D-Day Military And Spying Roundup 6/6/26

Overnight there was more military action in and around the Strait of Hormuz. The USAF attempted to “guide” four tankers out of the Persian Gulf through the strait. You’ll see further down that yesterday the USN tried to push two destroyers up near the strait in the Gulf of Oman, perhas in anticipation of this action, but Iran chased the destroyers away. The USAF “guidance” seems to involve drones flying overhead to attack Iranian positions or fast boats that interdict shipping. Reports regarding the tankers vary—some say they were American ships, but others claim they’re actually Israeli. In any event, one ship was hit and the other three turned back. In retaliation, Iran launched significant attacks on US bases in Kuwait and Bahrain, from which drones may have been launched.

Before I get to related matters, please note that Iran did NOT nuke those bases. Yesterday on Judge Nap, Larry Johnson suggested that matters had been quiet near Hormuz for a few days due to a supposed threat by Iran to retaliate for US attacks with a nuke. This is a good illustration of the bind a country puts itself in if it attempts to rely on nukes to deter aggression, an issue that Alastair Crooke addressed yesterday. Reliance on nukes severely limits a flexible escalation policy, since nukes are always going to be an asymmetric response to a conventional attack. The fact is, Iran has plenty enough conventional capabilities to deter an Israeli nuclear attack, but lacks—for now—the strike capability to threaten the CONUS with a nuclear attack (unlike North Korea). This is just another reason why it makes no sense for Iran to go nuclear—at this point in time.

OK. Here are summaries of the overnight activities. BTW, this probably explains the heavy USAF activity in the area yesterday—preparation for the unsuccessful attempt to exfiltrate the tankers.

MenchOsint @MenchOsint

As suggested yesterday, the US unsuccessfully tried to escort Oil Tankers through the Strait of Hormuz, risking the lives of the mariners for media victories.

Overnight, 4 oil tankers guided by the US Air Force, without coordination with the IRGC Navy, attempted to exit the Strait of Hormuz.

One of the tankers was hit and stopped, and the other vessels turned back.

Then at 2h30, US drones hit a telecommunications mast in Qeshm and a radar in Sirik with two projectiles.

In response, IRGC targeted Ali al-Salem air base in Kuwait and the the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet in Bahrain with Ballistic Missiles.

MenchOsint

@MenchOsint

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14h

US forces say they shot down 4 Iranian kamikaze drones and struck radar site on Qeshm island.

Most likely due to US quiet escort of oil tankers accompanied by dozens of fighter jets. x.com/CENTCOM/status…

Regarding the US use of drones in the region, the US is facing critical shortages of these platforms:

Will Schryver @imetatronink

16h

The USAF had 231 operational MQ-9 Reaper drones at the beginning of fiscal year 2025.

The inventory stood at 135 as of mid-May 2026.

The Iranians have added to the tally since then.

Tyler Rogoway @Aviation_Intel

USAF Scrambling To Buy What Few MQ-9 Reapers It Can Find After Epic Fury Losses

The USAF needs to scrounge-up any now out of production Reapers to replace the dozens lost in fights against Iran and the Houthis.

Now, a note on USN activity in the region. This happens to be another area in which I disagree with Larry Johnson. LJ has been making much lately of Iran “shooting at” USN ships and, as I understood him yesterday, is associating such boldness with the supposed possession by Iran of what would amount to a nuclear umbrella. I have long believed that Iran has the capability, if it chooses, to not only “shoot at” USN ships but to also hit them. My view has been that Iran has refrained from that step to avoid escalation beyond what it desires—at this point in time. My view remains that Iran is NOT “shooting at” but missing USN ships. It’s firing warning shots to chase those ships away—and succeeding in doing so. In other words, this is another example of Iran maintaining control over escalation. More:

Will Schryver @imetatronink

21h

Earlier today, the US Navy pushed a pair of destroyers into the northern reaches of the Sea of Oman. Once again, the Iranians bracketed them with drone and missile strikes, and both ships quickly withdrew.

Will Schryver @imetatronink

The IRGC is always careful to specify that it “targeted” such and such US warships.

I believe the Iranians, up until now, have been painting shots outside the bullseye, for effect. After all, the US ships always — without exception — turn back after getting “targeted”.

Matt Bracken @Matt_Bracken48

17h

Iran is, IMHO, by naming the two ships, trying to avoid USN casualties that might provide casus belli for an escalation above their own plans.

Naming the ships they could have hit is a pitcher saying, “Okay, buddy, next one is by your chin. So step on back out of the batter’s box, or the next one hits your head, maybe.

MoA has a highly recommended explanation of what’s going on here:

War On Iran: – Iran Needs Escalation To Avoid The Ceasefire Trap

A typical U.S. tactic against a strategic target is to ‘boil the frog’ by slowly increasing the temperature of the water it is sitting it. The conflict in Ukraine is an good example for this. Hits against Russia, directed by the CIA, are escalated bit by bit while Russia is reluctant to more severe deterrence measures.

The current war on Iran is another example. The U.S. is insisting on a ceasefire while trying to erode Iran’s leverage with economic strangulation.

Iran’s major weapon, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, will need another month or two to fully unfold its intended effect on the U.S. and global economy. Meanwhile the U.S. is trying to tire Iran with fake diplomacy, economic measures (its blockade) and pinpoint strikes.

But Iran is well aware of this tactic. It has decided to avoid this ceasefire trap by continuous escalation:

The United States and Israel are using this [ceasefire] period to reshape realities on the ground, weaken Iran’s leverage, and arrive at a negotiating table where Tehran’s position has already been quietly eroded. This perception is strengthening those within the Islamic Republic who argue that diplomatic restraint, under current conditions, carries its own strategic costs.
…
The delay in finalizing the memorandum of understanding is increasingly interpreted as purposive rather than procedural and as a U.S. attempt to use the passage of time as a strategic instrument. The concern is that each week of ceasefire, with American military and economic pressure continuing unabated and Iranian restraint producing no reciprocal concessions, represents a net erosion of the position Tehran believes it secured during the forty days of active fighting.

Iran has decided to respond to this ‘boiling-the-frog’ tactic by increasing the cost for even the slightest U.S. attack. It is no longer responding in kind. Each U.S. strike is answered by hitting back stronger and against more targets. As Rob Campbell provides of the skirmish of June 2:

…

All of which is to say that the day may come when Iran will make a serious effort to sink a USN ship—not just shoo it away.

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On to Israeli espionage against the US. The Pentagon has raised the threat level to “critical”, the highest level. FWIW, in my past experience the Israeli espionage operation against America was always rated as highly aggressive and dangerous. Israel is a hostile foreign power in the eyes of all intel professionals who aren’t Jewish Nationalists:

The Tectonic @thetect0nic

   The Pentagon has raised the counterintelligence threat level regarding Israel to the highest category, according to multiple U.S. officials. The Defense Intelligence Agency made the assessment in recent weeks, concluding that Israeli espionage efforts against the United States have become significantly more aggressive than usual.

IOW, they’re usually aggressive, but now they’re unusually aggressive.

The move reflects growing concern inside the Pentagon that Israel is actively trying to collect information on internal U.S. decision-making, particularly regarding the war with Iran and the Trump administration’s plans going forward. Officials described the assessment as a formal internal document that includes specific incidents which heightened suspicions. While it is common for allies to spy on each other to varying degrees, the current level of Israeli activity was seen as going beyond what is considered normal or acceptable.

… Israeli officials are particularly interested in understanding whether the United States intends to resume large-scale operations against Iran or shift toward a negotiated settlement. The heightened espionage activity appears aimed at closing that information gap.

…

The decision to elevate the threat level is notable because it formalizes a long-standing reality. Israel has historically maintained an aggressive intelligence posture toward the United States, as seen in past cases such as the Jonathan Pollard espionage affair in the 1980s. What appears to have changed is the intensity of the activity at a time when Washington and Tel Aviv are not fully aligned on strategy in the Middle East.

…

Closely related. Brandon Weichert offered some interesting observations on Bannon’s War Room. We’ve spoken about the Jewish Nationalist attempt to merge the US military into the Israeli military in the House bill section 624, but it seems the Senate version also attempts to merge the entire Intel Community into the Mossad:

Grace Chong, MBI @gc22gc

20h

WEICHERT: Section 622 would codify intel sharing with Israel into law and limit a president’s ability to restrict access in the future.

The Israelis and Zionists in Congress are fearful that eventually future politicians from either party could change the relationship.

Bannon: I understand why merging the militaries is a horrible idea--it’s the reason why they took a voice vote, ... but what is the issue on intelligence? How would this be any worse than the Mossad running the CIA right now?

Weichert: It enhances that control--let’s put it that way--by codifying it into law. Right now, our relationship with the Israeli intelligence services is mostly transactional--at least officially. We don’t share everything with them the way that we share with those Five Eyes countries--we pick and choose. Under the new law that’s being pushed, Section 622 in the Senate, basically, it would open a floodgate of intelligence and information into the Israeli intelligence services, whether they ask for that intelligence or not. Right now they have to ask for it, technically. Then, also, what this will do, it hems in future presidents. Right now the US - Israeli intelligence sharing partnership is controlled by a given president. So, if a president wants to restrict more access he can easily do so. Eventually, if this law passes, the president no longer has that freedom of movement. Now, you and I discussed last time, there is a groundswell of people in both parties, younger people, who are at least skeptical of our alliance with Israel in its current form. I think the Israelis and the Zionists in Congress are fearful that eventually future politicians will try to [crosstalk]. They’re trying to hem in the president’s freedom of authority on this.

Weichert also had some interesting thoughts on offer about how the AI data center craze plays into the goal of a total surveillance state—which, of course, Israel would have access to under the proposed legislation:

Grace Chong, MBI @gc22gc

WEICHERT: Data centers aren’t just about AI. They’re really about providing greater bandwidth to the surveillance state.

The NSA has been trying to use AI and other tools to create a digital electronic profile of every single American.

It is the greatest violation of the Fourth Amendment in American history.

We should get rid of it. I just don’t know if Congress is willing to do that.