Last Saturday I did a post that included some excerpts from an article that appeared in the Marine Corps Gazette. The MC Gazette is a publication that presents serious articles on military topics. The article in question called into question Western—and, obviously, especially American—misconceptions of what’s going on in Ukraine. The author was listed as an anonymous Marinus, a senior Marine officer. Of course, he wasn’t anonymous to the editors of the MC Gazette, and today at Moon of Alabama we learn about some developments in that regard.
The author is Paul Van Riper:
Paul K. Van Riper (born July 5, 1938) is a retired United States Marine lieutenant general. Van Riper was a combat veteran—twice receiving the Silver Star Medal for his heroic actions during the Vietnam War. At the time of his retirement, Van Riper was serving as the Commanding General, 2nd Marine Division and Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia. Since his retirement, Van Riper has served on several advisory boards and panels. He is currently the Chairman of the Board of Directors for the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation.
To remind readers of the nature of Van Riper’s article, here’s an excerpt of what I quoted in Ukraine Update:
The picture that has been presented of the war in Ukraine is completely at odds with the reality of the situation on the ground. Surprisingly, information that supports this assertion, which totally undermines the Western media narratives regarding the war, is provided by an article in the August edition of the United States Marine Corps Gazette. Writing under under the pen name Marinus, a senior marine corps officer, provides an objective analysis of Russian military strategy since late February. It totally undermines the narratives provided by Western media and pro Washington politicians.
Marinus observes how Russia has pursued three distinct military campaigns since the beginning of the war in late February 2022. In the north fast moving Russian troops never attempted to capture cities such Kiev or Kharkov, they never made any attempt to convert temporary occupation into permanent possession. Their whole purpose was to act as a ‘grand deception’ which led the Kiev government to divert large forces from its main field army in the Donbass. This gave the Russian army the time to deploy its artillery units in large numbers into the Donbass, secure transport networks and accumulate large quantities of ammunition for the long campaign ahead.
The article caused a great deal of heartburn within the US military establishment, to the extent that steps have been taken to curtail the independence of the MC Gazette’s editorial board. Van Riper has a history of causing heartburn in the upper echelon’s of the military establishment, as we learn from Moon—Various Points On Ukraine And Media:
Today I learned that the anonymous 'Marinus' author of the Marine Corps Gazette piece is allegedly the retired General Karl Van Riper who is well know for spoiling the Millennium Challenge war game by applying realistic conditions. The guy is hated by the chairborne divisions in the Pentagon.
That link to Millennium Challenge makes for some very interesting reading, for what it tells us about our military—and, by extension, the entire government—establishment:
Exercise action
Red, commanded by retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, adopted an asymmetric strategy, in particular, using old methods to evade Blue's sophisticated electronic surveillance network. Van Riper used motorcycle messengers to transmit orders to front-line troops and World-War-II-style light signals to launch airplanes without radio communications.
Red received an ultimatum from Blue, essentially a surrender document, demanding a response within 24 hours. Thus warned of Blue's approach, Red used a fleet of small boats to determine the position of Blue's fleet by the second day of the exercise. In a preemptive strike, Red launched a massive salvo of cruise missiles that overwhelmed the Blue forces' electronic sensors and destroyed sixteen warships: one aircraft carrier, ten cruisers and five of Blue's six amphibious ships. An equivalent success in a real conflict would have resulted in the deaths of over 20,000 service personnel. Soon after the cruise missile offensive, another significant portion of Blue's navy was "sunk" by an armada of small Red boats, which carried out both conventional and suicide attacks that capitalized on Blue's inability to detect them as well as expected.
Such defeat can be attributed to various shortfall in simulation capabilities and design that significantly hindered Blueforce fighting and command capabilities. Examples include: a time lag in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance information being forwarded to the Blueforce by the simulation master, various glitches that limited Blue ships point-defense capabilities and error in the simulation which placed ships unrealistically close to Red assets.
Exercise suspension and restart
Considered the shortcoming of the simulation it was decided to re-float various Blue ships in order to proceed with the exercise, while still validating the attack by Red forces. After the reset, both sides were ordered to follow predetermined plans of action.
Among other rules imposed by this script, Red Force was ordered to turn on their anti-aircraft radar in order for them to be destroyed, and during a combined parachute assault by the 82nd Airborne Division and Marines air assaulting on the then new and still controversial CV-22, Van Riper's forces were ordered not to shoot down any of the approaching aircraft. Van Riper also claimed that exercise officials denied him the opportunity to use his own tactics and ideas against Blue Force, and that they also ordered Red Force not to use certain weapons systems against Blue Force and even ordered the location of Red Force units to be revealed.
Who thinks Van Riper won himself any friends in the upper reaches of the military establishment with that performance? The American way of war gaming would seem to be a poor preparation for the type of war that the Russians wage, but exposing flaws in The System is never welcomed in large bureaucracies.
OK.
Now, back to Marinus’ article as quoted above—the quote which highlights the Russian feint toward Kiev. Actual experts like Colonel Douglas Macgregor regard the feint as a true feint and as key to the success with which Russia is prosecuting its Special Military Operation. Moon, whose background is in the German military, agrees:
I had read the Gazette piece when it first appeared some weeks ago and found it excellent. It realistically depicts the early Russian move towards Kiev as a feint. This is also my view. The feint, with too few troops to actually occupy Kiev, had a political and a military purpose.
Politically it put pressure on the Ukrainian government to quickly agree to Russian conditions for a ceasefire. This nearly worked when negotiations between Russia and Ukraine at the end of March in Turkey had promising results. The talks were then sabotaged by Boris Johnson's intervention in Kiev where he, speaking for Joe Biden, demanded a continuation of the war which Zelensky then promptly provided.
Militarily the feint had near prefect results. Some 100,000 Ukrainian troops were fixed around Kiev while Russian troops from Crimea moved nearly unopposed to connect the island via a land bridge to the Donbas and Russia and also grabbed a large foothold in Kherson on the west side of the Dnieper.
The hasty feint had a high price in the form of Russian casualties but helped to established front situations in the east and south that allowed for the mass destruction of Ukrainian forces with a minimum of casualties on the Russian side.
When the feint towards Kiev was no longer useful the Russian forces moved back to their starting positions without much fighting. The Ukrainian claimed that to be a victory but they had hardly anything to do with the well planned and executed retreat.
That the Gazette would print a piece that confirms this view is remarkable. Even more remarkable, as Lambert notes, is the lack of echo it has had in U.S. media:
As it happens, the MC Gazette, back in January—so, before the start of the Russian Special Military Operation—ran another article titled: Thinking Beyond Dead Germans. The idea behind the article is that the US military is still living in the aftermath of WW2 with regard to Russia. Specifically, the author maintains that much of US military thought with regard to maneuver warfare was derived from the self serving memoirs of (now dead) German generals who fought on the Eastern Front—men like Guderian and von Manstein. According to the German narrative the German Heer would never have failed but for the overwhelming numbers that the Russians threw at them. American military types accepted this narrative, due in part to the fact that Soviet archives weren’t open to them. Nevertheless they should have known better.
The Eastern Front War was a complex affair. However, an objective analysis reveals stunningly effective Soviet operations against a flawed but highly professional and formidable Wehrmacht. As early as late 1942 the conflict was, for all intents and purposes, decided—despite the remarkable German defensive capabilities. Obviously, this is a huge topic, but Thinking Beyond Dead Germans does offer an overall view:
However, I’ve saved the best for last. It’s a piece of analysis by Myrmikan Capital: dated March 9, 2022.
The author traces the roots of the current war on Russia back to British strategic thinking that was first expressed at the time of the Crimean War (1853-1856):
Noted investor Simon Mikhailovich (who grew up in the USSR) points out that Churchill’s view was informed by the conflict of the 1850s. In 1854, twice-UK prime minister Lord Palmerston stated:
We are pledged by the national interest, by European interests, and by our convention with France to prevent the recurrence of the causes which have brought the war on, and this can be accomplished only by weakening Russia for a time at least, if we cannot do so permanently, in some material point.
The best and most effectual security for the future Peace of Europe would be the severance from Russia of some of the frontier territories acquired by her in later times, Georgia, Circassia (Chechnya), the Crimea, Bessarabia (Moldova), Poland & Finland.
If these were taken from her she would still remain an enormous power, but far less advantageously posted for aggression on her neighbors.
The two quotations above illustrate the folly of the Western media narrative that the current conflict in Ukraine is idiosyncratic to Putin: a mark of his insanity, the means to crush domestic enemies, fear that the example of a prosperous democratic Ukraine would undermine Russia’s more statist system.
As Lord Palmerston explained: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”
Special Relationship, anyone? Special for the UK, maybe, but it takes some explaining to enunciate exactly why Russia is our eternal enemy. Nevertheless, the interests that Palmerston expressed with regard to Russia framed British grand strategy from that time forward—and still do. The US stepped into that quagmire without a lot of deep thinking:
The great game of European politics was balance of power: shifting alliances ensured that no one entity grew overly powerful in order to preserve the core national interest of each participant. The current conflict in the Ukraine is the meeting of two core sets of national interests. Russia was invaded by the Poles in 1605, the Swedes in 1707, the French in 1812, the Germans in 1914 and again in 1941. Russia’s military problem is that it sits in the great European plain, which offers few geographic assets for defense, the reason why invaders make rapid progress into Russian territory. Russia prevails in the end because the vast distances make supply lines precarious especially when fighting in harsh winters. These victories, however, come at horrific cost in lives and infrastructure. Having friendly (or at least neutral) buffer states is an eternal Russian “life-interest.”
Russia’s neighbors see history differently, of course. Russia’s need to create defensive buffer states has subjected all of them to Russian conquest—the Poles will not soon forget the Soviet murder of 22,000 Polish officers in the Katyn Forest—they share Palmerston’s view that European security requires stripping Russia of its influence in its border countries. And thus the problem: Russia’s and its neighbors’ security concerns are all valid.
In my view some of the author’s views going forward from this point are debatable in detail, but in general they seem sound:
Policy based on that assessment is no longer valid. Russian military aggression no longer poses a threat to the world or Europe … [for economic and demographic reasons] …
The larger threat currently is from American neo-conservatives. The movement began as a collection of students, notably Irving Kristol, at City College of New York. Attracted first to the Marxists and then Trotskyists, the neocons were soon “mugged by reality,” as Kristol put it. Love of communism turned into hatred particularly of the Soviet Union—George Kennan’s containment strategy was too soft: the neocons wanted to roll back the iron curtain.
The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 because of economic exhaustion. …
... Charles Krauthammer, a leader of the contemporary neocon movement, declared in 1990 that the world had entered a “unipolar moment,” which he amended to an “era” in 2002: this “dominance of a single power [is] unlike anything ever seen . . . American military spending exceeds that of the next twenty countries combined.”
The author presents an extensive critique of Neocon ideology, but he then shifts to realist thinkers such as Kissinger and Mearshimer and more, all of whom warned against Neocon fantasies of world domination. In sum, the author offers this pointed assessment:
Neocon policy is directly contrary to the founding principles of the United States. Their new international order can never consent to peace, only submission: having meddled in wars of intrigue, extraction is nigh impossible. A corollary to the neocon unipolar view is that Russia no longer has claim to nuclear arms, as Krauthammer implied: “The Soviet Union ceased to exist, contracting into a smaller, radically weakened Russia.” Russia is merely a rogue state, like North Korea, to be confronted, deterred and, if necessary, disarmed, a monster to destroy. …
The neocons seem bent on testing Russia’s resolve and the MAD doctrine itself. They may view Russia as a rump state, but Russia does not so view itself.
Putin is not wrong in his estimate of the impossibility of entering into agreements with the US—or, at least not as the US is currently controlled by an extreme ideological clique.
There’s a lot more of interest, but halfway through the paper turns, as one would expect, to an extensive analysis of why the Western sanctions would be likely to backfire—remember, the paper was written in March, 2022. That this view is correct has been borne out by events since that time, but it basically rests on a very simple analysis of Russia’s resource richness, and the disconnect of the American economy from the hard realities of eartly existence. After reviewing Russia’s resource wealth, the author writes:
Russia’s wealth is based on heavy industry and labor, the dirty part of the production chain upon which Westerners rely but prefer not to see; America’s wealth is based on financialization: the value of Twitter and Facebook and Amazon and mortgage-backed securities, the pooled debt of those who work in a country that exported its manufacturing base, a country in which 77% of GDP is based on services (10% of which is fees for financial intermediation).
The conflict between these two economies may not resolve as most in the West expect. …
Again, a lengthy analysis of the likely outcome of sanctions and attempts to collapse the Russian economy follows, with an emphasis on the foolishness of driving Russia into closer alliance with China.
Interestingly, the piece ends by comparing—at quite a bit of length—the fall of the Athenian empire, caused by the disastrous Sicilian Expedition. In doing so, he also appeals to George Washington. The entire comparison is too long to excerpt—the author quotes the speeches of Nicias and Alcibiades extensively—but this may suffice to gain your interest. The author cleverly compares our Realists with Nicias, and Alcibiades with the Neocons adventurers:
The aging general Nicias, playing the part of Henry Kissinger, warned the Athenians against invading Sicily:
…
America has its own Nicias who speaks to us from the grave to those who would listen:
Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none; or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.
Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. . . . Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor or caprice? It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.
Such was George Washington’s parting advice to his new country, advice to which America adhered in the main, if imperfectly, until the Wilsonian adventure of World War I. But now a mad desire for domination has succumbed to the arguments that the confident, youthful, ambitious Alcibiades made against Nicias:
…
The Athenians chose overwhelmingly to pursue the campaign. Their army and navy were crushed, their government was overthrown, their allies defected, and Sparta would soon occupy their city. The defeat shocked the Greek world.
America’s army is not at risk in the current conflict, but its economy and financial system may be overthrown even if Russia is defeated on the battlefield. If Russia “falls apart,” Cheney’s hope with the intrigue in Georgia, the ensuing chaos in terms of commodity prices and migration would be worse for Western countries than the relative geopolitical stability to be gained by a swift Russian military victory.
In light of the current situation of Russia’s Special Military Operation we would do well to consider these views. The country desperately a national debate on where we’re headed.
More On The Russian Way Of War
PKVR is one of the leading senior Marines taking to task the reasoning behind, and the validity of the CMC's Force Design 2030.
He is one of the Corps' best.
Berger, not so much.
"The article caused a great deal of heartburn within the US military establishment, to the extent that steps have been taken to curtail the independence of the MC Gazette’s editorial board."
I disagree with the Marinus piece, but I also believe that stifling discussion of the war in Ukraine and the lessons to be learned from it is a huge mistake. We are setting ourselves up for defeat. We need to discuss and debate openly the war in Ukraine and what can be learned from it. A military that cannot learn is a military that cannot win.