Europe Trembles

This article will be a feature for Sunday morning readers in the UK. As we’ve been remarking, Vlad looks relaxed, confident, cheerful. And why shouldn’t he? You’d be smiling too, in his position.

As an example of UK cope, the article is highly amusing—as also for its views on US politics. I particularly enjoyed this paragraph, which incorporates both aspects—cope and cartoonish views of America. In terms of cope, the author openly admits that he had confidently expected the Ukro-Nazis to drive Russia out of Crimea, so you can imagine his dismay and denial. As for US politics, in fairness, the author is basically reflecting Neocons angst over the prospect of Trump Redux—and America is largely a foreign country to the Neocons, a country they only pay attention to for purposes of power projection in other parts of the world:

Putin needs only to hang on for another 12 months. Even if Donald Trump is not elected – the former president makes no secret of his admiration for the Russian tyrant, once going so far as to declare that he trusted Putin before the US security services – Republican congressmen have turned against the war. Last week, they blocked President Biden’s £88 billion aid package to Ukraine.

Yeah, well, Trump is a Realist’s realist.

The realization that the end is nigh is prompting soul searching in European capitals. In that regard, I also came across an interesting article in a Polish journal that presents a more nuanced view than the Telegraph. The article, Gotowi na pokój na Ukrainie? (Ready for peace in Ukraine?), contemplates the way forward for Europe, but especially Poland, in the light of the clear signals coming from the US that the end of support for Ukraine—all but the cope, the crying, and the rationalization of defeat—is not far off.

What makes this article is interesting is the atypical perspective—from a modern Polish standpoint—of the author. The author is Jan Engelgard, who is an historian and a fairly well known political thinker in Poland. The key to understanding his perspective, I believe, is that he is currently the director of a political institute that is named after Roman Dmowski. For readers who may not be familiar with Dmowski, Dmowski is best known today for representing the vision for Poland that contrasted most strongly with that of Józef Piłsudski during the interwar years. I have written frequently of Piłsudski’s vision of a resurrected, multi-ethnic, Polish led “Intermarium”, stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea. This was a romantic recreation of an idealized Polish Commonwealth that was never a true reality in the past. Dmowski, on the other hand, championed the vision of a Poland based on the modern nationalist model of nation states in the post WW1 era.

There are two reasons why the contrasting views of Dmowski and Piłsudski remain important. Of course, their views remain important for politics in Poland. However, Piłsudski’s view, also known as Prometheism, is a direct forerunner to Neocon ideas on weakening Russia. By contrast, Dmowski viewed Germany as a far greater threat to Polish national identity than Russia. If Polish politicians turn to Dmowski’s ideas for guidance in this national crisis, the implications for Europe’s security architecture could be profound:

Roman Stanisław Dmowski, 9 August 1864 – 2 January 1939) was a Polish politician, statesman, and co-founder and chief ideologue of the National Democracy (abbreviated "ND": in Polish, "Endecja") political movement. He saw the Germanization of Polish territories controlled by the German Empire as the major threat to Polish culture and therefore advocated a degree of accommodation with another power that had partitioned Poland, the Russian Empire. ... While in Paris during World War I, he was a prominent spokesman for Polish aspirations to the Allies through his Polish National Committee. He was an instrumental figure in the postwar restoration of Poland's independent existence. Throughout most of his life, he was the chief ideological opponent of the Polish military and political leader Józef Piłsudski and of the latter's vision of Poland as a multinational federation against German and Russian imperialism.

Dmowski never wielded significant political power except for a brief period in 1923 as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, he was one of the most influential Polish ideologues and politicians of his time. A controversial personality most of his life, Dmowski desired a homogeneous, Polish-speaking and Roman Catholic-practicing nation as opposed to Piłsudski's vision of Prometheism, which sought a multi-ethnic Poland reminiscent of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. As a result, his thinking marginalized other ethnic groups living in Poland, particularly those in the Kresy (which included Jews, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians), and he was regarded as anti-Semitic. He remains a key figure of Polish nationalism, and has been frequently referred to as "the father of Polish nationalism".

In what I have to call typical Polish fashion, Dmowski managed to alienate most of the allies at Versailles—although, in fairness, Dmowski was faced with a West that was both ignorant of Polish matters as well as deeply disinterested in Poland and Poles, beyond the need to carve up Europe for their own reasons and interests. Wilson basically regarded the Poles as a nuisance, but a British diplomat was able to see the other side:

The American President Woodrow Wilson reported, "I saw Mr. Dmowski and Mr. Paderewski in Washington, and I asked them to define Poland for me, as they understood it, and they presented me with a map in which they claimed a large part of the earth."

In part, Wilson's objections stemmed from the dislike of Dmowski personally. One British diplomat stated, "He was a clever man, and clever men are distrusted; he was logical in his political theories and we hate logic; and he was persistent with a tenacity which was calculated to drive everybody mad."

It should be clear that the anti-Russian strain of Piłsudski’s thinking remains dominant in Poland today—in virtually all Polish political parties, although most vocally in Law and Justice. That is the difficulty that Engelgard struggles with, while never actually calling it by name. As you’ll see, however, his advocancy for and end to the war on Russia and his openness to acknowledging Russian security concerns reflects Dmowski’s thinking—albeit in a modern context. At one point he asks why “no political force in our country will dare to formulate such a demand”—i.e., for an end to the war on Russia. He surely knows that the accusation of toadying to Russia remains political suicide in Poland.

So, with that in mind, let’s look at Engelgard’s article, which is an attempt to prod Poles toward a consideration of where there interests lie—with the West or with Russia. This is basically an auto-translation, but I’ve amended it in places:

Ready For Peace In Ukraine?

Is Poland and its establishment ready for peace in Ukraine, but without a victory of the maximalist sort, which was the dogma adopted in 2022 for the final victory of Ukraine and its reconquest of not only Donbas, but also Crimea, and perhaps also the conquest of Russia?

There is no indication of this. While in the West there are more and more voices about the need to end the war and Ukraine come to terms with its territorial losses, in Poland no one even dares to discuss this issue.

We see here that Engelgard wants Poles to confront the paralysis of their politics. On such a fundamental issue for Poland’s future—but, as we can see in the Telegraph article, above, as well—this is a problem for Europe generally. American Neocons Haass and Kupchan are wresting with this problem—the problem of somehow managing a looming and “devastating” Russian victory. For Americans this remains more of a PR problem, how to cover for our bugout, although that may change. For Poles this is an existential matter—Poles can’t afford to remain silent.

Meanwhile, there are more and more 'peace' signals, from the enunciations of 'Bild' to such serious publications as 'Washington Post' or 'Foreign Affairs'. In the latter, Richard Haass (long-time president of the renowned think tank Council on Foreign Relations) and Charles Kupchan (professor of political science at Georgetown University) proposed to leave in force the principle formulated by President Biden that assistance to Ukraine will last 'as long as necessary', but this rule should be specified in time. Namely, it should be valid until the end of this year. Then there will come a time when the United States and Europe will have 'good reason' to abandon the policy symbolized by the phrase 'as long as it takes.' What does it mean? 'Maintaining Ukraine's existence as a sovereign and secure democracy is a priority, but this goal does not require the country to regain full control over Crimea and Donbas.' So, to put it bluntly, we need to conclude peace (ceasefire), recognizing Russian achievements.

In the preceding paragraph Engelgard is seeking to convince his readers that Poland cannot afford to lag behind—to simply accept whatever future the Neocons grant Poland after the US bugout. Poland needs to take control of its future, and that means recognizing that the Zhou regime is trying to gaslight Poles.

What does Warsaw say about this? What do other countries in the region say about this? One of the Estonian military officers formulated the following thesis: 'There are only two solutions: either Ukraine will win, or there will be World War III.' This crazy position is probably shared by a large part of Ukraine's supporters in our country, although such statements are not officially made. The so-called official optimism is still dominant, as well as [the effort] to convince public opinion that the defeat of Ukraine will mean that we will definitely be attacked by Russia, which is a cunning propaganda move by Kiev aimed at maintaining the Western policy of unconditional military and financial support. Such demagogic statements are often used by Ukrainian politicians at various levels as blackmail (e.g. during the protest of Polish carriers). This trick is also used by the failing administration of Joe Biden, which is scaring the countries of NATO's eastern flank with [the threat of] an attack by Russia.

There is no country in Europe that should be more interested in ending the war than Poland, which will be the first to face the consequences if the military situation escalates. Poland should be one of the first countries to demand an end to this war, just like the Hungarians are doing. However, no political force in our country will dare to formulate such a demand, even though it is in Poland's interest. Why? Because the dogma of 'fighting to the end' still applies - the fact that it means 'till the last Ukrainian' - no one in Poland cares. What's worse, if the 'last Ukrainians' die, then, as Jacek Siewiera, the head of the National Security Bureau, argues in an interview for 'Nasz Dziennik', Poland will have a war with Russia within three years. ‘If we want to avoid war, NATO countries on the eastern flank should adopt a shorter, three-year time horizon to prepare for confrontation. This is the time when a potential must be created on the eastern flank that would be a clear signal deterring aggression.' By the way, General Leon Komornicki, who is considered a realist among retired generals, says the same thing.

So, to put it bluntly, no one in Poland is talking about a fundamental change in the West's policy towards Russia towards dialogue and the creation of a security system in which all parties (Russia and the West) will feel safe. To achieve this, first of all, we need to end NATO's march to the east, clearly declare that Ukraine will be a neutral country, end the policy of endless sanctions and revive all institutions that could be a platform for dialogue between Russia and Europe (e.g. the OSCE). Someone will say, but it's impossible? If so, he will admit that the Estonian military officer already quoted is right - the alternative is World War III.

Left unarticulated is the real question facing Poles. If the West, on which Poland foolishly relied, is contemplating a bugout that will leave Poland hanging out to dry, no matter the fine rhetoric, shouldn’t Poland be considering some sort of a separate peace with Russia? The longer Poland waits, the more likely it becomes that its future will be decided by others. That’s not a happy position to be in, since nobody—least of all the Neocons—care about Poland. Hungary and Slovakia have shown the way, will Poland wise up? What path Poland takes remains crucial, because it is still the linchpin to NATO policy toward Russia—perhaps even to the continued viability of NATO in anything like its current form.