Crooke vs. McGovern; Yemen's Missile Targeting Of Israel

Today is a busy day, so I’ll combine two topics.

First, I want to highly recommend Alastair Crooke’s usual Monday discussion with Judge Nap. While not billed as such, the video clearly features Crooke pushing back strongly against McGovern’s goofball claims that the Russians regarded the US attack on its strategic bomber fleet and their airbases as “no biggy”. Instead, in McGovern’s view, the Russians were all worked up about the Ukrainian terror attacks on two trains, which inflicted sad but relatively minor casualties. This thinking flies in the face of logic, statements by high Russian officials, and Putin’s call to Trump in which Putin specifically demanded clarification regarding Trump’s role in the US attack on Russia’s nuclear triad.

Crooke does an excellent job in refuting McGovern’s misguided argument, according to which Trump and Witkoff are inexorably leading us to peace with Russia. Instead, Crooke persuasively presents the case that these attacks were reckless escalations that reflect an almost complete failure to truly understand the Russian position. Included in the video are clips of noted nut Keith Kellogg and Trump openly suggesting that the attack on Russia’s nuclear triad was intended to “pressure” or “force” Putin into concessions leading to a halt in the SMO via a ceasefire. The Russians have consistently and forcefully rejected the idea of calling a halt to their military actions because that would only provide a respite during which NATO could attempt to recover from its defeat and delay a total Russian victory. Here’s the link:

Alastair Crooke: Moscow's Silence/Moscow's Threats.

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I—and, I assume, many readers—have wondered about the thinking behind the Yemeni missile strikes on Israel. What are they intended to accomplish, given that most of the missiles are either intercepted or miss the targets? Last night I came across an 11 minute video that explains both the technology involved in the Yemeni missiles that have been used to target Israel, as well as the thinking behind the missile strikes. While the technical details are interesting, the military - strategic thinking is very important, as it helps to explain the regional geopolitical dynamics.

Below, I include a partial transcript as well as the video. Here’s a summary.

The video explains that, while Iran—which has developed the technology behind these missiles—has developed the Ghadr missile, which is able to reach Israel with a heavy payload, the Ghadr missile has not been employed by Yemen in its strikes. My own understanding is that liquid fueled missiles like the Ghadr are somewhat cumbersome and time consuming to launch. Instead, less capable solid fueled missiles have been employed by Yemen. These missiles which can be brought out of hiding and launched quickly.

The video explains the development process of these solid fueled missiles, originating from short range (300 km) Soviet Scud missiles to the current types of missiles that can now reach central Israel, including the Tel Aviv and Jerusalem regions. The increase in range was achieved by a number of techniques, including lightening of the warheads. As explained, there are drawbacks to this method, including a decrease in stability (which degrades accuracy) as well as a redesign of the reentry vehicle, which can lead to making the missile more susceptible to interception. So what’s the point?

The point is that the regular missile strikes force Israel to maintain its scarce and high cost radar sensors in a constantly active state and oriented southward toward Yemen. This is significant because the radar sensors are then oriented away from Iran—they are not capable of orientation over that broad a directional range. The constantly active state runs down the sensors, which must be replaced more frequently at significant cost.

These considerations are what lay behind Israel’s appeal to Trump to attack Yemen. However, Trump’s war on Yemen led to a startling consequence. The initial result was a stalemate of sorts—the US bombed Yemen while Yemen continued its missile strikes at Israel. But then the US and Israel attempted to escalate by striking directly at Iran via sabotage attacks. The reaction was swift. Yemen launched a missile that was both more accurate as well as carrying a more powerful warhead than any previously seen missiles—it narrowly missed the main terminal at Ben Gurien Airport, creating a large crater. The strike was carried out in broad daylight and evaded all multi layer Israeli and US defenses. Within hours Trump called off his war on Yemen. That’s where matters now stand. Yemen has reverted to strikes with less capable missiles which, nevertheless, have a degrading effect on Israeli missile defenses.

Here is the video, followed by the partial transcript:

The topic of this video is Yemen's campaign of ballistic missile strikes against Israel and the strategic effects. We look at the specific ballistic missile models employed by Yemen's Ansarallah and analyze why these sporadic strikes—though frequently intercepted by Israel's missile defenses—nonetheless achieve Yemen's broader objectives …

… Only around a dozen nations worldwide—primarily major powers—possess ballistic missiles or missiles in general with such reach. This range alone marks an exceptional capability. But the nature of the weapons themselves further underscores the threat they pose.

While one-way attack drones and subsonic longrange cruise missiles can be countered by relatively common air defense systems, ballistic missiles with their supersonic to hypersonic terminal velocities demand highly sophisticated layered missile defense systems. Such systems are deployed at scale by only a handful of countries, with Israel fielding the most concentrated ballistic missile defenses in the world. Thus Yemen strikes are extraordinary not only for their range but also because they target a nation with unparalleled defensive capabilities. The origins of Ansurula's ballistic missile capabilities of such performance trace back to Iran and its decadesl long investment in missile research and production.

During a Yemeni military parade in 2023 Ansarallah showcased for the first time a missile capable of reaching Israel—the Iranian-designed Ghadr a medium-range liquid propellant ballistic missile designated Tufan in Yemen service. This large missile boasts significant destructive potential and a dedicated video linked above explores the Ghadr in detail. However the Ghadr has played no role in strikes on Israel thus far as it has not yet been used operationally by the time of this video's making.

When Yemen ballistic missiles first reached Israel following the outbreak of the Gaza war in 2023 questions emerged about the specific missile type used. The answer was a modified variant of Iran's Rezvan missile, designated Zulfagar in Yemen. The Rezvan's origins date to the Soviet era R17 Scud B missile, which had a maximum range of 300 km. As detailed in the video linked above Iran spent years enhancing the Rezvan's range to approximately 1,400 km through extensive engineering efforts. ...

Reducing a ballistic missile's warhead weight is notoriously challenging as it disrupts the center of gravity and stability. However in response to Israeli actions in Gaza, Iran's and Yemen's engineers halved the Rezvan's warhead from an estimated 300 kg to 150 kg. This adaptation enabled strikes on southern Israel using the cost-effective Rezvan platform, which is believed to cost under $100,000 per unit. Yet the modification came at a cost. The lighter warhead reduced the destructive potential while the altered re-entry vehicle design reduced its ballistic coefficient, a critical factor in maintaining stability and accuracy during terminal descent. This metric determines the rate at which the hypersonic re-entry vehicle slows upon atmospheric entry. Faster deceleration makes the vehicle more vulnerable to interception by Israel's ballistic missile defenses such as the Arrow2 and Arrow3.

While the Rezvan modification's reduced ballistic coefficient also degraded its accuracy, its primary strategic impact lay elsewhere, compelling Israel to maintain its scarce highcost radar sensors in a constant active state oriented southward toward Yemen and often spending several missile interceptors on a single incoming target. This sustained alert posture has two critical consequences:

• First, it limits Israel's ability to monitor threats from the east--namely Iran--as sector search phased array radars operate within a fixed 90 to 120° arc with diminished effectiveness at the edges of their coverage.

• Second, prolonged radar operation accelerates wear on transmitter receiver modules necessitating more frequent replacements and straining the sensor network.

Then in early 2024 Yemen introduced a second missile system against Israel Iran's Kheybar-Shekan-2 Aeroballistic missile designated as Palestine 2 in Yemen service Though this solid propellant missile covered in detail via the linked video above has a nominal range of 1,800 km by mid 2024 it began striking central Israel at ranges of about 2,150 km 350 km beyond its official capability. ...

The Kheybar Shekan 2 variant further optimized this capability with an improved glider design featuring higher lift to drag ratio and leveraging advanced skip glide trajectory techniques to stretch its range to 1,800 km likely paired with a modest warhead weight reduction ... The unexpected distance strikes on central Israel were enabled by another warhead reduction mirroring the Rezvan modification approach. However this adjustment again degraded the ballistic coefficient and destructive power. If the Kheybar-Shekan-2's glider manages to evade interceptors despite its increased deceleration and reduced velocity its guided glider could still deliver the lighter warhead with relative precision.

Unlike the unguided Rezvan modification this creates ambiguity for Israeli missile defenses. Incoming re-entry vehicles could either be guided Kheybar Shekan 2 gliders or unguided low precision Rezvan re-entry vehicles. Consequently Israeli systems may be forced to launch multiple interceptors to ensure coverage against both possibilities, with the empty booster stages just adding to the approaching targets on the radar screen. Both lowcost modified missiles, however, suffer from reduced ballistic coefficients and slower terminal velocities, simplifying interception compared to their standard variants.

Then, in late 2024 another Rezvan modification emerged, capable of striking central Israel at 2,150 km, a staggering achievement for a platform rooted in the 300 km range Soviet R17 Scud B. Engineers apparently achieved this by integrating a smaller 100 kg re-entry vehicle, which includes composite material which maintained a ballistic coefficient comparable to the earlier 1,650 km range variant. This modification effectively introduced another inexpensive decoy missile deployable alongside the Kheybar-Shekan-2 variant to compel Israeli defenses protecting central Israel to engage every incoming threat due to the risk of encountering a guided Kheybar Shekan-2 glider. Consistent with Ansarallah's military concept this strategy employs staged escalation -- a calculated approach where adversaries are deterred from unconstrained escalation by Yemen's retained capacity to escalate a step further. This principle likely explains why the heavy Ghadr missile unveiled prior to the Gaza war remained in reserve throughout the conflict.

Though Yemen paused missile strikes in late 2024, hostilities resumed after Israel broke the ceasefire in spring 2025. At Israel's urging the United States under the renewed Trump administration initiated a military campaign against Yemen to break its naval blockade against Israel and halt missile launches targeting Israel. Shortly after that, Israel is suspected of having started covert sabotage operations inside Iran. However just mere days after these suspicious accidents in Iran, Yemen launched a single missile in broad daylight despite ongoing US air strikes and surveillance which successfully penetrated multiple layers of US and Israeli missile defenses. The missile struck just 300 m from Ben Gurien airport's terminal, Israel's primary air hub. Notably, multiple independent missile defense systems failed simultaneously to intercept it and the resulting crater far exceeded the destructive effects of the 100 to 300 kg warheads used in Kheybar Shakan 2 and Rezvan modifications. This suggested the deployment of a previously unknown missile type.

Whether coincidental or not, alleged covert Israeli operations in Iran ceased abruptly after this strike and the US campaign against Yemen also halted within hours. The statistical improbability of these events being unrelated combined with the missiles penetration of layered missile defenses, the unusually large crater and the sudden deescalation strongly implies Yemen--likely with Iranian support--escalated by fielding a new missile. Iran's F1 hypersonic ballistic missile aligns closely with the observed capability profile. Link to a dedicated video on it above.

In summary Yemen's campaign employs a lowcost high impact saturation strategy against Israel. Israel lacks effective counter measures beyond periodic retaliatory strikes on Yemen civilian infrastructure. The threat to Ben Gurien airport coupled with sporadic attacks using Kheybar Shekan-2 and Rezvan long-range modifications inflicts psychological and economic strain on Israel. Moreover the diversion of Israeli missile defenses weakens preparedness for a potential future Iranian missile attack. Together these actions and their results define the strategic objectives of Yemen's ballistic missile campaign. And in some ways it can be said that Iran successfully outsourced missile strikes on Israel.