Geopolitics Heading Into The Fall

If I were a betting guy, I’d bet that this fall could provide some geopolitical fireworks. There are a lot of developments unfolding, and the Neocons find themselves facing pressure due to the disastrous war on Russia. Things are not going well on either the military or the economic fronts. That’s not a prediction of US collapse. It’s simply a recognition that our Imperial freedom of action is increasingly constrained.

Tom Luongo has a brief thread today that sets out some of the lastest developments on the economic front. These developments will hit Europe the hardest of all, but that will affect the American Empire’s ability to project force. I should point something out. TL links an article he wrote back in July—not too long ago. One of the major themes of that article is that France has come under attack from the Anglosphere in the past few years. The Anglosphere sees France as seeking to establish a Franco-German alliance that would be an independent power base—independent of either Russia or the Anglosphere. The argument I’ve seen is that the wave of coups across the former French West Africa is part of the Anglosphere attack—those coups were led largely by US trained local militaries. Hmmm. Thus the infographic I reproduced the other day that mapped out US bases across the region. France may be pushed out, but does that mean the US will also leave? One may be allowed to be skeptical. Very skeptical. The US has by far the most powerful military presence in the region and will not surrender influence to Russia and China.

The panicked reaction of the Neocons to events in Africa suggests that, while the Anglosphere may indeed be looking to push France out, events are unfolding far more rapidly than planned. This could draw resources away from Ukraine just as the war there requires more and more support. So, here we go—follow the link for graphics:

Tom Luongo (Head Sneetch)

@TFL1728

Niger’s former “independent government”was allowing France to take Uranium out of the country for $0.80/kg. Current price is $150.

The junta just raised the price to France to €200 or $185.

…

France’s budget is a complete nightmare, and unlike other members of the EU it can violate budget rules b/c some PIGS are more equal than others.

Go back and reread what I wrote about Niger and France in July:

Macron, NATO, and the Fate of the Empire part I

What's going on in France? Does Emmanuel Macron have a clue or is he about to be sacrificed on the alter of Imperial Perfidy?

And Part II - tick tick tick goes the time bomb.

Where is oil trading this morning?

…

$88.36. Breakout on the weekly and monthly charts.

And where is the euro trading this morning? 1.073?

Who’s inflation is this a problem for?

Everyone’s, but for the US the least as the Fed keeps draining the world of dollars.

Labor Day was yesterday. That means summer in the Hamptons is officially over. Welcome back bond vigilantes. We missed you, and Baller Jay has your backs.

Tick,tick,tick

The price of oil seems to me to be a convenient marker for the failure of the sanctions war. As TL argues, this will hurt Europe more than anyone else. But that affects the US, too, in geopolitical terms. The drive for more and bigger wars will remain, but implementation will likely become more difficult, requiring more restraint.

Speaking of geopolitical complications, including wars, Andrei Martyanov’s post this morning, Predictable, covers some areas that are of great importance to Russia and to BRICS more generally: Turkey and the Caucasus region. Russia would like to ensure the stability of the Caucasus for a number of reasons, but especially for purposes of the North South Transport Corridor. For the same reason the Anglosphere would like to ensure maximum instability in the Caucasus, and especially as it would affect Iran. First, two maps to orient ourselves—take note of Azerbaijan in the center of the map, situated on the energy rich Caspian Sea between Russia to the north and Iran to the south:

Now a closeup of the Caucasus region:

This is complicated. Turkey and Iran have been geopolitical rivals ever since Turks have been in Turkey—and, before that, Iran was a rival to the Byzantines in Anatolia and all the way back to the Hittites. The Turks and Azerbaijanis are both Turkic peoples, and are closely related in history and culture. In addition to Azerbaijan, there are anywhere up to 23 million Azerbaijanis in Iran, dwarfing the population (~8 million) of Azerbaijan proper. The Armenians are Christian and have traditionally been allied with Iran against Turks of all sorts, but they have also relied heavily on Russia—until recently. Armenia and Azerbaijan have been at war, off and on, since 1988: Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Over the years since 1988 Armenia has, with Russian aid, been able to wrest control of the Nagorno Karabakh region from Azerbaijan. All that changed with the election in Armenia of Nikol Pashinyan as prime minister. Pashinyan pursued what Russia regarded as an anti-Russian policy, seeking close relations with the West. As a result, when Azerbaijan renewed its war with Armenia in 2020, Russia did not provide all the aid it normally would have and Azerbaijan basically crushed the Armenian forces—with extensive aid from Turkey and Israel (Israel had also been a major arms supplier to Georgia, before Russia crushed the Georgian military in 2008). Exactly what was going on behind the scenes is murky. Turkey is a NATO member and Israel is closely aligned with the US, so one would assume that the US may have had a hand in this, but to what end? Did Russia remain on the sidelines because of Armenia’s tilt to the West, or was it also because Russian relations with Azerbaijan (long a major MI6 outpost) were warming up because the NSTC will provide a huge economic boost to Azerbaijan? Is that why Azerbaijan is said to be assisting Russia in circumventing sanctions?

The latest development came over the weekend, with Azerbaijan massing its forces near the border with Armenia, seemingly in preparation for another offensive. Rather than mending fences with Russia in preparation for what looks like an imminent Azerbaini offensive:

On 3 September 2023, during an interview, prime minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that it was a strategic mistake for Armenia to solely rely on Russia to guarantee its security. Pashinyan stated, "Moscow has been unable to deliver and is in the process of winding down its role in the wider South Caucasus region" and "the Russian Federation cannot meet Armenia's security needs. This example should demonstrate to us that dependence on just one partner in security matters is a strategic mistake." Pashinyan accused Russian peacekeepers deployed to uphold the ceasefire deal of failing to do their job. Pashinyan confirmed that Armenia is trying to diversify its security arrangements, most notably with the European Union and the United States.

Now, just as one more example of how mind bending Caucasus geopolitics can be, consider this:

• Azerbaijan is currently colluding with Russia to circumvent sanctions;

• Armenia supports Ukraine;

• So who does Ukraine support?

Kevork Almassian

@KevorkAlmassian

Meanwhile, in an apparent message to Russia and NATO alike, Pashinyan's Armenia sends humanitarian aid to Ukraine.

11:04 AM · Sep 5, 2023

That gets us up to speed for purposes of Andrei Martyanov’s post, at least in a basic way.

First, Martyanov notes that Putin and Turkey’s Erdogan held their meeting regarding the Ukraine grain deal that Russia has abrogated. Erdogan had traveled to Russia, supposedly to persuade Putin to re-up the grain deal. Predictably, Putin rejected Erdogan’s overtures, restating Russia’s position that the West had failed to fulfill its undertakings in the deal and that Russia would not lift its blockade until restrictions on Russia grain exports were lifted. Nevertheless, Erdogan expressed confidence that a solution would quickly be worked out. Hmmm.

And then Martyanov turns to Armenia. Russia was very unhappy with Pashinyan’s statement over the weekend (above). I can’t vouch for Martyanov’s take on this, but I assume it reflects a typically Russian view:

In other news, Mr. Pashinyan works hard to finish off Russian-Armenian relations and this time even Russian Foreign Ministry was forced to react:

Translation: "Moscow is extremely dissatisfied with the latest public statements of the Armenian leadership, including the statements of the Prime Minister of Armenia in an interview with the Italian newspaper La Repubblica and the comment of the Armenian Foreign Ministry on August 31, they regard them as unacceptable in tone and content," the agency's interlocutor said. 

There are many venues through which wide swaths of Armenia's population try to commit suicide--the roles of French and US Armenian diasporas are of special interest here--but it is not an accident that the second largest US Embassy in the world, after Baghdad, is in Yerevan [capital of Amernia]. One may ask, what's [the] deal with that, in the country with a population of barely 2.8 million and with virtually no resources? The answer is simple--Armenian diaspora, which is very influential. Most, not all, though, especially many Armenians living in Russia, of Armenian diaspora don't care about Russia and want Armenia fully incorporated into the "Western" fold. 

Russia has a 102nd military base in Gyumri in Armenia and there are still some significant portions of Armenian population who are closely connected to Russia in social, economic, cultural and family senses but Armenian "elites" are generally pro-Western and anti-Russian. That complicates Russian-Armenian relations, especially after the reaction of Russian Armenian diaspora to the war in Nagorno Karabakh and a serious backlash by Russians in Russian social media to that. So, it is complicated and Armenia is infested with Western NGOs which doesn't make things, always complex, any easier. In the end, Pashinyan enjoys a wide support in Armenia and he is a full-blown US asset. 

Of course, one should not forget a complex factor of Armenia's ally, Iran, here, but that is a whole other story altogether. Armenia will be used by the US to sabotage North-South Corridor and any kind of the solution in Caucasus and Moscow understands that and made her position clear on many occasions. Armenians, meanwhile, remain a torn nation spread all over the word with diasporas living anywhere from Syria and France, to US and Russia. Russian Armenian diaspora numbers, by different estimates, the size of the population of Armenia proper and many of Armenians left a profound mark in Russia's history and served historic Russia with honor and dignity.

Regarding what Martyanov says about Russian - Armenian relations, it’s worth noting that Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, is actually half Armenian—Lavrov was born in Tbilisi, Georgia, and his father was named Kalantaryan.

Obviously, unrest in the Caucasus is highly desirable to the Neocons as a way of diverting Russia’s attention—and, hopefully, military resources—from Ukraine. We can expect the Neocons to continue to exploit the unrest. But what about Erdogan, and his expressed confidence in a grain deal solution? Obviously I have no idea what Putin and Erdogan discussed, or whether they discussed anything beyond the grain deal. Nevertheless, it would seem natural that they should have discussed the Caucasus—and bigger geopolitical matters. My belief is that Russia has a sufficient supply of carrots and sticks to do a deal with Erdogan that would go a long way to ensuring the stability that will make the NSTC a global success. The wily Erdogan will play his cards to extract the maximum amount of carrots—especially the proposal for making Turkey a major energy hub between the Middle East and Europe. There has been regular speculation that Turkey will apply to join BRICS. That would appear to be a natural and very beneficial development for Turkey’s economy. So, this is an area to keep in mind. Reasons for Turkey to remain in NATO continue to dwindle. Turkey already purchases its air defense systems from Russia. Further cooperation seems inevitable.