There are a few reports this morning that may shed light on the method by which Aleksandr Dugin’s daughter, Daria Dugina, was assassinated in a sabotaged car belonging to her father. As we stated yesterday, while Dugina was a vociferous supporter of her father’s views, most official sources assume that the true target was Dugin himself—who, apparently, was traveling in a car behind the one Dugina was traveling. The best sources say that the bomb was attached to the bottom of Dugin’s vehicle. Whether the bomb was detonated remotely, without identification of the actual occupant, or whether a decision was made to use the bomb on a secondary but identified target, is unclear.
At any rate, Moon of Alabama published this account via Russians With Attitude:
Please note this assertion: “Vovk and her daughter … left for Estonia via Pskov.”
The points above appear to be a translation of material that is presented via auto-translation at The Saker. Again, note the reference to Estonia and the conviction that Ukraine’s SBU was behind the assassinatin:
The FSB confirms: Dariia Dugina was murdered by the SBU
(Machine translation)
The FSB reported on the identification of the customers and perpetrators of the murder of Daria Dugina.
The murder was planned by the Ukrainian special services.
The direct perpetrator of the murder was a citizen of Ukraine Natalia Vovk, born in 1979, who left Russia for Estonia on August 21. She arrived in Russia on July 23.It is also reported that:
1. Vovk and her daughter Sofya Shaban rented an apartment in the house where Daria Dugina lived in Moscow.
2. A “Mini Cooper” was used to spy on Daria Dugina. The numbers were changed three times on it — the license plates of the DPR, Kazakhstan and Ukraine were usedAs reported, Daria’s car was blown up using a remote detonation of an IED with a capacity of 400 grams of TNT.
The car was driven from the parking lot to the explosion site. The suspects’ phones have disappeared from the network.The investigation continues.
…
According to Russian sources, Natalia Vovk is now hiding in Estonia, and EU and NATO member state.
The significance of the references to Estonia is as follows.
The escape of the perpetrators through Pskov to Estonia was clearly planned. The distance from Moscow to Pskov is 378 miles. That translates to a driving time of about 6-1/2 hours at a speed of 70 mph. From Pskov to Narva—the easternmost major border city of Estonia with Russia, is an additional 150 miles by land. I specify by land, because I assume air travel between Russia and Estonia is restricted or ended by the sanctions. I will make the assumption that the perpetrators sought to place as much distance between themselves and the crime scene in as short a time as possible, and therefore would have pre-arranged air travel to Pskov, saving hours of travel time, but then would have had to continue by land.
The Russian FSB appears quite confident that the perpetrators crossed into Estonia, but that almost certainly means that the Estonian border authorities were alerted to allow these travelers into Estonia—or that the perpetrators had travel documents that would allow entry to Estonia under tense circumstances. This strongly suggests the cooperation of professional intelligence services in their escape plan.
I doubt that Estonia took the assassination upon itself, but agreed to cooperate with the escape—or …
Estonia may have given MI6 more or less free reign or direction over its own security services. That or close cooperation has been established. The UK has a significant presence in Estonia, and has had for months—the UK military presence in Estonia, small as it may seem, dwarfs Estonia’s own “military”. For example. And where the UK military goes, they are sure to be accompanied by UK intelligence, both military and civilian. I therefore suspect that there is a subtext to the FSB statements, above, which point out this Estonian angle. While the FSB directly states the responsibility of Ukraine’s SBU, they surely understand that the SBU doesn’t have unrestricted ability to operate covertly in Estonia. The references to Estonia, for intelligence professionals, are probably hints at MI6 involvement. It’s probably not a question of proof at this point, but it is a logical inference that will not have been lost on the FSB.
Exactly what this will lead to is difficult to say. However, Estonia and the UK has taken a major step that will have consequences at some point.
On sober consideration, I conclude that the likeliest explanation for the Dugin hit is some sort of organized crime. The various Western three letter agencies had no plausible motive, and their track record of successful operations inside Russia is nearly nonexistent. I have heard it suggested that this was a false flag attack by Putin in order to have a pretext to escalate the war. I reject this also because claims of "false flag" are invariably put forward by the tinfoil hat brigade. I will add, though, that this claim has two virtues. It at least posits a rational motive and because it makes a testable prediction it is falsifiable.
BIsmarck once said "I could not have invented Boulanger but he happened very conveniently for me." Putin will milk the Dugin killing for propaganda value, but I doubt very much that he or his various Western and Ukrainian enemies actually did it. Organized crime is a real problem in Russia, and seems to me the likeliest explanation for this killing.
Mark, thank you for your always interesting posts. A couple of my own thoughts to add to it:
a) As you have pointed out elsewhere, Dugin is something of a crank with a talent for self-promotion. Dugina, on the other hand, is reputed to be a member of the Moscow establishment with ties to European politics. This suggests she was the target, perhaps in an effort to bring the war to the Moscow establishment.
b) If the Moscow establishment is being targeted, that is a dramatic escalation, and Moscow has a very obvious potential response, ie to respond in kind. Although questions remain about some alleged Russian assassinations abroad, others (eg Litvinenko in 2006) do seem to be Russia's work. In fact, that response is so obvious it must have been considered by the (presumably) intelligence agency which carried out the attack. And if Moscow starts targeting Western elites in Western countries, an escalation of direct Western involvement in the war seems inevitable.
c) So, if b is correct, cui bono? Ukraine obviously does. Zelenskyy has complained repeatedly about limited Western involvement in the war, and Ukraine has recently been escalating its tactics, eg attacks on Crimea. The EU also benefits: as you and Tom Luongo have pointed out, the EU needs this conflict to retain its power base, and perhaps to survive. The difficulty with the EU is that it does not have intelligence services of its own, but it could have either quietly suggested the attack to Ukraine as a means to force greater Western involvement, or worked through a member state's security service. Estonia's would appear to have some involvement, and other East European states might welcome a chance to punch Russia. The US and UK also could benefit from Russian attacks on their own soil as a means to gain political support for troops on the ground in Ukraine. However, despite a history of false flag attacks aimed at gaining political support for war, the US and UK have no history of inviting attacks on their own establishment, and have many other escalation options. So that looks less likely.
d) There is also the possibility the attack was a Russian false flag operation. In favor of this, the FSB is believed to have tight control over Moscow, Russia has a history of false flag attacks (including alleged terrorist attacks within Russia), and Dugina reputedly was disliked by the Russian state. Against this, an attack on a member of the Moscow establishment would be a huge risk for Putin, who desperately needs their support, and the war is already well supported within Russia (although there may not be as much support for escalating the war). It will be interesting to see if Russia responds to the attack by carrying out assassinations of foreign elites - if they do, a Russian false flag looks very unlikely. But if they don't, a Russian false flag looks a lot more plausible.
e) The facts are at this point too unclear to draw strong conclusions, but Russia's reaction is likely to clarify what's really happening.