Are We Seeing Results Of The Tectonic Shift In Geopolitics In Syria?

Most readers should be aware of recent events in Syria—the missile attacks on US occupation bases by forces with access to Iranian weapons systems. While initial reports were that US casualties were somewhat limited. More recent reports are that at least 23 contractors/soldiers suffered “traumatic brain injuries”. Again, initially, the US response was to launch airstrikes against various targets. But then the dynamics seem to shift, as the NYT reported on 3/27:

Biden Officials Hold Off on More Airstrikes in Syria, for Now

The administration says it is seeking to avoid a wider war with Iran and its proxies while protecting U.S. personnel from attacks.

To understand the dynamics here, you need to know what was behind the hostile missile strikes on US bases. The reporting I’ve seen is that the Iranian or Iranian backed strikes were responses to the US allowing Israeli overflights of the al Tanf base—on their way to attack Iranian related targets in Syria. One assumes—I’m certainly one who does so assume—that, whoever launched the missiles, the missile strikes happened after Iran consulted with Russia. Just basic coordination. Which leads to some interesting speculation:

Would the US be “holding off” but for the presence of Iran—but, more especially, Russia—in the Syrian background? The NYT only quotes “the Zhou regime’s desire to to avoid a wider war with Iran and its proxies,” but who can seriously doubt that the Russia angle was part of the “holding off” decision?

Does “holding off” also include denying Israel overflight permission for al Tanf? My understanding of “holding off” is it would work like this: Iran signals that Israeli overflights of al Tanf will result in Iranian bombardment of al Tanf. The US thought it could respond with air strikes, but that didn’t work—the air strikes didn’t lead Iran to back off. But “holding off” can only work if the US backs off from doing something that seriously angered Iran. That should mean a change in overflight permissions. That’s pretty big.

This “holding off” strongly indicates real limitations on US power projection that are a new factor to take into account. That’s the take of Simplicius, whose long post today is where I came up with the NYT article. Simplicius ties this into Ukraine:

It’s akin to a child finding out Santa Clause isn’t real. Akin to a teenager’s painful realization that his dad isn’t the toughest dad on the block, and that a friend’s dad might in fact be able to kick his ass. That the U.S. isn’t all powerful, isn’t completely in control of the situation, isn’t able to guarantee their victory, and—most shockingly—isn’t able to fully stand up to Russia, is an extremely difficult and painful pill to swallow for Ukraine supporters.

One day, when they realize that for over an entire year, everything they’ve been told was a lie, that they’ve been fed nothing but phony propaganda about Russia and its putative ‘weakness’, and conversely, U.S. and its putative ‘strength’. When that house of cards comes down, there will be a collective psychic undoing on the Ukraine-supporter side that will be awe-inspiring to witness.

All of this also needs to be taken into account along with the Azeri provocations against Armenia. The Neocons needing to back off in Syria doesn’t necessarily mean the US will stop its campaigns of geopolitical provocations (probably including Sudan, now). However, it does mean that a lot has changed geopolitically, including the fear level that the US is able to generate, since the Neocons launched their war on Russia. That foolish decision is having repercussions around the world, changing the calculus of decision making in ways that are difficult to predict. Neocon Grand Strategery theories can’t change this new reality.