Fascinating LJ - Crooke Discussion On Iran Negotiations

Trump On A Leash--Or What?

This afternoon I listened to a Larry Johnson interview with Alastair Crooke. What was particularly interesting about it was that it focused heavily on Iran and the US indirect negotiations with Iran—and the discussion took place before the Rome meeting. Both LJ and Crooke are on the pessimistic end of the spectrum of opinion, meaning, they both tend to the view that America is cruising towards war with Iran. They both expressed the view that the Witkoff attempt to tempt Iran into a deal would end in a trainwreck, based on Witkoff’s 180 after the first meeting, in Oman.

Briefly, Witkoff and the Iranians agreed after the first meeting that all had gone well. Witkoff made it clear that he had basically acceded to the Iranian position of what would be up for discussion in any future talks. And then Jewish Nationalist heads—and those of their stooges—exploded. That’s when Witkoff did his 180, reiterating the hardline of impossible demands on Iran. As it turned out the Iranians reacted calmly, simply saying that they would basically demand clarification. And Witkoff clarified by executing another 180 and winding up in exactly the same position he had taken after the first meeting. Whew! But LJ and Crooke didn’t know—or, seemingly, expect that—that would happen before they had their discussion.

LJ did contrast his own pessimistic views with the very optimistic views of Ray McGovern. I find myself in between. I think that what’s going on is that Trump really—really—wants to make a high profile deal. And it’s proving to be quite a difficult trick to pull off. These are high stakes games he’s playing, and nobody—not the Russians, not the Chinese, not the Iranians—owe Trump squat. So they’re not inclined to do him any favors or go out on any limbs for him. Recall, I’ve been saying that the Russians would talk and talk—and that would be it. They have zero incentive to come to the kind of deal that Trump has in mind. The Chinese certainly are not a likely candidate for a deal. Trump is beginning to realize that, so he’s now hoping to come to some sort of “deal” with Iran—possibly because Russia and China favor some sort of JCPOA 2.0.

Anyway, there was a lot of interesting discussion in the last third or so of the video, and I’ve prepared a cleaned up transcript. The discussion focuses heavily on Trump because, as Crooke says at the outset, that’s what it comes down to:

Israel’s Deadly Game: Is War Coming? | Alastair Crooke

Let's go to Trump, because this is really important in my view. At the end of the day this comes down to your judgment about who Trump is and what is he. Trump has been consistent. I think it was Rubio the other day [I think it was Hegseth] who was saying, 'Trump has been steadfast about this.' I went back and looked at Trump’s speeches after he walked out [of JCPOA] in 2018, and what did he walk out about? He said the usual boiler plate: ‘Oh, this is heading towards Iran inevitably getting a nuclear weapon.' Now this was the position, an old American position, that came from Rand organization for a long time, which was that any enrichment potentially could lead to weaponization. It was held very strongly by Rand and it was only the breaking of that injunction [under Obama] that enabled the JCPOA to come into being. But that was the original underlying assumption.

But what were Trump's main complaints? There were two, and he was very vociferous about it. One was their missile system--their conventional defense system, which he said has got to go--and the other thing was the Iranian proxies. Hamas, Hezbollah--he said that's got to stop, these have got to be disarmed and disabled. That was back in 2018. Then on the 4th of February [2025] he issued this National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM), which is a finding that is legally binding on all branches of the US government. There were several elements to that, and this was just a little more than a month ago.

• Iran should be denied a nuclear weapon

• denied intercontinental missiles

• also denied other asymmetric and conventional weapons capabilities

To this end the NSPM directs maximum economic pressure be imposed, that the Treasury act to drive Iran's oil exports to zero, that the US work to trigger JCPOA snapback sanctions--which they're doing, the E3 have said that they're going to do this in June; they've informed Iran that they're going to trigger snapback in June--and that Iran's malign influence abroad be neutralized.

Now that was what he signed and put into a legal context on the 4th of February--Trump. So my question comes back to this. I don't understand, and I have not heard a really clear explanation, why Trump seems so beholden to the Israeli interests--the Israeli interests of Israel, but the Israeli interests of Americans. They seem to have him on a leash in some respects. I don't know if there was some Faustian bargain agreed to, but this is the the question that I put to you. When people say, ‘Oh but you know he's really a man of peace, he wants to find a negotiated outcome,' it doesn't sound like that to me. This sounds maximalist and designed to mean that no agreement is going to be forthcoming. This wasn't 20 years ago--this was just a month or so ago that he put all these things down [in writing]. Now was that just bluster? It's possible but, at the same time, it was really very difficult to start talks on that basis, and quite clearly Witkoff didn't proceed on that line. He proceeded on the line about capping enrichment levels--which the Iranians are happy to talk about--and to come up with some counter proposals.

Exactly. Witkoff accepted the Iranian position on what they would be talking about. That’s a huge concession right at the start.

LJ: Trump has had a relationship in New York City--throughout his years in business in my understanding--with the whole Chabad community, the Lubavitchers in particular, so you know there is an element in which I think he's a captive of the Zionists. The other concerning part--and I've got this directly from someone who has had extensive dealings with him, multiple meetings--Trump is not a critical thinker. He's not someone who sits down and thinks things through like a chess player--'I've got to make this move, and the other side's going to make this move, and I'm going to move him into this direction.' He's much more emotional, coupled with some insecurity--he doesn't really relish having people smarter than him in the room. So it's dangerous. Ray McGovern and I disagree on this. Ray is very optimistic that this thing with Witkoff is moving in the right direction. I think it's going off the rails and it will go off the rails come Saturday, whether they're in Rome or Oman, ...

AC: Unless Trump or Witkoff, I mean, you know, this wasn't just a sort of casual comment. This was written on his official Twitter site. It's written in very clear English that Iran has to eliminate enrichment--enrichment and weapons--and have them inspected. And he said earlier that they will have to be inspected, and also inspected for trigger mechanisms. I mean, this doesn't sound to me like something that is really going to come to some sort of quick conclusion that Trump wants. And especially with Witkoff's about face on the two key things that Iran has always said are just not negotiable--that they have an enrichment process and that they have their conventional defense. Otherwise they're neutered, they're naked, they're simply humiliated. And probably then the Iranian state would be under threat.

LJ: Well, one thing I've been emphasizing is the signing of the comprehensive security agreement between Russia and Iran that took place on 17th January. I think that was significant because it gave Iran some assurance that--whatever doubts it had had previously about whether they could rely upon Russia, in particular in the wake of the debacle in Syria--this put Russia firmly in their camp. Then we come to March, the first week and a half of March, you get Russia, Iran, and China conducting that joint naval exercise. Then, after the end of that military exercise, you get the the first meeting of the the foreign ministers or their senior officials in Beijing between Iran China and Russia. Then that was followed up with the meeting a week ago Tuesday in Moscow--the same three where they're talking about Iran's dealings with the United States and this unfolding. I think the West has dramatically underestimated the importance of what Russia and China are doing with Iran, that these are not just superficial contacts. What's your view?

AC: I'm a little bit different in the sense that, while clearly there is really close coordination taking place with China, Russia, and Iran--about everything ... because the Chinese when they came back so quickly with tariffs on the United States, I mean, this had been thought about, it had been worked out. The Chinese put out a statement—in fact the CCP put out a statement—saying ‘this was expected, this was planned for, we were ready for it’ and they did it. Bam! This is our response that was coordinated. You remember, there was a 90-minute call with Putin [and Xi] about 2 months ago or something like that and the main discussion--we don't know any details about it--seems to have been really that America would try to put a wedge between Russia and China and how do we stop it? And also, probably, a discussion about: America will try and use its position to put a wedge or to put leverage on Iran through Russia, and how do we manage that?

Now, having said that, having talked to many Russians about Syria and the backdrop to Syria and so on, I just think there's one thing that needs to be clear. The Russians say to me, 'Listen, when it comes to the Middle East, to Syria and other things, we are here fighting the whole of NATO. This is our prime interest. This is what we're all about. It's very unlikely unless the situation becomes extreme. We have our hands full fighting whatever number of countries that are lined up in NATO against us, so we're not looking and don't think that we're going to intervene in Syria or Iran easily.' Yeah, they'll provide air defense equipment, perhaps specialists, training--I'm sure that's happening, there's no doubt of it, but would they intervene militarily? They will only take that decision at the time and in the circumstances that transpire because one thing is quite clear. I mean, I've been involved in conflicts over many, many years, and my whole experience is that what everyone says about how the war will go, whatever war we're talking about, it dissolves within 24 hours. It's gone. So I think the Russians will watch it very carefully.

They have a good relationship [with Iran] but much of that agreement was about the underlying reasons why Iran is so important to Russia. [Trade corridors] Also, Iran has security contacts for the whole of the 'stans-- central Asia--who are complex political structures. Russia and China need Iran's experience [in Central Asia], too, to keep security, because this is the future. The growth of the global economy lies in Asia which is just on the cusp of a major step up in its industrialization--right up to Siberia, where it is just humming with new activity. It's not that they're being nice to Iran--it's their interest, and Iranian interest, to keep this going. But I think [the Russians] will first of all see if Iran can handle [war with the Anglo-Zionists] itself, and it might well be able to handle it itself without help from outside, because they have been preparing for this war for 20 years. Iran has three different air defense systems and they have some over the horizon radars that Iran has made--they are the result of their own work, they're not brought in from Russia or China. It's wrong to think of Iran as not really up there in the first rank in terms of technology. Out of the 10 leading engineering institutions in the world, I think about six are in Iran. That's why Russia gets its drones from Iran and China does research projects jointly there.

There's deep skepticism inside Iran that they'll ever be allowed to do anything approaching a reasonable deal--that America will ever permit that, because it's all driven by Israel. It's not about American interests or American rationality. You can make the case that America could live with this or live with that, but they know it's not about that. It's all about Israel. A trial of strength is coming. It had to come, really, because there wasn't going to be an agreement, and so a trial of strength is likely. Its outcome will probably then determine what comes next in the region. It's interesting with the Saudi defense minister in Teheran today--I think they'll be having an interesting discussion. Trump is pinning everything on the Gulf. My own personal view is he's making a big mistake here because--perhaps Trump hasn't really understood who these emirs and kings and monarchs are, and the degree to which these police states don't really have quite the heft compared with a 5,000 year old civilization. Anyway, he may find that they're not quite as strong or capable as he thinks they are. But that's his choice and his decision, and we'll see what comes out in all of this.

That middle bolded portion is really interesting to me—it has the ring of truth to me. The Gulf Arabs have always been complicit with the Anglo-Zionists, because there’s very little substance behind their regimes. Their native populations are quite small—they’re just banks and oil fields owned, but not run by, a tiny elite without much of a base. However, in the past week I’ve twice quoted an RT article that talks about Trump’s plans for reshaping the Middle East—hinging on the Gulf Arab states: Can Trump reshape the Middle East? I’ll be those emirs were quaking in their sandals at the news this week that the Saudi defense minister visited Teheran for what looked like very cordial talks.

Again, the point in this last segment is that none of these five topics got discussed with the Iranians.

I can't guarantee that this is entirely accurate, but there was the message that was sent by Trump through the Emiratis and then the reply came back from the Omanis. My understanding and what I have been told was that there were five demands in the original message, before the the meeting with Witkoff:

• one dismantling Iran's nuclear infrastructure

• halting uranium enrichment

• ceasing arms transfers to the Houthis

• ending financial support for Hezbollah

• and disbanding the popular mobilization forces is in Iraq.

I cannot tell you that that's authentic, but it came from Emirati views who were the ones delivering the message. but it wouldn't surprise me if that was what was actually put in writing. So the question is--quite apart from the pressures that are coming from Netanyahu from Congress from the institutional Jewish leadership in America--is Trump in favor of bringing it to an end? I mean Iran. Delivering a sort of final swipe that will neutralize Iran completely, or does he really believe his rhetoric about, 'I prefer to negotiate. These are fine people and I like them?'