Judge Nap's Three Interesting Conversations Today

I want to recommend these three discussions on the Judge Nap show today. In each case, as is usual, the conversations were more wide ranging than the titles would incidate:

• COL. Douglas Macgregor : Readying For War With Iran.

• COL. Lawrence Wilkerson : Is Hegseth Competent?

• Prof. John Mearsheimer : Killing Without Purpose.

Each conversation starts with a discussion of Signal controversy. All three guests are quite fairminded, even charitable, while also deploring the amateurism of it all. But each conversation goes beyond that topic.

What I found very useful in the Macgregor video was his discussion of what he views as a chronic American failure to think in strategic terms. Instead, he maintains, all thinking seems to revolve around using military action to “send messages.” Macgregor argues that this is fundamentally misguided, and points to the chronic failure to actually get our messages across to those on the receiving end of our military action. He sees this misuse of the military as leading to one unsolvable mess after another.

The key part of Wilkerson’s interview is his description of what the role of a National Security Adviser is—to enforce discipline on national security decision making. Wilkerson maintains that that there really hasn’t been an NSA who understood his role and adhered to it since Brent Scowcroft. He further maintains that choosing politicians for that role is a recipe for disaster—and he names names.

The Mearsheimer interview is the most wide ranging. He excoriates the senseless killing that seems to be at the heart of American foreign policy—at some length—and he argues that none of this should come as a surprise, based on the control Israel has over the US government. If the US openly supports genocide and ethnic cleansing in Palestine, why should we be surprised at the conduct of our military in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere? However, for our purposes Mearsheimer’s most important observations concerned Russia’s strategy with regard to Trump’s ceasefire offensive. Mearsheimer argues, much as I have, that the Russians will talk and talk, will drive hard bargains for tiny ceasefires—with the certain knowledge that Ukraine will not abide by them. What the Russians will not do is enter into any programmatic, comprehensive ceasefire—because that’s not in their interest. Their interest at this point is to continue the war until they have achieved the goals that they have set for themselves.

Judge Nap asked each guest whether they thought America is headed for war with Iran. Macgregor, of course, believes that we are—that has been his long held opinion. He believes Israel is pushing the US into such a war.

Somewhat surprisingly, Mearsheimer believes that war will be avoided. He acknowledges that Israel ordered Trump to fill his national security team with mindless tools of The Israel Lobby, who are dutifully clamoring and mongering for war—if not tomorrow, then in a month or so (that seems to be the Veep Vance position). However, Mearsheimer cautiously believes that wiser counsels will prevail—presumably coming from the Pentagon. Despite his own strongly held position with regard to Trump and Israel—i.e., “Israel owns Trump”—Mearsheimer nevertheless believes that when push comes to shove Trump can just say, No, to war.

Wilkerson is the most optimistic of the three with regard to avoiding war. He believes Trump is engaging in pretty typical Trumpian behavior, much as I sketched it out the other day:

Trump’s MO—create a fake crisis, cause the crisis to go poof! and then bask in self plaudits.

Wilkerson cites the example of Trump’s dealings with the Little Rocket Man in Korea during Trump 1.0. I’d like to believe that, but it does appear that the example of Korea is rather different than the current situation.

• Trump’s threats directed at Iran seem more pointed than was the case with Korea.

• Trump’s attacks on Yemen—which he explicitly tied to Iran, thus pretty much stating that this was an example of what would happen to Iran—have no parallel examples in the case of Korea.

• The massive marshalling of military resources to the region of Iran also has no parallel with the case of Korea.

• In the case of Korea there was no 800 pound gorilla like the Israel Lobby in the Oval Office, demanding war with Korea—but there is, in the case of Iran.

• All these put together present a very worrisome scenario, in which avoiding war becomes progressively more difficult.

Gilbert Doctorow is also more sanguine. He points to the very real dangers of Russia and China (which gets 30% of its oil from Iran) being drawn in. On any rational basis, a war with Iran would be very much against American interests.