A Bit More On Iran's Escalation Intentions

I’ve been maintaining for some time that I believe Iran intends to escalate—not recklessly, but persistently. My reasoning has been that backing off, accepting some sort of settlement, will only work to the Anglo-Zionists’ advantage and will do nothing to advance Iran’s goals—which are existential. The Anglo-Zionist presence will always be an existential threat to Iran because Anglo-Zionism is inherently an expansionist ideology intent upon domination in any relationship. My most recent stab at this was yesterday: To Escalate Or Not--And Who Will Do It?. But late last night I came across a new article that articulates a similar view, and I always find alternate articulations helpful.

Surprise strikes signal Iran is digging in for a long war

As hopes for a peace deal with the US fade, Tehran appears to be preparing to fight through the end of Trump’s presidency

HADI KAHALZADEH

AUG 06, 2026

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Hadi Kahalzadeh is a non-resident fellow at the Quincy Institute and a research fellow at the Center for Global Development and Sustainability at Brandeis University. As a welfare economist, he served as a research fellow at the Crown Center for Middle East Studies from 2017 to 2025, where he studied the political economy of U.S.–Iran policy and the social welfare effects of economic sanctions across Iran and the broader Middle East and North Africa.

Where I disagree with the author is that he appears to believe that Iran is fighting for a fair global settlement. My belief is that, while Iran might settle for a fair temporary settlement in certain circumstances, Iran’s leadership believes that a major war is inevitable—for the reasons stated above. The current situation is favorable to Iran and therefore, as Alastair Crooke argued to Danny Davis this morning, Iran isn’t trying to avoid that major war. I agree, but stipulate that Iran is approaching this renewed war step by step, rather than precipitously.

I like the way Kahalzadeh presents that. He argues that Iran has come to view ceasefires and the MOU as benefiting the Anglo-Zionists—giving them an opportunity to rearm and refit—more than Iran. For that reason Iran’s best course, perhaps its only course, is to re-engage in war. But in a carefully calculated way.

He begins by presenting a view similar to Brandon Weichert’s, which we examined yesterday—Iran is overreaching.

In recent weeks, Iran has gone on the offensive, striking commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz and launching a surprise attack on U.S. forces in Jordan. From a distance, these moves look like self-defeating escalation. Why should a badly damaged state, under severe economic pressure, lash out at the U.S. instead of pushing for a ceasefire?

Note what Kahalzadeh is talking about here. Iran is moving beyond simply escalated retaliation to strikes that are initiated by the Anglo-Zionists. Iran has switched to the offensive—Iran is, itself, now initiating strikes in carefully calibrated ways.

The answer, simply put, is that Iran is digging in for a long war. ..., Tehran increasingly interprets sanctions, negotiations, temporary ceasefires and military strikes as different instruments aimed at a single objective: regime change.

Kahalzadeh puts this in the context of the Trump regime. He appears to believe that Iran could go for a settlement as described above after Trump leaves office. I would disagree. My belief is that the current Iranian leadership correctly sees the current war as the result of a decades long process that spanned both Dem and GOP regimes in America. For that reason I believe Iran is determined to seek victory in the current war—but with the realization that time is on its side. Iran expects that a new American regime will follow the path of hostility, regardless of the party in power. Rather than relying solely on its missile forces for victory, the economic aspect will play a major role, and that will take time. But the clear goal is to win before Trump leaves office.

Iran’s experience of failed negotiations with the U.S. before the two major airstrikes in 2025 and 2026 intensified this new perception. In Tehran’s view, a comprehensive agreement with the Trump administration is virtually unachievable. [For various reasons--domestic politics, Israel, Trump’s own psychology]

...

Altogether, [US violations of the MOU, especially regarding economic matters] deepened the suspicion that the United States had paused its attacks in order to rebuild its defenses, update its military targets, bring oil prices down, and manage domestic grievances before returning to war. ...

In Iran, a fragile MoU with no clear economic benefit was seen as a one-sided pause ...

...

..., the leadership in Tehran came to believe that the relative benefits of waiting flowed overwhelmingly in favor of the United States and Israel. In particular, as long as Washington controlled the tempo of the war and decided when the war began, paused, and resumed, Tehran would lack agency.

Here we come to what I consider to be the key paragraph. Note that while Kahalzadeh characterizes the Iranian strategy as “active deterrence,” he also sees it as designed to “break the deadlock”—to seek victory.

Seeking to break the deadlock, Tehran has thus adopted a strategy of managed confrontation, a form of active deterrence to raise the cost for the United States. Such a confrontation is limited enough to avoid full-scale war but would still increase political pressure on the Trump administration. Even limited attacks can disrupt the U.S. military’s focus, spread out its forces, engage its defensive systems, and force it to spend more on defensive operations than on preparing for a resumption of the war.

At the same time, Tehran could keep negotiation channels open and demonstrate its desire for diplomatic solutions.

Iran’s economic experience reinforces a confidence that Iran can win this gamble. Iran has absorbed enormous damage without collapsing. ... In contrast, a fragile MoU without economic benefits, combined with high uncertainty, will not ease the war’s economic burdens but will lower the cost [to the US] of a new U.S. attack. As such, a controlled confrontation is more worthwhile.

And lastly, Kahalzadeh brings up the reasons why Iran will not be in a hurry, even as it actively seeks victory. It’s called Hormuz.

Iran’s military and geographic leverage over the Strait of Hormuz helps the country raise the costs of war in a way that could exhaust Trump, perhaps forcing him to abandon the confrontation and change his Iran policy. The pressure is growing: ...