While the world is focused on the dramatic events in the Middle East, there are other noteworthy events going on. We’ve taken a look at the Armenia - Azerbaijan situation a few times, and now there’s been a development that raises interesting possibilities for the future.
Recall that, in addition to the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan has been aggrieved over difficult access to the Azerbaijani territory of Nakhchivan:
Azerbaijan and Turkey were demanding a corridor through Armenia that would join the two Turkic nations, as well as leading across the Caspian Sea to Turkic areas of Central Asia. Russia and Iran have, up to the present, been protecting Armenia. Iran, in addition to being a traditional ally of Armenia, is concerned that such a corridor would potentially block northward trade routes from Iranian use. The big development—which is being reported in a variety of media sites, but I’m using an Iranian one—is that Iran is offering what amounts to a corridor through its own territory, and that Turkey and Azerbaijan are amenable to the arrangement:
Erdogan: Azerbaijan-Nakhchivan corridor can pass through Iran
Tehran, IRNA -- Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has welcomed Iran's proposal regarding the so-called Zangezur corridor connecting Azerbaijan to Armenia, saying the corridor can pass through Iran in the event Armenia does not allow it to pass through its territory.
"We are doing our best to open the Zangezur corridor. There are also positive signals from Iran. If Armenia prevents the opening of the Zangezur corridor, it is possible for the corridor to pass through Iran," Erdogan said on Tuesday, a day after his visit to Azerbaijan's autonomous Nakhchivan exclave, the IRNA reported on Wednesday.
As I remarked previously, I’d bet that Erdogan is no more interested in a NATO/EU presence in Armenia that Russia or Iran are, so it’s enlightening to see him playing nice in this way. Especially in light of the aerial conflicts with the US during the past week. Erdogan was attacking US allies who are fighting against Iranian proxies. Strange bedfellows, except that seems to be what Erdogan’s foreign policy is all about.
Of course the loser in all this is Armenia. They were urged by the EU to accede to Azerbaijani demands and now find themselves surrounded by countries that have no use for them—or are outright hostile. This became very apparent at the EU conference in Granada this past week. Armenia’s Pashinyan showed up, having been told that Turkey and Azerbaijan would be there to discuss a final peace. But Turkey and Azerbaijan didn’t show—why should they, when they’d already got what they wanted? So Armenia, having snubbed loyal allies in Russia and Iran, learns the hard way that the support of the collective West doesn’t amount to much.
Speaking of the EU meeting in Granada, Zelesnky was there—and he couldn’t have been terribly thrilled with the word he received:
EU Says It Can't Support Ukraine Without The United States
Authored by Dave DeCamp via AntiWar.com,
The EU’s top diplomat on Thursday said the European bloc could not provide Ukraine with enough support without the US amid uncertainty about when Congress might authorize the next tranche of spending on the proxy war.
"Europe cannot fill the gap of the US," Josep Borrell said after arriving in Spain for a gathering of European leaders, according to POLITICO.
That’s especially bad news because Zelensky knows that US aid is very much up in the air. That’s doubly true given events in the Middle East, but Simplicius has some very interesting information about the Congressional process that will be involved, and it’s worth quoting at some length. A new aid package could be a real uphill struggle:
U.S. House of Reps Meltdown Puts Ukraine's Future in Jeopardy
Now the major problem is that there are only a handful of calendar days left for House of Reps sessions this year, and experts believe this is not enough time to create any further aid packages for Ukraine, which would mean there cannot be any aid at all until well into next year. This will be a moot point anyway if an anti-Ukraine Speaker takes charge, particularly because of the Hastert rule, which allows a Republican House Speaker to not bring up any bills for voting unless a majority of their party agree with it. The rule works as follows, as per Wiki:
In the House, 218 votes are needed to pass a bill; if 200 Democrats are the minority and 235 Republicans are the majority, the Hastert Rule would not allow 200 Democrats and 100 Republicans together to pass a bill, because 100 Republican votes is short of a majority of the majority party, so the Speaker would not allow a vote to take place.
In short, since Republicans are a current majority in the House, a majority of Republicans would have to agree on a Ukraine funding bill in order for that to even be proposed for voting in the House. And depending on whose poll you use, the majority of Republicans seem to not support Ukraine any longer.
Yesterday Biden hinted at having another trick up his sleeve to potentially get funding, but this seems like a canard or face-saving tactic. His bag of tricks in reality is running low.
It’s difficult to imagine a brand new House speaker deciding to flip off his own party about a week after getting the gavel. Not after what happened to McCarthy. Things are looking rather dicey.
Russia is proposing a naval base in Abkhazia, while Georgia sees it as an aggression toward it's territorial integrity.
Seems like the US is preparing a Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey axis to overwhelm Russia in the Caucuses. The link is necessary to give Azerbaijan a land conduit. I think they’ll go through Armenia anyway.
OT: If I recall there was some debate here a few days ago about Jeffrey Sachs' role in the transformation of the Russian economy under Boris Yeltsin, including whether he is culpable for the initially disastrous outcome. I believe Mark pointed out that Alex Krainer largely absolves Sachs of blame. For anyone interested in this issue (because it does impact Sachs' credibility as an opponent of today's proxy war against Russia), here is a link to Sachs' own assessment of his involvement:
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5d59c0bdfff8290001f869d1/t/5ed7d8e248deea6dbee5d577/1591204091062/Sachs+%282012%29_What+I+did+in+Russia.pdf