Growing Clarity On Ukraine Developments

Two excellent articles are out today that provide more clarity on the current situation in Ukraine. The first is by Larry Johnson. Johnson focuses on the issue of logistics to elucidate what’s been happening:

UNDERSTANDING PLANNING, ORDERS AND TROOP MOVEMENTS IN UKRAINE

Johnson begins with the same point that Andrei Martyanov stresses—that most Americans get their understanding of war from movies. The example Johnson provides is the movie Patton, which portrays Patton making a bold turn-on-a-dime maneuver to save the day in the Battle of the Bulge. In fact, as Johnson relates, the planning for the move began long before Patton actually moved out and proceeded in fairly deliberate fashion based on intelligence reports. That is the reality of how modern militaries normally operate:

That cinema account of how Patton planned and shifted the axis of attack of his troops is presented as something hastily put together. The German offensive started on 16 December and Patton met with Eisenhower on the 19th of December and received orders to relieve Bastogne. Patton’s troops moved out on the 22nd of December and reached Bastogne on the 26th. What the movie account fails to convey is that the planning for moving his Army north began on December 9, ten days before the emergency conference with Eisenhower.

Johnson—who has many years of exposure to these issues of logistics— is making the point that the Russian movements in the Kharkov region could only have occurred if planned days or weeks ahead of time. If the Russians began moving units in response to the Ukrainian attack on September 8, then you can be sure they had advance intelligence at least a week ahead of time:

So, was Russia caught by surprise? No. They had at least one week’s warning of the impending Ukrainian attack. If you want to believe that Russia’s intelligence service is incompetent or was deceived in this operation, enjoy the fantasy.

Johnson’s explanation takes the form of two alternatives.

The Russian planners had a couple of choices. They could have moved their forces into position earlier but that would have tipped off the Ukrainians and west that the planned offensive was compromised.

Alternatively, the Russian planners may have decided to mask their movements and made choices about which villages and cities to defend and which to abandon.

Johnson’s bottom line:

I agree with Andrei Martyanov’s take–the Russians knew it was coming and chose to let the Ukrainians flood the zone in order to eventually hit the Ukrainian forces with a massive counter attack. The Ukrainians are no longer in fortified defensive positions and their lines of communication to support the forward troops are now defined precisely. The Ukrainian attack has not destroyed nor disrupted Russia’s air, artillery, rocket and missile assets. Attacking the Ukrainian units is an easier task, not more difficult.

In other words, this was not a panicked response—it was planned in advance.

However …

This still illustrates the constraints of the Special Military Operation format. In particular, as discussed yesterday, it illustrates that Russia—up to now—has been determined to avoid casualties and to avoid full scale war. The question now is, will this current turn of events force a change in that approach. As Big Serge pointed out, this approach can now be seen to put Russian civilians at risk.

In an operational sense, this isn’t a catastrophe. Russia has the firepower and mobility to crush these offensives. The problem is that it allows Ukraine to temporarily retake settlements, which exposes the civilians in these areas to reprisal killings, such as occurred in Bucha. In the current example, we can look at Balakliya. In and of itself, these city does not have major operational value, but it does have Russian civilians in it who would be exposed to Ukrainian revenge if the city was temporarily recaptured. Russia must reconsider its force deployment so that it can more firmly hold settlements at the frontline for the sake of these civilians.

There will be pressure on Putin to respond to these changed dynamics.

Moon of Alabama, in an excellent article, expands on all of this:

The Izium Withdrawal - A Catalyst For 'Starting In Earnest'

I’ll excerpt a few of Moon’s points. First, following up on the issue of civilian casualties (be aware, that when Moon refers to “lack of military resources” he means lack of deployed military resources), Moon also raises the response of the Russian commentariat:

Yesterday's Russian withdrawal from the region between Izium and the Russian border was a disaster for the (pro-)Russian people on the ground. It was also the rational consequence of a lack of military resources. The Russian military forces in Ukraine are too few to hold the 1,500 kilometer long frontline against a Ukrainian military which now has a.) a much larger force to work with, b.) no concerns about high human losses and c.) a steady supply of 'western' weapons.

Russia must adapt to this.

The most mentioned demand in the pro-Russian commentariat yesterday was to "take off the gloves" - to seriously interdict 'western' deliveries of weapons, to destroy Ukrainian bridges and other dual-use infrastructure, to switch from a 'Special Military Operation' towards war.

With that Moon asks the obvious question:

Why hasn't the Russia's political leadership done this yet?

and proceeds to a fascinating discussion of the dynamics of Russian politics—little understood in the West:

After observing it for two decades I have concluded that the Russian political leadership, foremost its current leader Vladimir Putin, is driven by two guiding principles. The first is to follow the will of the people. The second are rational policies. The high ratings of Putin and other political leaders have in independent Russian polls is not by chance. It is the result of policies that are a.) rational and well explained and b.) thoroughly democratic in that they follow the public opinion of the majority of the people. They do not allow particular interest groups to have an oversized influence on it.

This can best be seen in the war Putin waged against those billionaires who, in the 1990s and early 2000nds, tried to enter politics to prioritize their interests over all others. They were defeated and those who didn't flee to London have since stopped to interfere with the state.

The other group that traditionally had an oversized role in Russia, especially during the Cold War, is the military-industrial complex. It shrank during Yeltsin's rule due to the catastrophic financial consequences of his mislead privatization drive. Under Putin the Russian military was somewhat resurrected, rearmed and sufficiently resourced. But it was also tamed. Under Defense Minister Shoigu and Chief of Staff Gerasimov the priority of general state policies over perceived military needs is no longer questionable [sic = questioned].

The biggest opponents to Putin's policies are the nationalist, not the 'western' favored 'liberal' clowns like Navalny. The nationalists can be found on the political left, right and center. They are not well organized but have a voice throughout the political spectrum. (The former President Dimitri Medvedev currently plays to that audience.) The nationalists even have a voice in public media.

Moon then touches upon the issue we referred to above—the understandable Kremlin aversion to Russian casualties, and the overall success Russia has had in “demilitarizing” Ukraine while avoiding high casualty rates. He also speculates on various measures Russia could take from a military standpoint. However, I believe that the important takeaway is this:

The Russian public, which at first did not fully understand why the war was necessary, has since grown in its awareness. It now understands the big game that is played against its country. It may soon demand to adjust the level of resources put into the war to the one needed for a decisive victory. Polls will clarify if or when that point is reached.

That is why Dima concludes that: "We can say that today was the best ever [..] day for the Russians in the territory of Ukraine. [Something must be changed.]"

…

The Russian public, softly led by the Kremlin through Russian media, is now likely to demand more. The question then is how much more. It must not mean the total mobilization of the Russian military. 'Western' claims that Russia is isolated are wrong. It has many friends it can call upon to contribute to its efforts. Diversion moves against the U.S. military in many regions of the world are just one of several possibilities.