About The Ukrainian Offensive--What Offensive?

By now, at this point in Russia’s Special Military Operation, it should be clear that Russia is in control of the action. Putin, as he almost always is, was extremely clear about the objectives—chief of which for our purposes is “de-militarization” of Ukraine. On the other hand, the Russians are typically tight lipped about their military operations, revealing little and engaging in disinformation to conceal their true objectives. That leaves outsiders in the position of trying to understand Russia’s actions, sifting through limited reporting from Russia and vast amounts of unreliable, slanted, or outright propagandistic screeds. The UK media is probably the most aggressive purveying outright propaganda and disinformation. However, sifting through Russian media sources isn’t easy, either. There are certainly schools of Russian opinion that gravitate toward various overall tendencies: 1) Russia is being betrayed at the top by incompetents and pussy-footers—Russia should end it all tomorrow; 2) general doomsaying.

My view regarding this business of a sort of Third Wave offensive by a third Ukrainian Army equipped largely with NATO castoffs and limited munitions is that I agree with the few Western military professionals who are willing to speak out bluntly. We’ve been seeing more and more of that in recent weeks, but the consensus is, beyond a doubt, that the fundamentals of military operation all militate against Ukraine being in any position to launch anything that resembles a true offensive. Rather, as one Polish general stated recently, they will only be able to engage in limited tactical activities.

That being the case, I see no point in dwelling on the squabbling that’s been ongoing for weeks, now, over the direction and likely success of an offensive that is unlikely to actually materialize. However, I’ve come up with a number of links to the views of informed observers who have proven reliable over the course of the conflict.

First, Bernard at MoA provides a good overview of the prospects for any “offensive”, and begins by, essentially, pointing out that Ukraine has no good choices—that Russia is dictating everything that happens in the bigger scheme of things:

Ukraine SitRep: Delayed Counteroffensive, Russian Defense Lines, Weapon Efficiency

Two weeks ago the Biden administration had recognized that the announced Ukrainian 'counteroffensive' will fail to make much progress.

The operation has still not started and Zelensky has moved its launch further into the future:

…

Time will not prevent that any counteroffensive will lead to high casualty rates. In fact, waiting longer means more attacks on the troops in their current positions. Any detected agglomeration of forces or material is already coming under long range Russian missile fire.

No good choices. Not from a military standpoint. For the rest, Bernard provides what seems to me to be a trenchant critique of the scenario builders. My view is that the professional Ukrainian military is recoiling from killing off more Ukrainians pointlessly and, so, is delaying. Judge for yourselves.

Big Serge, in four tweets, provides a quick overview of what we’ve seen of Ukrainian offensive action. It falls in line with what he’s been predicting:

Big Serge

@witte_sergei

Ukrainian forces launched local counterattacks around Bakhmut designed to push Russia's advanced positions on the flanks and unblock the roads. The fighting currently ongoing there is of a tactical nature, designed to support the ongoing AFU defenses in the area.

4:46 PM · May 11, 2023

There's no indication that Ukraine's posture is shifting or that they are beginning their anticipated counteroffensive in earnest. The forces and material being used around Bakhmut don't support this idea.

The fact that the AFU counterattacked to unblock the roads to Chasiv Yar at this stage in the game possibly indicates an intention to pull out the remaining personnel in Bakhmut. They may be ready at last to abandon the city.

I noted on several occasions that the situation was such that any withdrawal would require supporting counterattacks from outside the city; this may be what we witnessed yesterday.

It makes good sense to me, but it’s still speculative. I would add that limited pullbacks to more easily defensible positions is nothing new for the Russians. Russian tactics throughout this conflict—contrary to Western propaganda about “human wave” tactics—have consistently looked to limit their own casualties while inflicting maximum casualties on the Ukrainians.

Will Schryver reposts today an article from January regarding the doom mongering tendency in Russian life:

Ok, Doomer

Legendary Russian fatalism may be alive and well, but it will be ashamed of its doubts in the end.

The first paragraph sets the theme:

I have struggled in vain for almost a year now to comprehend the frequently expressed fears of potential defeat from a great many Russian observers of this war – as though they are constantly haunted by a sense that inevitable humiliation is lurking in the shadows just ahead, and they’d best prepare themselves accordingly.

He then goes on to argue for all the very real factors that work strongly against such doom mongering, concluding:

But in the context of the ongoing NATO / Russia war in Ukraine, I submit that Russia will prevail primarily because its military might and leadership are manifestly superior; its strength and capabilities are greater now than they were a year ago, and are growing month by month; its understanding of the rapidly evolving realities of 21st century warfare has been greatly educated by the events of the preceding year – and, not to be underestimated, I am convinced it will be supported to an ever-increasing degree by China and Iran, both of whom now clearly understand that their existential fortunes are inextricably bound to Russia’s ultimate triumph in the present contest of arms.

From the perspective of this author and observer of events, and notwithstanding the fatalistic and often fearful inclinations of many who call themselves Russians, Russia simply cannot and will not be defeated in this war. …

As I argued yesterday, the correctness of Will’s view is more manifest now, several months after he wrote this piece. I believe we are seeing a more openly confident and assertive Russia, due in no small part not only to military success but also to its string of major diplomatic successes and the faltering resolve of the collective West, which is more apparent with virtually every passing day. Today’s example:

The Spectator Index

@spectatorindex

BREAKING: The Wall Street Journal reports that Egypt ignored requests from the United States to close Egyptian airspace to Russian military flights

8:14 AM · May 12, 2023

Lastly, Andrei Martyanov rants against the same types of doom mongerers—including those who do it for profit. Yes, just as in the West, in Russia there are people who can’t get enough doomsaying and will even pay for it.

How Many Times To Repeat...

In particular Martyanov warns against trusting most Telegram channels, citing the Russian MoD:

The Russian Defense Ministry has denied rumors of a large-scale Ukrainian counterattack, noting in a statement late on Thursday that the situation along most of the frontline appeared to be relatively calm, with the only heavy fighting in and near Artyomovsk, also known as Bakhmut. “Reports by certain Telegram channels of ‘breaches of defenses’ in several places along the line of contact are not accurate,” the ministry said around 11 pm Moscow time. “The general situation in the area of the special military operation is under control.” According to the Russian military, the last remaining part of Artyomovsk was being stormed with air force and artillery support, while there was an “ongoing battle” to repel the attack of Ukrainian units in the direction of Malo-Ilyinkovka, northwest of the city, with “heavy enemy casualties in lives and equipment.”

This is not to say that anyone should place implicit trust in official statements. However, the reality is that even in this age of social media everywhere, operators of Telegram channels are unlikely to have better information. Martyanov goes on to cite some examples of doom mongering and disinformation, such as the nonsensical claims that a Kinzhal hypersonic missile had been downed by a Patriot missile supporting the Ukrainian AD—a claim that was convincingly denied … by the Ukrainian military.

Bottom line: We shall see. But the fundamentals haven’t changed and, over time, have shifted ever more strongly in Russia’s favor and against the collective West. I would even argue that Russia taking its time on the battlefield (while aggressively waging its diplomatic geopolitical war) is a sign of confidence. A sign of weakness would have been succumbing to the calls for a quick victory—charging forward against well prepared defenses. Taking their time shows confidence that victory is inevitable and that the overall situation will not shift to the West before victory is achieved.