Iran Waiting For Round Two?

I’ve been reading a thought provoking article today:

Inside story: Why the battle for Iran has likely just begun

The author, Ali Hashem, is associated with an institute at a UK university:

Ali Hashem is a journalist who has covered Iranian and regional affairs for the past 15 years. He is also a research fellow at the Sectarianism, Proxies and De-Sectarianization Project (SEPAD) based at Lancaster University. His research focuses on the Middle East with an emphasis on Iran, Lebanon and Iraq.

To be honest, I’m not sure where Hashem is coming from, nor SEPAD, for that matter. The article repeatedly cites the views of Iranian “officials”—even “senior officials”—but without any characterizations that place those sources somewhere on the ideological scale of Iran’s complicated politics. Overall, my impression is that Hashem’s sources are mostly or entirely those of the “pro-Western” view, who are blaming the “theocratic hardliners” for provoking the attack. So, make of this lengthy excerpt what you will. I have a few areas of disagreement, or of caution, which I’ll point out.

The latest phase of Israel’s campaign to dismantle Iranian power was masterfully disguised. Tel Aviv and Washington cloaked their military preparations in an unprecedented layer of diplomatic and media theater. President Trump announced the initiation of negotiations with Iran during Netanyahu’s White House visit on April 7, and the much-discussed tensions between the two leaders now appear to have been Act One of a calculated drama.

My first caution. This next, key, paragraph presents a seriously incomplete picture of how the ceasefire was arrived at—there is no mention of the fact that it was USrael that urgently sought the ceasefire, nor any mention of the Iranian response to the US strike or its effectiveness.

Having evacuated the US Central Command (CENTCOM) forward headquarters in Qatar shortly after Israel’s surprise attack, US bombers closed this act in the early hours of June 23 with precision strikes against Iran’s nuclear installations. Shortly afterwards, a ceasefire was announced. Yet, few in Tehran see lasting peace. A senior Iranian official, speaking anonymously to Amwaj.media, said he views the truce not as an end but as a prelude to a bloodier chapter.

My view regarding this next paragraph is that the probe for weaknesses happened in the earlier attempted attack by Israeli planes. It was discovered at that time that the attack would need to be done with drones and standoff missiles—which is what transpired. The Iranian response taught that any Round Two will be fraught with difficulties—starting with the likelihood that it won’t be a surprise, following with a much more drastic response by an Iran that will have upgraded its capabilities. The need for the Anglo-Zionist side to regroup should provide Iran with a significant breather.

"This may have been a probe for weaknesses and a reconnaissance of supply lines, paving the way for ‘Phase Two’," he reasoned. This sentiment, he insisted, now dominates the thinking of Iran’s political and military elite. Reflecting profound mistrust, an informed Iranian diplomat bluntly described events, "They used negotiations as a cover to prepare for war…they gave the impression of progress, and then struck."

In this next section I can accept that Iran’s dominant faction regarded the geopolitical landscape with complacency. I can’t think of any other way to explain Iran’s failure to respond effectively to the bombing of its embassy in Damascus, for example, but as a manifestation of the view that they had the big picture totally under control. The assertion that Iran made itself an inevitable target of the Anglo-Zionists by providing drones to Russia is interesting and has a certain plausibility. However, that appears to reflect the “pro-Western” view in Iranian politics, according to which playing more nicely with the Anglo-Zionists could somehow provide protection from attack. I doubt that. The Anglo-Zionists are opposed in principle to a strong Iran—economically, politically, or militarily. Further, Iran appears to have failed to understand the fundamental character of “the core conflict”—the Anglo-Zionist drive to destroy Russia, and in which conflict Iran is viewed as the Southern Front.

The misreading of power

In recent years, Tehran generally viewed the global political landscape with confidence. Soaring energy prices and western preoccupation with Ukraine had convinced Iranian officials that the balance of power was shifting in their favor. They ignored European warnings over drone shipments to Russia, while dismissing domestic critics who questioned the benefits of such transactions for Iran.

As one western official told Amwaj.media at the time, "Iran’s sin transcended regional ambitions; it crossed into the core conflict between Russia and the [W]est, an unforgivable breach."

Political advisors to the Iranian government dismissed European concerns and clung to the narrative of an ascendant east challenging American hegemony. After Trump unilaterally left the 2015 Iran nuclear deal in 2018, a new accord was within reach as the Joe Biden administration took office. But Russia’s declaration of war on Ukraine in Feb. 2022 was among the key factors that effectively killed the prospects of Iran-US engagement. Oblivious to the consequences of missing another opportunity, some Iranian voices heralded that “Winter is Coming” as a symbol of western decline. Yet that winter never arrived for Washington, but arrived first for Iran.

In the next brief paragraph there are some omissions or misrepresentations. The identification of Syria as belonging to an “Axis of Resistance” is disputable and simplistic. More importantly, no mention is made of the Houthi blockade of the Red Sea, which has proven to be quite effective.

By the autumn of 2024, the ‘Axis of Resistance’ had suffered crushing military defeats. Damascus faced a brutal winter as the regime of Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad was collapsed by Sunni Islamist forces backed by Turkey and Gulf Arabs. And when the first days of summer came, Tehran burned.

Cold reality checks

As Iran reeled from Israeli bombings deep within its territory last month, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi sought concrete support from Tehran’s presumed strongest partner: Russia. The Kremlin’s response—calm, calculated, and utterly devoid of military commitment—was chilling: "Accept the ceasefire." At that moment, Iran’s long-cherished vision of a strategic alliance crumbled.

Again, this misrepresents the situation. According to Russia, they were absolutely willing to enter into a mutual defense agreement with Iran. We don’t know what the terms and conditions of such a pact would have been, but it seems clear that it was Iran that decided not to include such provisions in the final agreement. The Russian position, viewed in this light, is entirely reasonable. A mutual defense pact might very well have prevented the Anglo-Zionist attack on Iran. Instead, the lack of such a pact opened the door for the attack. Araghchi’s belated appeal to Russia—which had been given no time to prepare for action in a measured way—exhibits a surprising degree of naivete. In fact, the wording of the paragraph suggests that the appeal to Russia was only made after the USraeli appeal for a ceasefire had been advanced. From this standpoint, what we see here looks like something very different than a Russian betrayal and more like sound advice from a hardnosed realist standpoint. It also looks like a determination on the part of the “pro-Western” government of Pezeshkian to blame others while holding to their own naive views of Anglo-Zionist intentions.

On the other hand, it would be unfair to place all the blame on the Pezeshkian government. In the following paragraphs Hashem rightly points to serious failures of strategic thinking among all factions in Iran. As he says, the warning signs had been there for all to see for a long time.

This wake-up call echoed the Islamic Republic’s own predicament vis-à-vis its Arab allies. For over two decades, Iran treated regional conflicts as controllable fronts: whether in Syria, Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq, or Yemen. Decision makers in Tehran believed that adversary states would stop short of total war, favoring negotiated settlements.

While the current confrontation with Israel was not Iran’s choice, it was neither entirely unforeseen. Hezbollah’s performance in its war with Israel last year, and the fear of overwhelming Israeli retaliation, had sounded alarms. Having weapons without the readiness to use them, it turned out, produced no real deterrence.

Iran continued to wager on delaying or containing escalation. But it misjudged the depth of the Israel-US coordination and failed to grasp the west’s doctrinal shift: from managing global hegemony to reimposing it by brute force. For years, Tehran wielded rhetoric as a strategic tool. The war with Israel has exposed how symbolic threats lose potency without executable capacity behind them. The Israeli-American message has thus been unmistakable: words alone may now invite fire.

This next section is one I found fairly persuasive. My one caveat is that the assertion that Iran’s “alliances” failed it. In fact, Iran has no military alliances, preferring to rely upon somewhat vague understandings. What the Anglo-Zionist attack should have taught Iranians is the insufficiency of that approach for dealing with the threat that they face. The fact that high level Iranian delegations immediately conferred with both the Russians and the Chinese suggests that some lesson of that sort may have been learned. Whether this constitutes a real come to Jesus moment for Iran, remains to be seen.

A crisis of identity

Iran’s military response plunged Israel into an unprecedented state of war but lacked initiative. In contrast, Israel executed a deliberate escalation campaign: strike, pause, reassess, strike again. The disparity in tempo revealed tactical and psychological gaps in Iran’s posture.

Some in Tehran argue that Iran’s goal in this confrontation is not outright victory but containment; managing an imposed war while avoiding entanglement in a prolonged conflict. As one Iranian diplomat acknowledged to Amwaj.media, "Netanyahu’s choice is war. Iran’s priority is to encircle that choice and stop the war at the lowest possible cost."

But the concept of deterrence itself is now under harsh scrutiny, reminiscent of the soul-searching following the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. That conflict claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and caused unfathomable destruction, yet strengthened a fragile Iranian state born through fire. Today, what was once considered a shield—Iran’s regional influence, alliances, and arsenal—has proven penetrable and insufficient.

A heated debate has thus emerged over shifting from “strategic restraint” to “offensive deterrence.” This includes renewed discussions about nuclear weapons: not as a preemptive and proactive choice, but as a response to fill the vast strategic void revealed by recent events.

At the heart of Iran’s crisis, however, lies an unresolved contradiction: a revolutionary state attempting integration into a global system whose premise and rules it rejects. The Islamic Republic’s refusal to recognize Israel and rejection of western strategic priorities keep it in the perpetual crosshairs of Tel Aviv and Washington. The Iranian state holds elections, practices diplomacy, maintains a revolutionary discourse, and expands its influence through armed allies—all while seeking to avoid direct war.

This hybrid model, once perceived as shrewd and innovative, has become a liability. Iran over the past two decades managed to accumulate leverage but failed to translate it into solid institutions or lasting stability to its advantage, whether in Iraq, Lebanon, or Syria. In the Levant, the outcome of this failure has been catastrophic for Iranian influence. Baghdad may yet see tectonic shifts in an election year.

In this season of change, Iran faces important questions: what does Israel want? What does the United States seek? And most critically, what does the Islamic Republic want for itself?

The concluding section correctly identifies the problems that Iran faces. My own, non-expert, view is that the gaps in Iran’s air defenses are probably the least of its problems. The more fundamental decision facing Iran is whether to continue its preference for a go-it-alone strategy or whether to modify that approach in light of a new perception of the Anglo-Zionist threat.

The road ahead

Iranian missiles exposed weaknesses in Israel’s layered air defenses, even those supplemented by western systems and operated by US soldiers. But gaps in Iran’s own air defenses remain glaring. More critically, the war has revealed a vulnerability at the core of Tehran’s deterrence narrative.

The struggle now is not merely between Iran and its enemies but within Iran itself. The battlefield has moved from distant fronts to Tehran’s doorstep. A war which Iran clearly did not see coming has arrived, with unprecedented ferocity. From here on out, deterrence will no longer be measured by words but by actions, consequences and the ability to inflict pain on adversaries. Every leader in Tehran knows this and understands how daunting it will be. Options that seemed unthinkable just days ago are now back on the table. But whether options will translate into decisions remains to be seen.

And while Iran’s choices are limited, the implication of any retreat will be reflected in both domestic security and the posture of Tehran’s regional allies. Israel grasps these dynamics, and is pushing to secure as many gains as possible while anticipating another possible round of confrontation if Iran fails to meet US demands that it halt nuclear activities.

Iranian officials, while repeatedly insisting that Iran will continue enriching uranium, appear to be buying time, a strategy that suggests a shift toward “nuclear ambiguity.” This ambiguity, however, may not be confined to the nuclear file; subtle signs point to its extension across Iran’s regional posture as well. Therefore, the critical question now is whether President Trump will tolerate such a calculated vagueness, or if it will trigger a harsher response. As before, only time will tell.