It’s a thing! It came to Ukraine, the question is: Where next?
John Helmer, via Naked Capitalism, has a shrewd guess:
The Helmer portion was originally published here:
No Russian military source will publicly express the line that Iran’s attack on Israel of April 14 was a strategic success, despite the tactical shortcomings. This is first of all because Iran is a strategic ally of Russia in its war against the US and NATO in the Ukraine, in Syria, and in Yemen.
It is also because of what may happen next. If Israel escalates by attacking Iran and striking at the country’s infrastructure, then Iran’s counter will be to take a page out of Russia’s book and commence the one line of attack which Israel, the US and their allies cannot withstand any better than Ukraine – that’s Electric War.
There’s a lot of interest here, but the key part is when Helmer quotes “a NATO veteran and expert”:
A NATO veteran and expert in applying electrical engineering to war comments: “Honestly, I don’t believe the Iranian strikes were all that effective in terms of damage done. This being said, again, they weren’t meant to be. They mostly used drones and older missiles with a few of the newer models thrown in to test, and send a message.”
“The problem for the Iranians, and anyone else in the region taking on the Israelis, is that they are facing a military machine backed by a US money printing machine propped up by a largely indifferent population. On top of that, the relative cost to the Iranians of maintaining the burn rate necessary to stifle the joint air U.S./Israeli/flunky coalition is prohibitive. Other actors will have to join in the strikes, or feed in the ammunition, for this to be a successful strategy. Past the above, if the Iranians turn to electric war strikes, things will look a lot different.”
He is repeating what the Israelis began admitting publicly last week. “A war scenario with Hezbollah presented last week by the head of the Ministry of Defense’s National Emergency Management Authority (NEMA), Brigadier General Yoram Laredo, sparked widespread concern about the level of preparedness for such an event within the energy sector. Despite the fact that state bodies should have been well-prepared long ago for such an event, mudslinging, budgetary problems, and lack of coordination and communication are rampant between various organizations. This bears great significance especially in recent days which have been marked by an unprecedented alertness over the first possible direct military clash with Iran, which has threatened to retaliate for assassinations of senior members of the Revolutionary Guards attributed to Israel.”
Source: https://www.calcalistech.com/
There’s lots more. Helmer concludes with a lengthy quote from an Israeli report put out by the Ministry of Defense’s National Emergency Management Authority (NEMA). The fundamental problem is that Israel is not in a position to protect all of the following at the same time: military infrastructure, energy infrastructure, and cities.
The report concluded that Israel cannot afford to do both. “There is a need to create a parallel response of active protection for both the population and the critical infrastructure installations, such as essential electricity installations that are highly vulnerable to kinetic weapons. A consideration of the need for reasonable active defense for IDF bases, particularly for IAF airfields, makes it apparent that there is no alternative other than to increase the number of anti-missile batteries significantly and prepare for their operational deployment during emergencies, so as to provide adequate defense for the infrastructure installations within the range of these batteries as well.”
“To protect the functional continuity of the state and the capability of the IDF to maintain an ongoing offensive effort until victory has been achieved implies the protection of power stations and IAF bases before the protection of the large cities. It is possible that in the future we will be able to protect both, but currently, with the number of batteries and interceptor missiles at our disposal, we have to designate an order of priorities for the deployment of our assets. We have to make a difficult, painful, and clear-cut decision.”
That was seven years ago – the Israelis were taking no account of the development by the Iranians of drone decoys and hypersonic missiles, and of the impossibility of defending against their combination.