordained (by the gods?), and that Russia is low hanging fruit – a fragile rotten structure that easily can be toppled.

In other words, Neocon “myths” are presented in the form of conceptual constructs that are literally true. In this sense we can see that their conceptual constructs are not really “myths” at all in the proper sense. Crooke, and many others, is using the word ambiguously, rather than distinguishing between myth and its corruption—ideology. This is the distinction between myth and ideology—ideology being a corruption of myth (cf. Eliade on that score). In this ideological way of thinking the conceptual construct takes on the quality of a magical incantation that is capable of bringing into reality the wished for result that is invoked. See, for example, Hegel As Sorcerer, which is an explication of Eric Voegelin’s essay on Hegel (not freely available on the internet)—magic being a corruption of myth. Modern man lives in the Age of Ideology, and the history of the last several centuries is littered with the wreckage wrought in the name of ideology, for those who have eyes to see. Thus, ideologues like the Neocons do, in a sense, believe their own “myths” in a way that the ancients didn’t really believe their myths.

Do then the neo-cons believe their own myths? Well, ‘yes’ and ‘no’. ‘Yes’, in that the neo-cons are a group of people who come to share a common view (i.e. Russia as fragile and fissiparous), often proposed by a few ideologues deemed to be credentiallised. It is a view however, not based in reality. These adherents may be convinced intellectually that their view is right, but their belief cannot be tested in a way which could confirm it beyond doubt. It is simply based on a picture of the world as they imagine it to be, or more to the point, as they would like it to be.

The will to power is key to understanding the function of ideology. Ideology goes beyond the function of myth—to communicate the meaning of human existence and to provide structure for the embodiment of that meaning in our lives—and seeks to project power through action in history, based on the conceptual construct. As Crooke argues below, acting on the basis of ideology that is an expression of the will or desire for power in history but which cannot be verified, is essentially delusional. The followers of ideologues may, in fact, be successful at times, but because they are driven by conceptual constructs, wishful thinking, they run great risks because they lose the ability to see reality clearly.

Yes, the neo-cons believe their myths because they seem to work. Just look around. ...

...

The neo-con myth of Russia on the cusp of implosion makes no sense. But it is a picture of the world as the neo-cons imagine it to be, or more to the point, would like it to be. The shortcomings of the Ukrainian forces as detailed in (their own American) Intel leaks: They pretend not to notice – convinced, as Foreign Policy explains, that once the expected Ukrainian offensive launches, if “the Russian soldiers panic, causing paralysis among the Russian leadership … then the counter-offensive will be successful”.

The more such delusional analysis is pursued, the more functional psychopathy will be exhibited, and the less normal it becomes. In short, it descends into collective delusion – if it hasn’t already.

Now, on to Crooke’s interview with Napolitano. What I’ve done is transcribe (with a bit of editing to clean it up in written form) about five minutes of the interview, in which Crooke speaks about Neocon thinking. It’s similar to, but not identical with, his article’s presentation. For example, he dispenses with his discussion of myth and instead argues here that the motive behind Putin’s actions is the desire to preserve or recover Russian sovereignty, in opposition to the Neocon ideology that seeks to subjugate the entire world to the American Empire. Certainly Putin has spoken on the theme of sovereignty repeatedly. This is an idea that he sees not only in economic terms but also in cultural terms. Crooke certainly understands that sovereignty embodies the national myth, the meaning of national existence, that Putin—and not just Putin, but also Central European countries like Poland and Hungary—sees as so necessary for a healthy society. See the conclusion to Crooke’s article for some discussion of that.

[15:23] Q: What are the Neocon myths? Do they believe their own myths?

A: The principal myth is that [Russia] took the wrong turn in the 90s. They should have adopted a neo-liberal economic structure, instead of which they continued with a centralized Soviet bureaucratic planning. That has left [Russia] as a weak, fragile, broken state. One that if you give it a little push the whole thing will collapse. This is a myth that is very powerful--and they think China is making the same mistake. That's what Yellen's speech was about, just the other day. China making the same mistake, and so moving away from the international, global order and having a much more state-ordered economy. Yellen was saying that this is a great error on China's part. Paradoxically, Xi and Putin see things the other way round--that it's actually the West that's economically fragile. They see more [economic] self sufficiency leading to a return of national sovereignty.

One can argue with some of what Crooke is saying. While Russia may, to a remarkable extent, actually be autarkic, it’s hard to say that about China, which is reliant on external trade.

Q: Do the Neocons actually believe that the war in Ukraine can, should, will result in the removal of President Putin from office?

A: The answer is Yes and No. Some have convinced themselves that Russia is fragile, broken structure that is about to collapse. Actually, its economy is booming. ... Putin rebuilt the Russian economy. Everyone talks about the Chinese - Russian project being about the war in Ukraine. That is the keystone in some respects, but it's also about the move to get away from Anglo-American economic structures in order to get some form of [national] sovereignty back. That's what they [Russia/China] are saying to Africa, that's what they're saying to South America. For sovereignty you need to go back to the 19th century model of a more closed economy with a small external trading component--the work of Friedrich List and others in the 19th century who attacked Adam Smith's ideas.

Pat Buchanan is a big fan of List. It can also be argues that Trump followed out some of List’s ideas.

Georg Friedrich List (6 August 1789 – 30 November 1846) was a German-American economist and political theorist who developed the nationalist theory of political economy in both Europe and the United States. ... He advocated raising tariffs on imported goods while supporting free trade of domestic goods and stated the cost of a tariff should be seen as an investment in a nation's future productivity.

This is why you're having a run on the dollar currently. These states are trying to move toward some sort of sovereignty again. China and Russia are encouraging this. [20:22]